

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER VIO-
LENT EXTREMISM**

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:58 a.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, Graham, and LeMieux.

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Christine G. Lang.

Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Great Lundeborg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux, and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning. Thank you all for coming.

We're going to hear from two panels. The first panel: Garry Reid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Countering Terrorism; Ambassador Dan Benjamin, Counterterrorism Coordinator at the Department of State; and Lieutenant General Frank Kearney, Deputy Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

We want to welcome you all.

And the topic is timely, because—9 years since September 11, 2001, and the United States has been engaged in this fight with al Qaeda, and now associated groups, particularly in the Afghan/

Pakistan region, as well as Iraq. And, of course, al Qaeda is metastasizing around, and now we find it over parts of Africa, on the Arabian Peninsula, et cetera.

And then Christmas Day. It reminds us that they still have the capability of launching attacks, and they can launch them from many different places in the world.

This threat of violent extremism is complex and it has the ability to destabilize countries, create economic crisis, and, of course, cause violence. And so, what we want to do is better understand the extent of the threat posed by this loose network of groups that comprise all of these terrorist groups and affiliates.

And so, in light of this threat, we are understanding that we can't rely on overwhelming military power, we need a comprehensive strategy that works and a strategy that will counter this violent extremism that is now coming out in various forms. And we've got to employ the full spectrum of instruments of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, informational, and a lot of other things, like helping poverty, digging wells, growing crops, getting kids educated, and bring that all into a cohesive vision for action.

So, I want to welcome our panelists. What I am asking you all to do is—we're going to insert your written statements; it'll be as part of the official record. What I'd like you to do is, let's have a conversation.

We'll just go right down the line, with you, Mr. Reid, first. And share with us for about 5 minutes—we'll go to the Ambassador, then to the General—and then we want to get into a discussion with some questions.

Mr. Reid.

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate the opportunity to be here and share your views on the importance and the urgency of this particular issue. And I appreciate you entering my statement into the record. I would just like to take a couple of minutes to hit about three key points that are in that statement.

The first is, right upfront, that—as you said, Mr. Chairman, the urgency and the importance of this topic, and to emphasize that—our recognition, and I think everyone involved—that this countering extremism is the pathway to long-term success out of this period of current active conflict that we're in, and have been in, as you said, Mr. Chairman, for many years.

The counterterrorism activities, for good reasons, get a lot of attention, but the counterideology efforts are the more strategic and the more important, and they are the—in some ways, the more complex. And we share your views on that.

We recognize—the Secretary recognizes, and he's said, that we cannot capture/kill our way to victory. But, even within that, the manner in which we go about our counterterrorism activities, more and more we are learning and adapting that even those ap-

proaches—within those approaches, we can support and reinforce our counterideology, counterextremist objectives, as well.

Collaboration across the government is crucial. We know that. I think we're doing a pretty good job of that, but I know we have more to do in that area. And we're also getting strong convergence with allies. And I think the greatest recent example of that is the acceptance in our NATO allies of the new strategy in Afghanistan/Pakistan, and the things that are coming together there; the appointment of a civilian—NATO senior civilian. All of these types of things that are coming out of Afghanistan are very symbolic of some of our