

## HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, Bingaman, Kaufman, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; and Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R. Knowles, and Christine G. Lang.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Great Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

Today, the Armed Services Committee will hear from James Miller, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kevin Chilton, Commander of the United States Strategic Command; Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; and Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator of

the National Nuclear Security Administration. The topic this morning is the recently released Nuclear Posture Review.

This is the third Nuclear Posture Review since 1994, and the first to be completely unclassified. I commend each of our witnesses this morning for working to achieve that result. An unclassified Nuclear Posture Review should allow discussions on the role and the future of nuclear weapons to be held publicly, which will help to demystify an often technically complex subject.

As the Senate considers the New START Treaty, open discussions on nuclear weapons policy will help assure the American people that ratification of this new treaty will strengthen U.S. national security and enhance U.S. nonproliferation goals.

There are five key objectives of the new Nuclear Posture Review: first, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. national security strategy; third, maintaining strategic deterrents and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth, strengthening regional deterrents, and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and, fifth, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

This new Nuclear Posture Review allows for continued reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, and also lays the foundation for substantial future reductions in the total nuclear weapons stockpile. Having fewer nuclear weapons reduces the danger that these weapons and nuclear materials might fall into the wrong hands. Preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism and maintaining a strong deterrent are both important parts of nuclear policy and this Nuclear Posture Review.

In addition to the commitment for modern nuclear weapons complex needed to maintain an even smaller total stockpile, this Nuclear Posture Review makes other significant decisions. It will eliminate nuclear Tomahawks and would finally implement a decision from the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the removal of multiple warheads from land-based ICBMs. This Nuclear Posture Review will also change the way the U.S. thinks about nuclear weapons, by reducing their role in U.S. policy. It will strengthen nonproliferation and take a broader, more balanced approach to deterrence. It affirms that the United States will not return to nuclear testing, in that there is no technical need and no military requirement for a new nuclear weapon. It also recognizes that supporting our non-nuclear allies and partners is an important element of regional security, and strengthens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some think that this Nuclear Posture Review does not go far enough down the road to zero, while others think the reductions are too dramatic, and the policies, unrealistic.

These are the topics that we'll discuss and debate in the coming months as the Senate considers the New START Treaty and, hopefully, at some not-too-distant point, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Just last week, this committee held a hearing on Iran, where we discussed that government's refusal to give up its nuclear program, in defiance of its international obligations. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, demonstrated its nu-

clear weapons capability, and fails to live up to its commitments in the Six-Party Talks.

Intelligence assessments tell us that terrorists continue to seek nuclear materials and technologies, and would most likely use a nuclear device if they had one. But, with 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia must lead in the direction of zero. This Nuclear Posture Review is the roadmap for the United States to move in that direction, which is not only sound policy, but one required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which we're a party.

Senator McCain.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN**

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our witnesses for their service to our country and for joining us today to discuss this very important issue.

This month has seen some significant changes to our Nation's nuclear policy. And today's hearing on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, is the first of a number of important upcoming opportunities to assess and review the current and future role of our nuclear deterrent. I look forward to engaging with our witnesses today and addressing some of the concerns that appear to arise from this NPR.

This year's review appropriately reiterates the widely acknowledged need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, to pursue a sound stockpile management program, to modernize our aging nuclear facilities, and to invest in human capital. Unfortunately, the NPR seems to limit, inappropriately, the ability of our nuclear complex to ensure the highest level of safety, security, and reliability.

In their analysis of the stockpile, the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission recommended that a full spectrum of options be available for stockpile modernization. The Commission recommended that life-extension programs be, quote, "guided by the principle of finding the optimum approach for each unique weapon." The NPR appears to constrain the ability of our scientists to utilize the full range of options by asserting that refurbishment and reuse techniques are the methods of choice for life extension. Instead, we should not rule out any stockpile modernization options that are achievable, including replacement, which may be the best option, in some cases.

Another concern raised by this NPR is its change to our Nation's longstanding nuclear declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity, which has been embraced by past administrations on a bipartisan basis. This declaratory policy has successfully and effectively deterred aggressors by preserving the use of all options in response to an attack on the United States or our allies. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission advocated maintaining this declaratory policy as a, quote, "critical element for reinforcing restraint and caution on the part of a potential aggressor." This administration has now overturned that policy, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses why they believe that less ambiguity, as proposed by the President, will be as, or more, effective than the previous policy, and how this makes us safer.

Another concern stems from the assumption made in the NPR that the development of conventional capabilities, such as Prompt Global Strike, will lead to the reduction of the role that nuclear weapons play in our deterrence posture. To be sure, conventional weapons can augment or support our deterrence posture, but they are no substitute for nuclear weapons. Again, I look forward to the witnesses' explanation for why this planning assumption was made and why it's effective.

I'm also significantly concerned that no one has yet addressed the overall affordability of the course set out in this NPR. The cost, alone, for modernizing both the nuclear weapons complex and the triad is substantial; and as we move to reduce our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important.

Factoring in the cost of missile defense and prompt global strike, both essential and critical, but also costly programs, the overall budget outlook becomes daunting. I look forward to discussing the notion of affordability, both in the near term and the long term, and further exploring how committed this administration is to resourcing these costly, albeit essential, modernization and development efforts.

Finally, I would just reiterate that the key test of our Nation's credibility on nuclear issues is not whether, or how much, we reduce our nuclear arsenal, but whether we meet the nuclear proliferation threats posed by regimes like Iran and North Korea.

I agree with the NPR's conclusion that the two primary threats to international security are nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, when it comes to Iran and North Korea, this administration has little to show for 15 months of effort. Meeting the proliferation threats posed by rogue states like these must be our top priority as we determine our nuclear posture and work to shore up the global nonproliferation regime. Otherwise, all of all our efforts to reduce our nuclear arsenal, as well as our reliance on it, will be for naught.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

And I think the witness list, we will follow, here. We'll start with Secretary Miller—Dr. Miller.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL UNDER  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Dr. MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It's a pleasure to join my esteemed colleagues in discussing U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities, and to have worked with them closely throughout the Nuclear Posture Review.

The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President's Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Because we recognize that this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines specific steps needed to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as

nuclear weapons exist. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests from the Departments of Defense and Energy and State are important installments in this long-term effort.

The 2010 NPR identified the most urgent nuclear dangers today as nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and has outlined a comprehensive approach to deal with these challenges that includes policy initiatives and increased investments in a number of areas.

And as the Chairman noted, more broadly, the NPR identified five key areas and five key objectives for U.S. nuclear policy. First—and it is a top priority—preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Second, reducing the role and numbers of—excuse me—reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our National security strategy. Third, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels. Fifth, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners—pardon me—fourth. And, fifth, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I will not summarize all of its conclusions, but will focus my remarks on declaratory policy and on plans for nuclear and conventional forces.

The 2010 NPR aims to make clear to other countries the benefits of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and the potential consequences of not doing so. It strengthens the U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT by stating that, and I'll quote, "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations," end quote.

A bit of historical context is useful, here. The United States first offered a "Negative Security Assurance" associated with the NPT not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states in 1978. This pledge was reiterated by subsequent administrations in 1995 and in 2002. This NPR includes a critical change in this assurance. Unlike previous pledges, the revised assurance stipulates that a state must not only be a party to the NPT, but that it must be in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This is a determination that will be made by the United States.

For non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, which include the vast majority of countries in the world, the United States is reiterating and clarifying its longstanding pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

At the same time, the NPR is clear that if any such non-nuclear-weapon states were to make the grave error of attacking the United States or allies and partners with chemical or biological weapons, it would face a devastating conventional military response and their leadership would be held fully accountable. This pledge is backed by the most formidable military in the world, and the administration is committed to not only sustaining, but strengthening, our conventional military power.

The NPR also makes clear that states that do not meet their nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran, are not covered by this Negative Security Assurance. For these noncompliant states, and for nuclear-weapon states such as Russia and

China, U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring, not only nuclear attack, but also conventional or chemical and biological attack against the United States or our allies and partners.

These clear declaratory statements strengthen our nonproliferation efforts and reinforce our ability to deter potential adversaries with precise and credible statements, backed by the full strength of the U.S. military.

One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued throughout the review, was to define positions for the New START negotiations, including appropriate limits on delivery vehicles and on nuclear warheads, and the DOD NPR team reached the following conclusions:

First, the United States should retain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and dual-capable heavy bombers under New START.

Second, as the Chairman noted, all U.S. ICBMs should be “deMIRVed” to a single warhead each, in order to reinforce strategic stability.

Third, an ability to upload nondeployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, and preference should be given to bombers and strategic submarines over ICBMs for upload.

The administration will provide additional details on plans for U.S. Strategic Forces under New START soon, when we submit a report required by Congress, under Section 1251 of the 2010 Defense Authorization Act, associated with submission of the treaty for advice and consent of the Senate.

The NPR also concluded that the United States should retain the ability to provide extended deterrence to allies and partners.

First, we’ll retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and dual-capable heavy bombers.

Second, we propose to proceed with full scope life-extension study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb, to ensure that first production can occur in 2017.

Third, we will retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, or TLAM-N, as a redundant capability.

Fourth, we’ll continue our extensive consultations with allies and partners to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrence.

And, finally, decisions about the future of NATO nuclear weapons will be made through NATO processes, and not unilateral decisions. That consultative process is now underway.

I’d like to say just a couple of words about long-range strike capabilities, and then conclude.

Today, the United States has a wide range of non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities, including conventional-only and dual-capable heavy bombers in both sea-launched and air-launched conventional cruise missiles. Of these systems, only dual-capable heavy bombers are accountable under the New START Treaty. The NPR concluded that the U.S. should also develop non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities, and should focus such capabilities on regional threats, while not undermining strategic stability, vis-a-vis Russia and China. And, as you know, conventional prompt

global strike capabilities are allowed under the New START Treaty.

In closing, a key premise of the 2010 NPR was that reducing nuclear dangers to the United States, including sustaining effective deterrence, is a long-term challenge that will require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations and Congresses. Laying the groundwork for a sustainable bipartisan consensus was, and is, a central purpose of this NPR.

I'd ask that my prepared statement be entered into the record, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. All these statements will be made part of the record.

Next, General Chilton.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER,  
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

General CHILTON. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. And it's a pleasure to join my distinguished colleagues here, in this panel.

United States Strategic Command was closely consulted throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review and during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, and I look forward to discussing them with you today.

I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in support of both of these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha, and their diligence, expertise, and tireless work continues to ensure our ability to deliver global security for America.

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different from the one we faced in the cold war. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and strengthen USSTRATCOM's ability to conduct our deterrence mission.

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command-and-control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security Administration's aging infrastructure.

America's triad of diverse and complementary delivery system provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships' end of life; and to study future long-range bomber capabilities.

It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-scope non-nuclear, and, importantly, nuclear, life extension of the B-61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life-extension options for the W-78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting warhead for sea-launched ballistic missiles, and thereby reducing the number of warhead types.

Additionally, the NPR and the President's budget recognize the need to improve the Nation's nuclear infrastructure and address the challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and sustainment. These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is absolutely fundamental to nuclear deterrence.

Investments that revitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure and intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and the people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical changes, and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. The administration's request for a 13-percent increase in NNSA funding for fiscal year 2011 is an essential first step in this process.

With regard to New START, the nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear capabilities, at STRATCOM we are keenly aware of how force posture and readiness changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability. The New START agreement, in my view, retains the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the treaty.

In support of the New START negotiation effort, U.S. Strategic Command analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance, and provided options for considerations by the Department. This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon reductions in New START and recommendations in the NPR.

In closing, every day U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on providing the President, and future presidents, with the options and flexibility needed for deterrence. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective; our forces are trained and ready; and the Command is faithfully and fully carrying out its mission, each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to deliver global security for America, today and in the future.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this committee, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Chilton.

Secretary Tauscher, it's always great to see you back in a congressional setting. It just warms, really, literally, my heart to see

you here, and we hope you're in—you're happy in your relatively new home; I guess it's not so new anymore to you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, it's been almost a year, Senator. But, thank you very much, Chairman Levin. It's an honor to be back here.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Tauscher.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

Ms. TAUSCHER. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the State Department's role in protecting the United States and our allies from today's most pressing threats. I am honored to appear today with my distinguished colleagues.

Last year, President Obama outlined several steps to strengthen our National security by reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons. In the past months we have advanced that agenda by releasing the Nuclear Posture Review, signing the New START Treaty, and hosting the Nuclear Security Summit. Let me say a few words about the New START Treaty and missile defenses.

I spent much of March in Geneva, to help conclude the New START Treaty. It will enhance our security by reducing and limiting the United States and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Those limits were guided by rigorous analysis in the Nuclear Posture Review.

The new treaty will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability. And it will advance our non-proliferation agenda by demonstrating that we are meeting our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

The New START Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. The United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the United States homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.

Russia's unilateral statement on missile defenses is not legally binding. It won't constrain United States missile defense programs. As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our budget plans make clear, we will deploy the most effective missile defenses possible, and the New START Treaty does not impose any additional cost or inconvenience to those efforts.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask permission to submit, for the record, the United States and Russian unilateral statements on missile defenses associated with the New START Treaty.

Chairman LEVIN. That will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, sir.

In addition to reaffirming our commitment to missile defenses, the Nuclear Posture Review also supports the goal of bolstering nonproliferation. We want to give more incentive to non-nuclear states not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons. So, we updated our Negative Security Assurance to make it clear that non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT who comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations do not have to fear a United States nuclear attack.

I want to clarify what this new negative assurance does, and does not, do. For non-nuclear-weapon states to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation commitments, we are removing only the possibility of nuclear retaliation. For such states, we retain the prospect of using devastating conventional force to deter and respond to any aggression, especially if they were to use chemical or biological weapons. No one should doubt our resolve to hold accountable those responsible for such aggression, whether those giving the orders or carrying them out.

Deterrence depends on the credibility of response. A massive and potential conventional response to non-nuclear aggression is highly credible. We also Reserve the right to readjust the Negative Security Assurance, if warranted, by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons and their threat. The updated Negative Security Assurance does not alter our current policy on the use of nuclear weapons toward nuclear-armed states or non-nuclear-weapon states not in compliance with the NPT and their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran. In other words, for this group of states, we have retained calculated ambiguity.

But, I want to stress that the NPR states that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

Nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 65 years. The bar for their use is high, and this NPR recognizes that fact. It is in the United States interest, and that of all other nations, that for—the long record of nuclear non- use be extended forever.

Let me close by noting that former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and Jim Schlesinger, the leaders of the Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, wrote, recently, that the NPR approach on declaratory policy was sensible. They concluded that the NPR provides a comprehensive and pragmatic plan for reducing nuclear risk to the United States.

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCain, I look forward to working with this committee and the Senate on these important matters, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tauscher follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Secretary Tauscher.

And now, Administrator D'Agostino.

**STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I'm very pleased to appear before you today with such a distinguished panel as my colleagues here, General Chilton, The Honorable Ellen Tauscher, and Dr. Jim Miller. My remarks will focus on the Department of Energy's equities included in the Nuclear Posture Review.

The National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, is actively engaged in direct support of the first NPR objective, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The most important steps we can take to keep terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear device or radiological “dirty bomb” is to prevent them from acquiring nuclear material. This job is not new to the NNSA. We have led this effort, over several years, and now we are accelerating and broadening the scope of these efforts.

Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials, technology, and expertise, including the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; disposing of excess U.S. and international fissile materials; strengthening the international safeguard system by developing new safeguards, technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships; developing an active nuclear and radiological security dialogue and cooperation with key domestic and international partners; and, developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear material detection technologies.

The NNSA is also actively engaged in direct support of the fifth NPR objective: sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. For more than 65 years, our program has been able to do just that; assure the Nation that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective, and meeting the nuclear deterrent needs of the United States.

To that end, the United States will not conduct underground nuclear testing; we will not develop new nuclear warheads for new missions; we will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear warheads, on a case-by-case basis.

Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the ongoing life-extension program for the W76 submarine-based warhead, and the full-scope life-extension study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb. We will participate with the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well, on a new study of life-extension options for the W-78 ICBM warhead.

The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital; the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who carry out our stockpile management work and support other vital nuclear security missions. To that end, the NNSA will strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base, including supporting computational and experimental capabilities needed for conducted weapon-system life extensions, the weapon surety work, certification without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile weapon surveillance.

The NNSA will also fund two key research—or, two key facility projects, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, for work on plutonium to replace the existing 58-year-old facility, and a Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

The NPR also sustains the strategic triad. This drives the recent Department of Defense decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarines, the most survivable leg of our Nation’s deterrent, are reaching the end of their operational life. In support of the NPR, the Naval Reactors Program will continue reactor plant design and development efforts

for the procurement of long-lead reactor plant components, in support of Navy procurement of the first *Ohio*-class submarine replacement.

Responsible stockpile management requires not only the supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the deterrent and to support the President's nuclear security agenda.

The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining the human capital needed in the NNSA for the nuclear security missions. In order to succeed in these missions, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals, because our highly specialized workforce is our greatest asset.

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear issues for our National security and of keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective for the foreseeable future. The administration's commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile, and its comprehensive nuclear security agenda, ensures the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities.

I want to share with the committee a statement from our National Laboratory directors that provides their view on the NPR. The directors universally state that, and I quote, "We believe the approach outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life- extension options, provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk. We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical infrastructure comprised of the National Security Laboratories, and a complex of supporting facilities, and a highly capable workforce," close quote.

This Nuclear Posture Review is an important step towards adopting a 21st-century approach to nuclear weapons and a broader array of nuclear security issues. This path forward will require a long-term commitment to provide the support and the resources necessary to sustain our deterrent and enable future arms reductions.

Finally, our approach towards maintaining the stockpile described in the NPR is wholly consistent with, and was informed by, the Stockpile Management Program principles passed into law through the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.

With the committee's endorsement, the nuclear security enterprise will have the science, technology, and engineering expertise to manage the stockpile and to also carry out the full range of nuclear security missions, which include nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and nuclear forensics, among other activities.

Secretary Chu recently stated that the Department of Energy must discover and deliver those solutions to advance our National priorities. The NNSA and our nuclear security enterprise are poised to provide these solutions.

I'll be pleased to respond to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Agostino.

Let's try a 8-minute first round.

And I want to thank Senator Ben Nelson, by the way, for taking over at around 10:30, when I have to leave. Very much appreciate that, Senator Nelson.

General, let me start with you. You indicated, in your testimony, that the Strategic Command was a full participant in the Nuclear Posture Review process, and that you're satisfied with the outcome. When the Strategic Command performed the analysis to support the NPR, you also, I think, said that the force structure decisions were based on existing nuclear guidance, which has existed since 2008. And if I understand that statement correctly, you're implying that the force structure in the Nuclear Posture Review is more than enough to meet future requirements, because, in part, it meets current requirements. Is that correct? Do I have that straight?

General CHILTON. Senator, as we got into the year—the last-year time period, and realization, with the NPR being due, the Quadrennial Defense Review being due, START expiring, we knew we needed to kind of fix the playing field on how we could proceed forward on this. And Dr. Miller can add to this, as well. So, one of the things that we decided we needed to fix, as we went forward with START negotiations, in particular, was what we were going to base our negotiating strategy on—that was our question, was, What guidance should we assume is applicable to this? And it was decided, rather than work through, which is normally a year-long process to develop new strategies and guidance, we would just fix that for our analysis of the force structure for the START negotiations. And so, that's how we moved forward.

So, that is the context of my statement, there, is that—it was how—more about how we went forward. And, yes, I am comfortable with the force structure we have. I believe it is adequate for the mission that we've been given, and is consistent with NPR.

The only assumptions we had to make with regard to the new NPR, which was, of course, in development, in parallel, at the time, was that there would be no request for increase in forces. And there was also an assumption, that I think is valid, and that is that the Russians, in the post-negotiation time period, would be compliant with the treaty, should they ratify that, and that we would, too. Those were really our going-in positions.

Chairman LEVIN. During the cold war, the force structure was based largely on the number of targets and the certainty required to hold those targets at risk, and to eliminate the targets. Without a specific adversary, I understand that the philosophy has changed so that the force structure is based on the capabilities to address types of targets rather than specific targets. If that is accurate, that change in philosophy provides you—I—does it provide you with the confidence that you can go to lower levels and still meet any new nuclear guidance policy?

General CHILTON. Chairman, a couple of points. One, parity was a driving factor, at one point during the cold war, which is why we still have continuous growth in stockpiles back and forth between Russia and—I'm sorry - -the Soviet Union and the United States,

at the time. And, it wasn't so much driven by specific targets as it was how big your force structure was. We've steered away from that, for sure.

One thing that is similar is that what Strategic Command—then SAC, in the cold war—was told to plan against were types of categories of targets, and then they would—the Command would plan against and present the results of that efforts up for approval. That process is pretty much still in place. Again, we're not told specifically what to do. We're told categories, as you described, for our deterrence, and then we develop a plan, and then push that forward for Secretary of Defense approval.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask both Dr. Miller and you, General Chilton, the Nuclear Posture Review does not identify how the 800 strategic nuclear systems are going to be allocated amongst the legs of the triad—the 800 coming from the New START Treaty. What's the process for determining how many bombers—nuclear-capable bombers, how many submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and how many land-based intercontinental missiles are going to be in the force structure? When—let me start with you, Dr. Miller—when's this process going to be completed?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, this process began during the Nuclear Posture Review, and we looked at a wide range of alternative force structures. It will be completed shortly, as we provide the Section 1251 report to Congress. Along with that, we'll provide a recommended baseline force structure.

Chairman LEVIN. And when is that?

Dr. MILLER. It will be provided, sir, with the submission of the New START Treaty, hopefully in the next several weeks.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Dr. MILLER. The—if I could add, the treaty provides and allows the freedom to mix, for both sides, their strategic forces, under these limits; so, our intention would be to provide a baseline plan, understanding that it could be modified later, if there were a challenge with one leg of the triad or another.

And, Mr. Chairman, if I could add very briefly, with respect to the question of guidance, during the NPR we looked at a very wide range of scenarios—possible nuclear scenarios—and found that the force structure and the numbers that had become part of the New START Treaty provided a very robust capability across that wide range. We are in the process of reviewing and revising classified guidance, and are confident that this force structure will provide more than enough capability for that revised guidance.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree with that, General?

General CHILTON. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

Secretary Tauscher, one of the key objectives of the Nuclear Posture Review is to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Now, the review conference for that treaty is going to be held in May, with a commitment to support the regional allies and partners, as this NPR does, with the reductions in deployed nuclear forces, and increased emphasis on nonproliferation. Do you believe that the NPR will have a positive effect on the review conference?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do. As you know, the President has made the Non-Proliferation Treaty a central pillar in

his nonproliferation agenda, and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, both through the review conference and ongoing efforts, is a very important opportunity. Both the Negative Security Assurance in the NPR, which makes very clear the exemption for non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with the NPT obligations. This, once again, not only makes clear what our position is on the exemption, but it also strengthens the Non-Proliferation Treaty and countries' ascension to it and adherence to it. What it says is that, if you are a member of the NPT, and are clearly in compliance, then you have this exemption.

So, I think that the President's agenda, when it comes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review, is one—because it's a consensus-driven exercise, for over a month in New York at the U.N., with hundreds of countries coming—are many different parts of this that we want to work collaboratively. But, at the same time, it's not just the review conference, but an ongoing effort, working with key partners, to make sure that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is strengthened, and that there is great adherence to it.

Chairman LEVIN. And there's also commitments, are there not, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to—for the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear inventories? Is that not correct?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, sir. That's Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There are three pillars to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: peaceful uses, disarmament, and nonproliferation. We believe, in the United States, certainly with the New START Treaty and other efforts that we have made unilaterally, that we have made a strong commitment to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. You won't be surprised to find out that not everyone believes that, but we strongly assert that we—certainly with Russia, going down to 90 percent of the weapons in the world—that we're working very seriously, as we maintain a very strong, safe, and effective stockpile.

Chairman LEVIN. And if we expect others to maintain their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is important, won't you agree, that we keep our commitments, as well, relative to reductions?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, as usual, Mr. Chairman, issues like Iran, which is a significant challenge for us, and has been for various administrations, the Iranians' lack of commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their abuse of U.N. Security Council resolutions causes us to look for arrows in our quiver that will remind people of these obligations. And certainly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best example we have of Iranian noncompliance.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Miller, a lot of us have been very unhappy about the fact that there is no cohesive—or, coherent policy towards the Iranian nuclear buildup and their inexorable movement towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, which is the view of all intelligence agencies throughout the world. Yesterday's hearing on Iran, Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright said, in direct response to questions, that all options regarding Iran were, quote, "on the table."

Yesterday, in Singapore, Secretary Flournoy said, and I quote, "Military force is an option of last resort," Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy said during a press briefing in Singapore, quote, "It's off the table in the near term." Now, which is it? Which is it, Dr. Miller? And, is it off the table for the near term, as Secretary Flournoy says, in direct contradiction to her testimony before this committee? Or—and what is "the near term," if it's off the table in the near term? Do you think the American people have a right to know that?

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, I had the opportunity to talk to Under Secretary Flournoy yesterday, and I have not seen a transcript, nor has she, to confirm which is the case. But, she was either misquoted or misspoke; this administration's policy, as Under Secretary Flournoy said before, is that all options are on the table.

This administration has also made clear that the strong preference is to work through diplomatic channels, and now as we move to the so-called "pressure track," to apply sanctions to Iran so that they will change their policy.

But I will, again, state for the record, and for the—on behalf of the administration, that all options are on the table, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. So, now we're treated to our Under Secretary of Defense for Policy going to Singapore and saying, quote, "It's off the table in the near term." No wonder—no wonder—our friends are dispirited and our enemies are encouraged.

Secretary Tauscher, why did the decision made concerning the elimination of the nuclear option in cases of nations that are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty—what was the rationale behind that reversal of what has been a national policy of deliberate ambiguity since the cold war began?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator McCain, I don't think it's a reversal. I think what it is, is an articulation of the reality of the 21st century. What we have—

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me, it's not a reversal of the previous policy of ambiguity concerning what the United States action would be, in case of attacks on the United States and our allies?

Ms. TAUSCHER. With all due respect, Senator, I don't know how you reverse ambiguity. Ambiguity is what it is, it means that you were not specific—

Senator MCCAIN. Oh no, ambiguity was clearly a policy, Madam Secretary. It was clearly a policy so that our enemies would not be clear as to what actions we would take in case of attacks. That—

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator, you're making my point.

Senator McCain:—that is a policy, Secretary Tauscher. And if you allege that it's not, then we might as well move on to the next question.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator, you're making my point for me.

Senator MCCAIN. Pardon me?

Ms. TAUSCHER. You're making my point for me; we were not clear. We were not clear to countries, that—

Senator MCCAIN. And now we are clear.

Ms. TAUSCHER.—we would never use nuclear weapons against, that we would not use nuclear weapons against them. That's what this policy says. This policy says that, for non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with their Non-Proliferation Treaty

obligations, they are not going to be—we're not going to either threaten or use nuclear weapons against them.

Senator MCCAIN. And that's not a change in our policy.

Ms. TAUSCHER. It is an articulation of our policy. It is moving our policy to a more clear point of view. It is more clear than ambiguity. Yes, that's right.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, could I perhaps add, briefly—

Senator MCCAIN. I'll be glad to.

That's one of the more bizarre statements I've ever heard made before this committee.

Go ahead.

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, the United States first made a Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT in 1978, and that's by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. That statement said that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that were party to the NPT.

Same pledge was made in 1995, and again in 2002 by subsequent administrations, so that—this Negative Security Assurance is not new. What the change is—in the Nuclear Posture Review—is that we've added the condition that a state must also be compliant with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So, we've added a condition. In order to get into that group, that is provided an assurance that the United States will not use nuclear weapons, we've added a condition, under the old assurance, that Iran, today, would be provided that assurance; under the new assurance it is not.

Sir, the other part of that—I think you were refer to it as “calculated ambiguity”—at various points in time in the past, the United States has hinted that nuclear weapons might be used in response to chemical or biological weapons, even if by a non-nuclear-weapon states. Our view was that the credibility and capability of our deterrence posture is the determinative factor, in that—both with respect to non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states or noncompliant states, that a clear posture that makes—that distinguishes between those two was likely to be more effective for deterrence.

Senator MCCAIN. I guess that's in the eye of the beholder, Dr. Miller.

So, let's have this scenario. There's a biological and chemical attack—or chemical attack—on the United States of America, inflicting a great deal of devastation on the United States of America, and we know who did it. So, then the decision is made as to whether we consider the use of nuclear weapons to be directly and—guided by and dictated by whether that nation is in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the policy would be—the policy would be that the use of nuclear weapons would be contemplated if that state were either a nuclear-weapon state, or a state that was not compliant with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

Senator MCCAIN. So, this—a massive attack on the United States. We decide whether nuclear weapons are used, not—will be used—not because that might be the best way to respond or not, but whether that nation is in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, the—

Senator MCCAIN. That is really remarkable.

So, we are telling the American people, now, that if there's a chemical or biological attack on the United States of America, and it is of devastating consequences, we will rule out the option of using a nuclear weapon, even though that may be the most effective course of action, if that country is in compliance or noncompliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if you look at the countries today that have any significant capacity to develop chemical and biological weapons, you will find that those are states that are either nuclear-weapon states or that are not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, such as—

Senator MCCAIN. Today.

Dr. MILLER.—North Korea and—

Senator MCCAIN. Today that's the case. Maybe not a year or 5 years from now. But, if they are in compliance with the NPT, they are free to launch attacks on the United States of America, and be assured that there will not be a response with nuclear weapons, even though that may be, in the view of our military leaders, the best way to respond to it.

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if you look at the experience of, to take one example of Saddam Hussein, I think you can see that the conventional capabilities of the United States are—ought to be sufficient to provide a very significant deterrent. And we've made clear, in this Nuclear Posture Review, that both political and military leaders would be held accountable for the use, or the transfer, of weapons of mass destruction.

And might I very briefly add, in—with respect to your point, that conditions could change. I absolutely agree. And that's specifically why the Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States Reserves the right to modify this assurance if, in the future, the threat posed by biological weapons proliferation and technology advancement would so—would make that appropriate.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, of course, I got a nonanswer from Secretary Tauscher. Why we even got into this is beyond me. Is beyond me. But, the fact is that we have now sent a message: Stay in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and you will be immune from the response, if necessary, of a nuclear weapon, in order to save and minimize losses or most effectively respond to a chemical or biological attack on the United States of America. It's a remarkable circumstance.

My time has expired.

Senator BEN NELSON [presiding]. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Tauscher, I think you were leaning forward to the microphone, but I wanted to give you another chance to answer that question of Senator McCain, because it's an important question, which is, Why is this section in here? In other words, let—before I give you the chance, I'll just say, really briefly, it does seem to me that this provision in the Nuclear Posture Review takes the previous calculated ambiguity, removes a lot of the ambiguity, but, frankly, then restores some of the ambiguity, in the language that Mr. Miller just quoted—Dr. Miller—which is that we Reserve the right to review this at any time. So, it's a curious part of this,

and I—of the review, which I, overall, think is a very constructive and significant document. So, why is it there?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Lieberman, it's there because the decision, I think rightly, was made that the great balance of countries, many of whom are our allies that don't have nuclear weapons and that are in compliance with their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, are not targets of the United States to use nuclear weapons. The bar for using nuclear weapons is extremely high.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ms. TAUSCHER. And the deterrence of nuclear weapons is extremely successful. We have not used a nuclear weapon in 65 years. We have used conventional weapons, with great success and great force and great devastation, in the recent decade.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ms. TAUSCHER. So, we have decided that we would deter activities by non-nuclear-weapon states in good compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with conventional weapons. Knowing that, we believe, since we have the finest military in the world and the most significant conventional weapons, that that deterrence suits the kind of threat that they pose to us.

Senator LIEBERMAN. On—

Ms. TAUSCHER. We have added the caveat that, if those states should use chemical or biological weapons, that we would make very clear to them—we specifically say this—that we would use a devastating conventional force, and that we would hold all of those accountable. And that makes it very clear, to any leadership in those countries, what the consequences of these kinds of aggressions would be.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, so that helps to clarify this, because—Dr. Miller, you said earlier that this was “explicitly not intended” as a removal of ambiguity, in the case—

Ms. TAUSCHER. That's right.

Senator LIEBERMAN.—for instance, of Iran and North Korea.

Ms. TAUSCHER. That's right, because what we did—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because they're not in compliance with—

Ms. TAUSCHER. That's right.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Or they're not signatories. So, this is a reassurance to our allies.

Okay, I'd just ask one last question. Maybe you've answered it, but just to give you a real-life example, as I recall it.

In 1991, during the—either the lead-up or as—or, actually began the Gulf War—as I recall—I can't remember the exact words, but Secretary of State Baker issued a public warning to Saddam Hussein that, if the Iraqis used chemical weapons on our troops, they would suffer—I believe he said something like “devastating consequences.” That was widely interpreted to mean—to include nuclear weapons.

In the aftermath of the Nuclear Posture Review, would you say that a current Secretary of State or President, in a similar circumstance, could issue the same warning?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Lieberman, the answer to that is yes. It—Iraq, at the time, was not in compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, in precisely the same words, and an associated calculated ambiguity would be applicable.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very good. I appreciate that.

Let me go on to another point, which was the main concern I had about the NPR, as I said; and most of it, I think, is really constructive and important. I was surprised by the statement that, when weighing options for the life-extension programs for our nuclear arsenal—which become more important as we go forward with the START Treaty, because we’re going to have fewer nuclear weapons—and this is a quote from the NPR, “There’s a strong preference,” end quote, for the refurbishment or reuse of nuclear components, rather than their replacement. The NPR continues to state, and I quote, “replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken”—replacement—“undertaken only if critical stockpile management program goals could otherwise not be met.”

And I was surprised by that, because I think the overall goal is, what you’ve said and we all agree with, that we wanted to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. That was the goal of the nuclear stockpile program, the goal of the—setting up of the NNSA; it’s consistent with—I’m looking at a document that reported—the Jason Advisory Report to the NNSA—this one is last year’s, 2009. It describes refurbishment, replacement, and—excuse me—reuse and replacement. And, frankly, the language of the replacement seems more—most forward-leaning. This is actually in—a quote from their report of, what they said, the definitions given to them by NNSA. I’ll quote from the definition of “warhead replacement.” “Some, or all, of the components of a warhead are replaced with modern design that are more easily manufacturable, provide increased warhead margins, forego no-longer-available or hazardous materials, improve safety, security, and use control, and offer the potential for future overall stockpile reductions,” end of quote.

So, here’s my concern, that—I’m puzzled about why that language is in there, and I’m puzzled because I’m—I fear that it will send, both to NNSA and, really, most important, to the extraordinary scientists who are working for us, a kind of discouragement to use replacement, when, to me, it should be equal with reuse and refurbishment. And the choice would be, Which one helps us most to have a safe, secure, and effective, reliable nuclear stockpile?

Dr. Miller and Mr. D’Agostino, or maybe both?

So, can you reassure us that replacement is equal, as an alternative, to keep our stockpile as we want it to be?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Lieberman, I’ll answer very briefly, and then turn it over to—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay.

Dr. MILLER.—Mr. D’Agostino.

The NPR stipulates that—in considering life-extension programs, that the full range of—will be considered and studied, from refurbishment, to reuse, to replacement, and that only at the point of moving forward to engineering development would a preference be given, or first consideration be given, to refurbishment or reuse.

It does note that the—presidential authorization would be required to go forward with replacement. And, Senator, speaking from my perspective, one of the reasons for this provision is that the administration noticed that the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program had been canceled by Congress, and understood there was

a—there would be an important threshold involved with moving forward with a replacement option, wanted the President to have a specific look at that and to understand the case for it, when it should occur.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay.

Mr. D'Agostino? I mean, to me, it creates some confusion. And I hope, perhaps in the 1251 report that you're going to submit, you can clarify this.

Incidentally, the—I'll ask you first; you're the expert. Replacement of a warhead—warhead replacement doesn't mean building a big, new warhead? Not necessarily. It mostly means replacing component parts, doesn't it?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. It means replacing component parts, sir, but also—the most important thing, from our standpoint, because we have a commitment to maintain our stockpile and our deterrent without underground testing— is, it's based on previously tested designs.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's very important, I appreciate your mentioning that, right. Not a big, new design.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. It's based on previously tested designs. We have a tremendous test history, test database that we want to exploit and use all that information in order to move forward.

The principles of the Stockpile Management Program are—have really guided us, here, as I said in my oral statement. We want to increase the stockpile safety, the security, and the reliability; we obviously want to reduce the likelihood of conducting an underground test; we want to enable reductions in future stockpile sizes. And the approach outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, as Dr. Miller said, allows that full study.

There is—there's actually no confusion. I've talked to my lab—the lab directors. They are very comfortable with the language, here, that it will allow them to study all options and provide to us, the decisionmakers, policymakers, and ultimately, as it proceeds through authorization and appropriation to Congress, provides us the opportunity to make sure that we have full insight into that best combination of safety, security, reliability, cost, use of that test history and database, together—all together in one package.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yeah. Okay, I appreciate the clarification from both of you. I'm interested in what you described as a potential reason this was in here, Dr. Millar, because of the history that Congress canceled the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But, this is a different kind of replacement. And I think, as you said, it's based on existing design.

So, I think, at this moment—not that I or former Congresswoman Tauscher would ever say that Congress might alter its opinions on matters, or need clarification, but I think it's—it might help to define “replacement” and assure us, and those working with you, that this kind of replacement is on equal footing with “reuse and refurbishment.”

I thank you, my time is up.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could just add one thing, to just clarify my comment. It's based on existing component design; components—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. MILLER.—that we've tested. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Understood.

Dr. MILLER. Thank you.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I, too, want to thank the members of our panel today for being here, and for their service to our country, and especially want to welcome our—my former colleague from the House of Representatives, Secretary Tauscher. Very nice to have you with us today, as well.

I would like to associate myself with some of the comments that Senator McCain made with regard to the “calculated ambiguity.” I, too, think that our military leadership would want to have all elements of national power available to them in the event of attack by an enemy of the United States. And I won't belabor the point, because I think he covered it pretty well, but I do—let me also add that I'm not satisfied with the response to that question.

Dr. Miller and Secretary Tauscher, the—9 months ago, General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former head of Strategic Command, testified before this committee that he would be, quote, “very concerned” about endangering the triad if the number of strategic delivery vehicles dropped below 800. And yet, the newly signed START Treaty limits the number of delivery of vehicles to only 700.

And I guess my question is, What is the rationale for the agreement on only 700 delivery vehicles included in the New START Treaty? And what justifications and analysis did you rely on to come to that—to arrive at that number?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, I'll give the first answer, and General Chilton may wish to join in, as well as Secretary Tauscher.

We conducted extensive analysis, during the NPR, of various force structures, including combinations of different balance with each leg of the triad—with ICBMs, with SLBMs, with heavy bombers—and found that there were a range of possible outcomes that would be satisfactory and that would meet the requirements for U.S. Strategic Command.

As the negotiations proceeded, the—we continued that analysis, and looked at the combination of—the limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles or launchers, plus a—and a cap of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers, and determined that that combination allowed us to do virtually everything that would have been possible under a single limit of 800 strategic delivery vehicles.

We will provide a specific force structure—and I think you'll see it's a balanced force structure—associated with the New START Treaty when we submit the Section 1251 report as the treaty—as the New START Treaty is provided for advice and consent of the Senate.

General CHILTON. Senator, I would only add that, of course, time has passed since General Cartwright testified, and we had the opportunity to do a lot more analysis during this time period. And as we looked at it, it not only made sense strategically, but it certainly is doable, to continue to sustain the triad at these current numbers and, I believe, at lower numbers. The triad will still be a viable and important area, even if there are future considerations for that,

should they come up. The flexibility provided by those three legs are still important to us today.

Senator THUNE. Will the Russians have to cut their number of delivery vehicles to get to 700?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, relative to their current accountable levels under START, it will be a slight reduction. We would expect them to be going down, in any case, over time, however.

Senator THUNE. Okay, well—and my understanding is that they're already, yeah, going to be at or below that level. And for us to drop down to that level, I guess my next question would be, What, if anything, do we get in return for that concession?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Thune, I wouldn't call it a "concession." In the negotiations for the START agreement—the New START agreement, as you can imagine there are many, many different variables and many, many different things. The Nuclear Posture Review, which the—is congressionally mandated in this administration, began early last year—was actually designed to deal with the guidance for the New START negotiations, first and primarily. So, all of the guidance that went into the START negotiations came out of what was the beginning of the Nuclear Posture Review. And those limits were limits that the entire interagency agreed to.

So, I wouldn't call it a "concession." These were decisions that we made, that we believe that—were the right numbers for our side, and the Russians made the same decisions on their own side.

Senator THUNE. You sort of answered this, General Chilton, and go ahead and respond to that question, if you'd like, but I also want to know if you could elaborate a little bit on what the implications are for each leg of the nuclear triad under these reductions. How many bombers, land-based missiles, submarines will we have to cut in order to be compliant with the treaty?

General CHILTON. Right. Those numbers, and the decisions on that, will come forward in the next couple of weeks, as Dr. Miller said, and there's still some work to be done by the services on how to balance that out.

But, back to your other point, Senator, one thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits. Because, as you look to the future—although Russia may be close to, or slightly below them, already—when you look to the future, we certainly don't want them to grow. And they would have been unrestricted, otherwise, without these types of limits articulated in the treaty. And so, having that limit there, and with the knowledge that what we negotiated to is absolutely acceptable to the United States Strategic Command for what we need to do to provide the deterrent for the country, made me comfortable with that approach.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could add, very briefly, that the New START Treaty has provisions that should allow us to do three things that will reduce the requirement for the number of strategic delivery vehicles while still keeping the same force structure.

The first one is, it eliminates the—what we've called the "phantom" strategic delivery vehicles, those that are accountable under the old START treaty, but that are no longer associated with the nuclear mission. That includes the strategic submarines that were converted to conventional-only; it includes our B-1 bombers that

have been converted to conventional-only. And those changes allow us to take a number of delivery vehicles off the books.

Second, the treaty also allows further conversion of current dual-capable bombers to a conventional-only role that would take them off the books, as well. And we are looking at that possibility for some B-52Hs.

And, finally, the treaty allows the elimination of launchers from accountability for submarines, through a variety of means, including the removal—the simple removal of the gas generator that would eject the SLBM. As we look at the overall requirement, we determined that we wanted to keep 14 strategic submarines in the nuclear mission, at least for the near term, as we see how they do as they get toward the later part of their lives. But, there's not the same requirement for all the tubes associated with those. So, we are looking at the possibility of removing some of those, through a very simple—a relatively simple operation.

Senator THUNE. I want to come back—the Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the development of conventional prompt global strike capabilities. Will these prompt global strike systems count against the New START limits and require further nuclear cuts to accommodate them?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, there are basically—two-part answer. The first part is that, if we were to put a conventional warhead on an ICBM with a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, or on an SLBM with a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, then it would be accountable. When the Department of Defense previously proposed the conventional Trident modification, that system had this sort of trajectory, and would have been accountable. The numbers associated with that were two missiles per boat times 14 boats; it would be 28. The NPR explicitly looked at the—as it did force structure analysis—and looked at further—the potential for further reductions, under the 700 and 800 combined limits; that would leave room for that, and indeed, would leave room for a small number of conventional ICBMs, if the—if that were the determination—determination were made that that was desirable. That would be a very small number. That analysis is underway as part of our broader long-range strike study, and we expect to conclude that in the coming months, and provide any recommendations in the fiscal year 2012 budget.

There are a wide range of conventional systems that would be considered prompt global strike that will not be accountable under the New START Treaty, including, for example, the work that's ongoing now on hypersonic-boost glide vehicles, longer-term work on hypersonic cruise missiles, and so forth.

Senator THUNE. And my time is up, but just a real quick—if I could get General Chilton to respond to—as the nuclear weapons are reduced, and conventional prompt global strike capabilities are developed, to what degree can those conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities when it comes to providing deterrence?

General CHILTON. Senator, I consider the prompt global strike capability as a niche capability, another weapon in the quiver, if you will, of the United States to address warfighting concerns. I do not see it as a replacement for the nuclear deterrent in that role,

specifically. Not to say that, as a conventional—all of our conventional capabilities have some deterrent role. But, you don't replace the nuclear deterrent with that, one-for-one; or, not even ten-for-one.

Senator THUNE. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator. I guess it's my turn.

Mr. D'Agostino, the new treaty between our governments, of Russia and ours, to further reduce the number of strategic nuclear forces, places a premium on our ability to maintain an infrastructure in the technical capacity to provide for that stockpile that's safe, secure, and effective into the foreseeable future. So, my question is a money question. Do you have adequate funding? Are you asking for adequate funding to make certain that the weapons programs, the facilities, and the improvements to the facilities and workforce—do you have adequate funding for all of that?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Senator Nelson, absolutely. I do have adequate funding. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request and the 5-year stream that—picks a total 5-year stream—provides the funding for this first 5-year slice of this program.

As Dr. Miller described, the 1251 report will describe a full 10-year period. This funding stream, and the support by future administrations and future Congresses, will be required over multiple years, because the work that we have will—does happen over many years.

Senator BEN NELSON. And as I asked you in our subcommittee hearing, is the budget backloaded? In other words, is—are we anticipating higher costs in the out years, therefore, underfunding for the current and the foreseeable years?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Absolutely not. The budget is not backloaded. The budget that we have for the first 5 years represents exactly what we need to do, what the Nuclear Posture has asked us to do. It also recognizes the reality that, in the early stages, particularly for large construction projects, and of which we have two in this proposal, that the early years of those construction projects, we spend time doing the design work, and then, after a few years of making sure we know exactly what we want to build, we'll shift into the construction effort. We won't have those baselines established until about the year 2012, 2013. And—though I do expect some adjustments—but, this is natural, in a fairly complicated, long-range plan.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

General Chilton, you've stated that you fully support the Nuclear Posture Review and the New START Treaty. Is that accurate?

General CHILTON. That's correct, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. And as the combatant commander of U.S. Strategic Command, perhaps it would be helpful if you could discuss the role that you had in the development of the Nuclear Posture Review.

General CHILTON. Well, Senator, both with the Nuclear Posture Review and with the START negotiations—

Senator BEN NELSON. And the START negotiations.

General CHILTON.—we were—Strategic Command was closely consulted and part of the team that was working in the background

to support the dialogue and the preparation for negotiators, going forward. So, we were always asked for our input. We stood up a team almost a year and a half ago, anticipating this work, back at STRATCOM headquarters, of some very great Americans, with exceptional talent, who studied and prepared for this, and put the models in place to be able to answer questions quickly to support negotiations and also support the dialogue we had with policy folks, with Dr. Miller's staff, along the way. And so, we certainly appreciate the close cooperation we were offered.

Senator BEN NELSON. There have been criticisms raised regarding whether or not the verification aspects of "trust but verify," to use some very famous words—that that's inadequate in this treaty. Could both you and Dr. Miller tell us what your belief is about the verification requirements, or lack of requirements, in this treaty really mean? And then, also, has anybody from intelligence been consulted in connection with these verification issues?

General CHILTON. Senator, you bring up a good point at the end. This is—really the question on whether verification regimes are adequate or not is a question for the Director of National Intelligence and his staffs, because, they're the—going to be the ones that we will turn to throughout the treaty regime to say, "Are the Russians compliant?"

A couple of points I'd make, though, is, one, throughout our participation at STRATCOM, in support of START, these types of questions were asked frequently and, I believe, addressed throughout that time period. But, again, the question I think is more appropriate for the intelligence area.

And one final point. There were no verification opportunities for us anymore, given the expiring of the previous START agreement, back in December. And, of course, the Moscow Treaty did not allow for any verification. So, what we were faced with was going forward with no verification, no insight into what the Russians would be doing with their strategic force structures. So, I'm encouraged by the fact that we do have that now included in this treaty.

Senator BEN NELSON. And you believe it's adequate at this point in time.

General CHILTON. All indications, from what I've been told, and my observations throughout the development were that they were adequate for the period of the treaty.

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Miller?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Nelson, I would, first, just reiterate that this is, ultimately, an intelligence- community judgment, as you know, and that we expect to have a National Intelligence Estimate provided to the Senate right about the same time that the Treaty is. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and different elements of the community were very much involved as we went forward with the negotiations. And as the negotiators considered steps to take, in terms of the priorities for U.S. negotiating positions, the intelligence community played a very important role.

I'll just say, on a couple of items in particular, I think we have very strong provisions. There is a provision for 18 onsite inspections per year that will be able to cover both deployed and non-deployed systems. And we have a robust data exchange process in place that will—that, along with a number of other provisions, that

are quite detailed, will help support our ability to collect intelligence through national technical means that also support verification.

Again, it's an intelligence-community assessment, but I share with General Chilton the view that, based on everything that I've seen to date, have great confidence that this treaty will be verifiable.

Senator BEN NELSON. And do you have any reason to believe that the intelligence position will be any different than what you've just stated, right now? In fact, they were included in the discussions and negotiations, so I'm assuming that you don't believe that they would have a different opinion than yours, right now.

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I don't believe that, but I won't speak for the intelligence community. That'll be their judgment.

Senator BEN NELSON. Yeah. Well, I intend to talk to them about it, as well. But, thank you.

Secretary Tauscher, the criticism is—I've seen from time to time is that, if this treaty doesn't really require us to do certain things, it's more of a statement that this is what we intend to do, as long as it's in our National interest; and if it ceases to be in our National interest, we Reserve the right to either withdraw from the treaty or change our actions. And the same thing would be true of our counterparts.

Perhaps you—in a few words, you could give us, then, the value of entering into an agreement of that kind, that is not really binding per se, because either party may change its behavior or withdraw from the treaty.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, Senator Nelson, that's true of all treaties. Most treaties have a national-interest exit clause. In fact, the United States decided to abrogate the ABM Treaty in the last—

Senator BEN NELSON. That's true.

Ms. TAUSCHER.—administration, because we wanted to build limited missile—regional missile defenses.

I think the important parts about this New START agreement that are salient and specific to the timing is that we had the unfortunate circumstance of the previous START Treaty expiring last December. While both parties agreed to move forward while we were negotiating, to keep the spirit of the previous treaty, what we ended up having was a treaty that expired. And, frankly, in the Moscow Treaty, there was no verification at all.

So, we have verification that is specific. It is robust in many different areas; certainly, onsite inspections and a number of the elements that we had in the previous START agreement. There are fewer inspections, but there's also a—fewer places to inspect. During the Soviet time, we had many, many different facilities, including other countries, other than the Russian Federation. So, a lot of those facilities have been closed down over time, and there are fewer weapons and fewer places to go to inspect them.

So, I think the amalgam of what we have here is a strong treaty on disarmament. We have a strong treaty on verification. We have better technical means now than we've ever had. We've got a smaller footprint to visit. But, I think that, in the end, this is a treaty that will serve the American people and add to our National security interests.

Senator BEN NELSON. And it can serve as an example, for others, for nonproliferation. Is that fair, too?

Ms. TAUSCHER. It serves significantly for nonproliferation. That's one of the reasons why the combination of our Negative Security Assurance, which makes clear that we're putting a lot of onus on belonging to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and being in compliance to it. As Mr. Miller—Dr. Miller said, up until we changed this policy, in the previous policy, Iran and North Korea may have qualified, under certain readings of a Negative Security Assurance. What we have said is that we will not use nuclear weapons against countries that are in compliance with their NPT obligations. And that is an important difference, and it certainly carves out countries like Iran and North Korea, who are clearly not in compliance.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.

Let me begin by following up on an area that Senator McCain touched on.

Dr. Miller, this statement, in Singapore yesterday by Secretary Flournoy—the statement was, “Military force is an option of last resort. It is off the table in the near term.” I understand you spoke to Secretary Flournoy yesterday, and she was—her position is that she was either misquoted or that she misspoke. Is that correct?

Dr. MILLER. That is correct. And I have known the Under Secretary for some time, and I would lay money that it's—that she was misquoted.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Well I hope—

Dr. MILLER. It is—sir, it is—if I could, Senator, very quickly—it is fair and appropriate to say that the use of military force should be a last resort. But, this administration has also made clear that it is on the table.

Senator WICKER. That we don't take options off the table. And I think that's a problem you get into when you start answering questions of this type. I hope it's a misquote. Alex Kennedy is the Associated Press reporter. Perhaps there's a transcript of that. Reporters are human, and so are public officials; and people do make mistakes, and people do misspeak occasionally.

But, Secretary Tauscher, do you agree that this needs to be clarified, and if, indeed, Secretary Flournoy did say this, that she should issue a statement, retracting that?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, I think, once again, we have to get to the bottom of exactly what happened. But, what is clear is this administration's policy. This administration's policy, regardless of who says it or when it is said—the President has made very clear that all options are on the table. And while the military option may be the one of last resort, it is certainly on the table when it comes to Iran.

Senator WICKER. And so, if she said otherwise, which she's quoted as doing, then she should clarify that and retract that statement.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Under Secretary Flournoy is one of the most respected members of the Defense Department, and I'm sure that she will take the responsibility seriously.

Senator WICKER. All right. Well, I certainly—

I'll just say this, Mr. Chairman. I would hope that this could be clarified. I view it as a serious matter, as did Senator McCain. And if she said it—we're all human, but she should retract it.

Now, let me ask, then, with regard to this replacement and reuse and refurbishment issue, clearly we have made it harder, and the NPR makes it more difficult to go to the replacement option, by saying that that would be a last resort and that it should be specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

Mr. D'Agostino, does this make it more difficult for us to recruit the top scientists to work on a nuclear stockpile, if they know that the replacement option faces these additional hurdles,—or, at least, there's confusion for their professional career? And, if you could, give us an example of what is off the table, at this point, unless we have specific presidential authorization and specific approval by Congress.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Sir, it doesn't—Senator Wicker—it does not make it more difficult to recruit scientists. The scientists at our laboratories now—the lab directors at our laboratories now—understand the policy. They understand that they have a free rein to study all options associated with extending the life of the stockpile. That's the most important thing. This NPR is very clear on that. It also—

Senator WICKER. They're studying all options, and they're equally studying the replacement option—

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. Yes—

Senator WICKER.—at the same time.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, Senator they are absolutely equally studying the replacement option. And the key is to make sure that, in the studies of "How do we approach extending the life of a particular warhead?" that we understand the benefits associated with each of the particular options. And the most important thing, as the NPR makes clear, is that we—our desire is to do so in a way that maximizes the safety, the security, and the effectiveness of the deterrent without underground testing. And the replacement option, the policies that put forward here allow us, specifically, to be able to do that.

Senator WICKER. Okay. You know, we're limited in time today. I'm going to ask you to provide of an example of what we're talking about on the record, as a response. Will you do that?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Senator, I'd be glad to provide that on the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator WICKER. Okay. Because, I think it would take all of our time.

Well, let me ask the panel this, with regard to missile defense and Russia. I asked this question to Secretary Gates in January of 2009. What about a possible missile defense program with Russia and the United States partnering up? The idea would be a joint missile defense system. And Secretary Gates said, "There's nothing in writing." No, but there have been some inferences and some discussions, and maybe if we got political baggage out of the way, that might be a possibility.

I had a conversation with a leading Russian legislator, just this week. And I can tell you that he was open to this possibility. As a matter of fact, he brought it up before I did.

So, let ask you—and starting with Dr. Miller, and others might be able to interject—what about this? Is there a place for Russia, in this issue? And have—has there been any work with Russia on any of our missile defense concepts?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Wicker, the answer is most emphatically yes. I had the opportunity to meet with, I expect, the same delegation that you did with Senator Margelov from the Russian Federation—pardon my butchering of the pronunciation—and had a similar conversation—

Senator WICKER. Senator Nelson taught me how to pronounce that word: “Mar GAY’ luv.”

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much.

The—we’ve had an ongoing conversation with the Russian Federation for some time on the possibility of cooperation in missile defenses, and have begun a joint threat assessment of the—of missiles that could affect both Russia and the United States. Secretary Gates and the Defense Department believe there’s a tremendous amount of possibility for significant cooperation, moving forward.

If I could, Secretary Tauscher has led some of our discussions with the Russian Federation on this topic. I think it would be helpful to hear from her, both about what’s been accomplished and about plans which I think are going to continue in the very near term.

Senator WICKER. That would be great.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Senator Wicker, you’re absolutely right. Obviously, while there are concerns that we address very often about the phased adaptive approach and what exactly it means to the Russian Federation—and we have constantly asserted that the phased adaptive approach is neither targeted toward the Russian Federation nor, frankly, capable to deter its many, many, many, many offensive weapons—we have had ongoing strategic dialogue with the Russians. I began it last summer, and we actually are having a meeting again next month.

There is interest on the part of the Russians. There are many threats and many opportunities, where we view the world in the same way. We don’t have—we have a warming relationship with the Russians. We don’t have a close relationship yet, but it certainly is one where we are establishing much more of a dialogue, especially when it comes to threats and trying to assume that we can look at threats the same way.

So, as Dr. Miller said, we’re looking at a joint threat analysis. We’re looking at common platforms like radars, things that the Russians have that are strategically located that could be part of an—a larger network that we would have.

So, I think that there is the possibility for—certainly, we are going to have ongoing conversations. The idea of working cooperatively on missile defense is an agenda item of President Obama. He has talked to President Medvedev about it. And I think that we will continue to see how we can work together and find those common areas of common agreement where we can come together.

Senator WICKER. Well, I hope so. And I hope that our relationship with Russia is, indeed, warming. This is a concept that goes back all the way to President Ronald Reagan, who very famously and publicly announced, "If we can learn a way to defend ourselves against a missile attack by a rogue nation, we would certainly be willing to share that and let others defend themselves." So, I'm encouraged by this and I hope we can get further reports.

Thank you, ma'am.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.

It's always wonderful to see my former colleague from the House, Secretary Tauscher. Thank you for what you're doing.

And, Secretary Miller, you're making an appearance here almost every day. Look forward to seeing you again next week, I'm sure.

You, Secretary Miller, talked about tactical nukes and the fact that they're not included in the limitations addressed in both the New START and in the NPR. Could you address the quantities of these tactical—or nonstrategic, as some might call them—nuclear weapons that we possess, that Russia possesses, the function of these weapons, and why they weren't limited in START and the NPR. And then, General Chilton and Secretary Tauscher, if you'd care to comment, as well, after Secretary Miller does, I'd appreciate it.

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, I will not get into precise numbers, because they're classified. But, I'll say, in general terms, that we have "some," and the Russians have "a lot more" tactical nuclear weapons. And as we note in the NPR, we'd like to see them move their tactical nuclear weapons deeper back into Russia, and to continue the steps that they've taken over the—really, the past couple of decades, since the end of the cold war, to continue to improve the security associated with them.

These weapons were not included in the New START negotiations, quite simply because, at this point in time, Russia was not interested in including them. And we believed it was appropriate and important to move forward with significant reductions in our strategic nuclear forces on both sides, and that this would have an important effect on strategic stability and also help move the relationship forward, as well.

We have proposed—and noted in the NPR, as well—that after ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, assuming Senate advice and consent for ratification, that we would intend to pursue further reductions that would include both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, and both deployed and nondeployed weapons, so that we really get after the overall number of nuclear weapons on both sides.

As Under Secretary Tauscher said, even after New START comes into place, the United States and Russia will, together, have approximately 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. So, we think it's appropriate to take another bilateral step after New START.

Senator UDALL. Secretary Tauscher, would you care to comment?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, thank you, Senator. It's always good to see you, too.

You know, Dr. Miller's right, first things first. START was aptly named, a long time ago. But, it is the start, not only as Senator Wicker mentioned, of the warming of the relationship, but it is the start of the—a bigger opportunity to move not just on strategic offensive weapons, which is all that the START Treaty encompasses, but on to tactical. And there is a larger agenda, too, of conventional forces in Europe and many other things that are intertwined with the 21st-century force structure and perception of threats and the evolution of threats. So, there's a—many opportunities here, once that we all hope that the Senate gives it's advice and consent on the New START Treaty, to move forward on a bilateral basis with the Russians, but then move into a multilateral opportunity on many of these different elements. And I think that, you know, first things first.

Senator UDALL. Sure. It has to be expensive for the Russians to maintain all of those tactical nukes. You'd think that there might be a sweet spot where—and you also imply that they're amenable to these future conversations. Is that a fair assumption?

Ms. TAUSCHER. That may be a stretch, Senator, but I think, certainly, that there is—one of the reasons why the President's Nuclear Security Summit, I believe, was such a success, of having 47 heads of state here in Washington, talking about nuclear terrorism and the importance of nonproliferation, is this issue of having weapons that are out there that are not only difficult to secure, but that are the targets of organized crime and, certainly, terrorism. So, smaller number of weapons, easier to secure, while we are still, obviously, maintaining our stockpile at the highest levels. So, I think that there will be increased interest, and perhaps some pressure from the world community, for the nuclear powers to look at, specifically, tactical substrategic nuclear weapons, and to get the numbers down to a more controllable number.

Senator UDALL. I'm—General Chilton, did you want to add anything to the conversation?

General CHILTON. I think that adequately covers it, Senator. I'd agree that the next topic of discussion ought to be the large disparity and the large Russian stockpile of what we would call tactical weapons. That should be—and there will be a dialogue that needs to start as soon as both sides are ready to come together on it. And it will be, as mentioned, one that will be a complicated one that will take time. But, we won't get there if we don't start talking about it.

Senator UDALL. I'm not a lawyer, so I can ask questions I don't know the answer to. I'm curious—the size of a tactical nuke, is it—would it be much bigger than those two desks that you're sitting at there?

General CHILTON. Physically in—

Senator UDALL. Physical size—

General CHILTON.—size?

Senator UDALL.—yes. Physical size. I'm sorry.

General CHILTON. They can be much smaller than this desk.

Senator UDALL. It can be much smaller. I'm mindful of that very powerful documentary that the Nunn-Lugar group put together and the couple at the Canadian border with what they said was a

statue in a desk-sized box, and, instead, it was a tactical nuke inside that box.

Let me turn to China. I know their arsenal is much smaller than ours in the States here, but they also have a lack of transparency, and so, you could raise questions about their strategic intentions.

Secretary Miller, Secretary Tauscher, could you talk about your analysis of their intentions, and what are we doing in the realm of more mil-to-mil discussions that might create more transparency and a better relationship?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, you're right, Senator, I think that confidence-building and a sense of transparency and the kind of visibility that we're looking for, not only among the nuclear powers, but generally to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is an area of conversation that we have with the Chinese.

Once again, we are mindful of the fact that China is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, at the same time, I think that there are concerns about their force posture and the way that they manage their weapons that would cause concern, not necessarily significant concern, certainly. But, you know, people want to have a sense of confidence and more of a visibility into the Chinese program. And more of a sense of confidence-building would be welcome.

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, I would just add that the Chinese have indicated that they're not seeking numerical parity with the United States or with Russia. And at the same time that the—as Secretary Tauscher has indicated, they've had a lack of transparency about their plans and programs for nuclear weapons and delivery systems. And we would hope to engage with them in a discussion on strategic stability that includes increased transparency, not just on numbers of weapons, but on their thoughts about both plans and policies associated with them.

Senator UDALL. The NPR calls for bilateral talks, I believe, with both Russia and China, with an emphasis on more stable and resilient, transparent strategic relationships. When would you anticipate those talks might start?

Ms. TAUSCHER. President Obama put together a strategic dialogue between both China and the United States, and Russia and the United States. And there are 13 or 14 subgroups. All of them have met in both the Chinese and the Russian engagements. And these are talks that are meant to, once again, assert what our positions and our principles are in many issues, but, at the same time, to listen and to work together and develop relationships. So, I think we're well on our way to developing the kinds of relationships. But, once again, the Chinese will make their own decisions as to the kinds of transparency they will have. But, I think that we and many others are on notice that the lack of transparency causes us to ask for more confidence-building. And we are very interested in having conversations that would create that kind of confidence.

Senator UDALL. And I'm confident, as I finish my questioning here, that, Secretary Tauscher, you will lead the effort ably, as you have. Congratulations on START II. I look forward, as one Senator, to supporting it when it comes to the floor of the Senate. And I see

no reason that we shouldn't be able to find, easily, the 67 votes to ratify the treaty.

So, thank you for your—

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator UDALL.—hard and important work.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much.

Senator UDALL. Thanks.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Chairman Nelson.

It's great to see each of you. We thank you for your service to the country and look forward to working with you on some very important issues that we'll be dealing with in the months to come.

And, Secretary Tauscher, we worked together on funding a lot of defense issues over the years, and I hope that relationship can continue.

I'll ask Secretary Miller and Tauscher this question. It seems to me that the President has stated an improvident policy. That is that we would eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. I say it's improvident because it's not going to happen. And sometimes bad goals can get you in trouble. Second, the administration seems to be committed to the view that if America leads in reducing our weapons significantly, that this will cause others to want to follow.

And so, I guess my question is, What evidence do you have, and what facts can you cite, that this so-called "moral leadership" argument will actually impact countries that present the greatest immediate threat, it seems, to us—Iran and North Korea—from pursuing nuclear weapon systems?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, I'll answer first, and then turn it to Secretary Tauscher.

The goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the Earth has been a goal of U.S. administrations, starting with the Truman administration, and has been embraced by every one—every administration but one since then, including, as you know, very famously, President Reagan.

What the President said as he announced this objective for the United States, or reiterated this objective for the United States, was that this is an important objective and that he, at the same time, realized that it was something that may not occur during his lifetime, or during our lifetimes. And so, the fact that we are pursuing this objective and taking steps in this direction, consistent with our Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, but, at the same time, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies and partners, is a fundamental part of the policy.

With respect to the reduction of nuclear weapons, we didn't assume that if we reduced it, others would. Indeed, that's why we had a bilateral negotiation with Russia to reduce their nuclear weapons as we reduced ours. And we believe that while exact parity in numbers of nuclear weapons is not as important as it was, perhaps, during the Cold War, that there's—still important to have approximate parity on both sides, so that neither side has any confusion about the intent of the other.

And finally, with respect to the question of the impact on non-proliferation of our statements, including our declaratory policy,

the intent is to make very clear that there are benefits to states that will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty—not just join, but fulfill their nuclear nonproliferation obligations—and that there are potential risks to states, such as Iran, that do not.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Sessions, as Dr. Miller says, the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons has been a goal and an aspiration of American administrations for over 50 years. It is also a key pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and—something that we are not only a depository state, but a signatory to—and that is for nuclear-weapon states to disarm.

But, the President has balanced those commitments and those ambitions with a very sanguine set of national security priorities, which include increasing budgets, in both the NNSA and in the nonproliferation budget, to make sure that, until that time—as the President has said, which may not happen in his lifetime, that will take patience and persistence—the United States will have the strongest, most effective, and the safest nuclear stockpile in the world, and that our deterrent that we use to protect ourselves and, certainly, our allies—our extended deterrence—is as strong as ever.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Well, I'm just not sure that this kind of political leadership is going to work in the way that it's projected. I do worry that if we draw our numbers too low, a lot of nations might well consider that they could, with a little investment and a period of years, be a peer-competitor of us with nuclear weapons and alter the balance of power in the world. And we do have problems with that.

Secretary Tauscher, we—I believe you were asked about Secretary Flournoy's comments recently, that need to be, you know, backed off on. But, it was reported in the ITAR-TASS, February 15th, that you told journalists in Russia—I guess it was in Russia—that the United States had no plans to deploy missile defense elements in the Black Sea, to include Aegis ships and sea-based missile defense components. The Aegis BMD capability is currently installed on four cruisers and 16 destroyers—all Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—and 9 Ticonderoga-class cruisers are planned to receive the capability. So, a significant portion of our fleet. Aegis-class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven times over the past 5 years. The last such deployment was, however, in July of '09. Your comments are disturbing, because it would seem to indicate a new policy on deployments in the Black Sea. And certainly, we received Russian demands on missile defense that I think go beyond anything we should acquiesce in.

So, are there any restrictions on the deployment in the Black Sea? And are you aware of any changes in the policy?

Ms. TAUSCHER. No, Senator. There are no restrictions, and I was very clear. The question asked me if there was a—if there was any permanent deployment of Aegis ships in the Black Sea, and I said, "There are no—there isn't." And there is not policy to do that. I was very clear that we've had—have had deployments of Aegis ships—most recently, last summer—and that, you know, this is a decision that is going to go forward, with cooperation. It's—I think it's the Montreux Treaty.

Senator SESSIONS. Are there any—

Ms. TAUSCHER. But, there's no other—there are no constraints.

Senator SESSIONS. Including Aegis ships with missile defense systems.

Secretary Miller? Dr. Miller? Defense Department, what's your understanding?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, that's correct. We have no plans to permanently deploy Aegis cruisers in the Black Sea. But, we have the—

Senator SESSIONS. Well, these—

Dr. MILLER. But, we have the option to position ships there, as consistent with the Montreux Convention.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I certainly can understand that you don't always get well quoted in foreign press—not even in American press. Sometimes you can be misquoted. It's important that we maintain that right. But, I've got to say that we also were told that there would be no connection on missile defense deployment to the START negotiations. And before they even started, we, basically, undermined our ability to work with the Poles and Czechs and have been, from my perspective, on a very uncertain course, with regard to that.

Maybe, Dr. Miller—first, you've also indicated that they—we are committed to, quote, “the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,” and that—and that's in the NPR—and that the President has, quote, “directed a review of potential future reductions in—below the New START levels,” even further down. Will it—can you assure us that this—an objective and careful analysis will be made before such decisions are made?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, yes. And to reiterate what is stated in the NPR, the intention would be to conduct this analysis, look—have a hard look at deterrence requirements and a number of other factors, and to consider any future reductions only after ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, my understanding is that the Russians have absolutely no vision that weapons—nuclear weapons will be eliminated from the world. This is not something on their radar screen. So, we're not going to influence them, I think, by unilateral actions.

And with regard to our huge disparity in tactical weapons—and they are not covered at all in this treaty—it seems to me that the proliferation—the danger of a terrorist obtaining a nuclear weapon would be at least as great, if not greater, that—with regard to a tactical weapon than one that's in a strategic situation. Would you agree?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, in general, I would agree. We do think it's still important to move forward with New START and to strengthen strategic stability. At the same time, we would look forward not just to further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, as you suggested, but also would look forward to Russia taking further steps to improve the security of its tactical nuclear weapons, including their movement deeper back into the interior of the country.

Senator SESSIONS. These are, just, very serious matters, and I'm afraid—I want to be sure that our minds clear that the agreements and treaty-signings, and happy days that those produce, don't color our view of the reality of the dangerous world that we live in. And

in my view, one of the certain ways to in—expand nuclear proliferation to a host of nations in the world—if they lose confidence in the willingness of the United States to utilize a nuclear umbrella to protect them—we’ve got allies and friends who could build nuclear weapons easily. And if they feel, at any point, that we’ve lost our will to maintain sufficient numbers or to use them in their defense, they will have no choice, probably, but to decide to build systems of their own. So, you can end up—the danger is—the risk we could have is that policies hoping to reduce weapons and reduce proliferation could actually create the other.

I guess you’ve thought about that? Dr. Miller? Ms. Tauscher?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, yes, we certainly have. We consulted extensively with allies and partners during the conduct of the Nuclear Posture Review, as well as during the New START Treaty negotiations. And we have expressions of support for both the NPR and New START from allies and partners across the world. I’d be happy to provide some of those for the record, if you’d like.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think there are some that are nervous. I’m aware of that. Would you not agree?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I—we certainly have allies and partners who are nervous about the security situation in which they find themselves. I believe that the expressions that we’ve heard from both—from allies and partners from multiple regions has been to increase their confidence in the United States commitment to their security, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I understand that some are nervous.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much.

Appreciate all of you being here.

Let me just revisit one issue that General Chilton talked about earlier. My understanding is that the—when President Bush entered into the SORT Treaty, the—I think that’s called the “Moscow Treaty”—you referred it—back in 2003—there were no verification measures contained there. And the thinking was that the verification measures in the START Treaty would apply or would meet the need. And now START has expired, so we have no verification measures, at the current time, with regard to the Moscow Treaty. Am I right in that?

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. That’s my understanding.

Senator BINGAMAN. Yeah. So, one of the necessities that we need to think about, in regard to the START—the New START Treaty, is the need to put back in place these verification measures, or a new set of verification measures, and that’s what I understood Under Secretary Miller to talk about, in your comments, earlier.

Let me just go to another issues. I think one of the goals in the NPR is to increase the decision time for launch that the President would have. And I would ask, Dr. Miller, if you could, maybe, explain what reviews are underway or what actions might be possible to accomplish that. Is there really something happening to increase

the decision time the President would have before he would have to decide whether to launch, or not?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Bingaman, there are two elements to thinking about increasing decision time and thinking about how to improve the quality of information available, whatever the decision time.

The first is that we are looking at improvements at our nuclear command-and-control system. We are making some investments now that are—that were decided during the Nuclear Posture Review, and are considering additional steps that it would be more appropriate to discuss in a classified setting.

The second is that as we move forward with a possible ICBM follow-on, we will look at options that have the possibility of survivability without requiring launch- under-attack or launch-on-warning, as would be the case with our current silo-based ICBMs. We think the current ICBMs are extremely stable and stabilizing, particularly as we deMIRV to one warhead each. But, we will look at concepts that would make them even more survivable over time, which would allow them to be part of a Reserve Force.

Senator BINGAMAN. Okay.

Dr. MILLER. Those are really the two principal areas that we have—that we've looked at.

Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Miller, let me also ask about—my understanding is that NATO is currently debating whether or not the deployment of this B-61 gravity bomb—how will decisions by NATO affect the life-extension program of—that NASA—that NNSA is engaged in with regard to that? And how will it affect NNSA's budget, going forward?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Bingaman, you are correct that NATO is currently discussing the future of the NATO nuclear deterrent. Irrespective of the decisions that are taken at NATO, the United States will continue to have a requirement for the B-61, both for our heavy bombers associated with the strategic deterrent, also for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that is moving forward now, and we're planning on a dual-capability for that aircraft that would be available in the 2017 timeframe.

General CHILTON. Senator, if I could add to that. There has been a lot of, I think, misunderstanding here. We need the B-61, as Dr. Miller said, both for the B-2 bomber and for our current dual-capable aircraft. Folks have tried to make a linkage between the B-61 life-extension program and NATO decisions and F-35 schedule. And they are not linked. We need to move out on the B-61 life-extension program. And that includes current-year fiscal year '10 reprogramming that will be required to get us on schedule so that we can complete the B-61 in time to then, in 2017, move on to the next problem we know we will have to address, which is—will be the W-78 warhead. And so, we are up at a tipping point here, a critical time—and I'll defer to Mr. D'Agostino on this—schedulewise and infrastructurewise and fundingwise, and it's time for action on the B-61.

I would close by saying it is—will be the first opportunity—real opportunity to add the enhanced security and safety features, as well as increasing the effectiveness of the warhead, that are in line with the President's statements that we've seen here in the NPR.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. If I could just add—

Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D'Agostino, did you have a comment?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Absolutely. To back up what the General said, this—the B-61—the requirement still exists for me to maintain and take care of this warhead, as you've heard, from a requirements standpoint. It is one of our oldest warheads in the stockpile. It's the mainstay of our bomber leg of the deterrent. We know we have components that are aging out, and they have to be addressed.

The sequencing, as the General described, is very important. The plan is clear: finish the production work on the W-76, look at what we need to do at the B-61 concurrently. That's why we need to start now on that. When the production work on the W-76 warhead tails off, the sequencing is very—is perfect for taking care of our aging issues and concerns on the B-61. That'll pick up in the year 2017.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask, on this W-78—I understand—I guess I gathered, from Dr. Miller's comments, that one of the things being considered is developing a common—that as a common warhead for the ICBM and the sea-launched ballistic missiles. How much more complicated is that than just a straight life extension of the W-78?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Why don't I start, and then if General Chilton would like to add, that'd be fine.

It clearly is going to be more work—technical work, than just doing one life extension. But, we do know, in—you know, in the aggregate, it's a better—it's better for us to look at this opportunity to consolidate, because there are some—potentially, some very significant savings—savings associated with costs of only doing one life extension to take care of two warheads—real opportunities to reduce the numbers and types of warheads, when we look at commonality and the cost piece, and the real opportunity, frankly, to put the types of safety and security pieces in. It's going to be a little bit more challenging technically, but absolutely worth the study. And, in fact, that's what our 2011 budget proposes to do, is start that effort to study options that we have to do with the W-78.

General CHILTON. I would just echo the point that the study is very important and the promise of the study, with an adaptable-type warhead like this, is that, if we can successfully do this, that I would be comfortable, and I'm sure future STRATCOM commanders would be comfortable, with reducing the numbers warheads we retain in the nondeployed hedged status. And so, this is proceeding forward. And being able to look across the spectrum of refurbish, reuse, and replace is what enables this type of study to go forward.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much.

My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bingaman.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning.

General Chilton, after having some conversations with General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and General Kehler, the head of Air Force Space Command, they are quite concerned about the recent decision by the NASA budget, which originated with the

science advisor, having not consulted the Department of Defense. They suddenly proposed the elimination of the testing of the solid rocket motor, known as the Ares 1-X. It is a derivative of the solid rocket motor of the Space Shuttle, which has four segments. And it adds a fifth segment. There has been one flight test. There is another rocket that is prepared for test. And the question before us is whether or not to continue the testing through fiscal year 2011 of the Ares 1-X, instead of canceling it, as the President's budget proposes.

The concern, as expressed by General Cartwright and General Kehler, is that by shutting down a major part of solid rocket production, it then exponentially increases the cost of the remaining solid rocket motors that the Defense Department has to acquire for the submarine-based ballistic missiles and other ballistic missiles that we have in silos.

And since you're the Strategic Command commander, I'd like for you to give your opinion.

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson, as you are well aware, the solid rocket motor—large solid rocket motors are very complicated devices. They appear to work quite simply, but, indeed, they are—they give us a great advantage, having the technology and industrial base that we have today, to be able to produce them. My—as the Strategic Command commander, my concern, that I know AT&L is taking a close look at in the Department, is what impact this decision might have on the industrial base as we look to the future.

We're committed to look at a follow-on to the land-based strategic deterrent—the Minuteman III. And although the Navy, right now, has decided to continue with the D-5 missile during the transition to the follow-on Ohio class, I would anticipate, in the future, there will be requirements for a follow-on to that missile at some point, as well.

So, I think the question is, Are we postured correctly, from an industrial-base standpoint, to sustain this technology that I believe will be important for the strategic deterrent for many years to come. That's a question that I think we need to take a hard look at, Senator.

It goes beyond just cost, in my view, though. Although cost would certainly, I would imagine, transfer over towards those other programs. But, it is really bigger than cost, in my view.

Senator BILL NELSON. In response to your answer about industrial base, as well as cost, help me understand someone who would—might say that the diameter of the continued testing on Ares 1, since it's a big rocket, is not the same as the diameter on a D-5 or a follow-on to a Minuteman III. And does that have any bearing? Because, would it still affect the same industrial base that you're talking about?

General CHILTON. Senator, I guess I don't understand the argument. Again, a solid—a large solid rocket motor has the issues of getting the chemistry right and the production of a solid propellant. It has issues with liners, it has issues with inhibitors, it has issues with guidance and control. Thrust-vectoring systems with the solid rocket motor are not simple to do—casing issues, et cetera. All of these are very complicated components of any large solid rocket

motor, whether it be the D-5, the Minuteman III or the Shuttle SRBs or any follow-on to that. This is what I'm worried about, is that we don't lose that formula and expertise for being able to address all the engineering challenges associated with all of those things, not the least to mention are joints between segments, as we go forward.

Senator BILL NELSON. I think the overall DOD has been taken by surprise in this NASA announcement to cancel. And I have, clearly, let it be known my displeasure that there was not—well, here it comes back to one hand of the government not knowing what the other hand of government is doing. And there should have been this kind of consultation.

So, I would encourage you, as one of the major commanders, to weigh in your feelings about this, because there's going to have to be a decision made very soon, with regard to whether or not this industrial base is going to continue. And when I say "very soon," I have put additional money on the budget resolution, that we are in committee today on, to give some flexibility for the future that NASA could continue this testing. But, decisions are going to be made, come June, in our authorizing committee. They're going to be made, come July, in the Appropriations Committee. So, this is upon us. And I urge you, use all deliberate dispatch.

Madam Secretary, I just want to say that, for any one of our colleagues to ascend to the heights of power and prestige that you have, my compliments to you. I want to ask you about what progress you thought was made, in this recent Nuclear Security Summit, on the goal of a nuclear lockdown on the proliferation.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Senator. It's good to see you. I'm honored to be here.

I think that, first of all, this was a historic summit. It was the first time in decades that we've had so many heads of state come. As you know, this is an issue that, when your former colleague, President Obama, was in the Senate, was something that he believed to be a primary threat to the American people and the stabilization of the world community; the idea that there were more states acquiring nuclear weapons than ever before, and that nuclear security has become an issue that we have to all deal with. It's not just the responsibility of the P5 nuclear-weapon states, but it's everyone's responsibility, because everyone's got to patrol their borders, everyone has to deal with export controls, everyone has to deal with the ambitions of terrorists and others that are around the world.

So, I think that the deliverables of—at the Summit were very significant. There were two big baskets of deliverables. The first one was, the United States and Russia, after 10 years, signed the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which commits both countries to moving toward elimination of plutonium, enough plutonium to make 17,000 nuclear weapons. So, this is a sizable commitment, to eliminate this plutonium.

And the second was a basket of highly-enriched uranium offerings from countries like Chile and Canada and Mexico and the Ukraine, where they will eliminate their HEU and actually have both the United States and Russia work to eliminate that HEU.

So, I think that it was significant, from a policy standpoint. It was significant, from the fact that there were real deliverables, of lessening significantly both plutonium and HEU that is in the world.

And I think, probably most significantly, it added to the debate and heightened the sense of awareness, to average Americans and people all over the world, that this is, indeed, a 21st-century problem that is going to take lots of people and, frankly, a lot of political will to abate. But, this—these ambitions of states to get nuclear weapons, and making sure that we have secured both the know-how and the material and the weapons themselves, significantly, both by diminishing their numbers, but also by making investments in keeping them secure, is a priority of the President and, certainly, those heads of state were there and many others.

So, I think it was a very big success. As you know, the Republic of Korea has agreed to host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. This was originally an idea that was meant to be a one-time thing. But, it was such a big success and, I think, accrued to the American people such big national security gains, that we're very happy to see the Republic of North Korea host the 2012—the Republic of Korea host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

You don't have any additional questions, I don't either.

We are very grateful to this panel for your terrific work in this area. You have proposed a number of documents, here, and important treaties and reviews, which will set the direction of this country for decades, in an area that is of critical importance to the world, to world security, to the fight against terrorism. And your involvement, all of you, is a major contribution to our security, and we're grateful for it. We're grateful for your being here today.

And we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.]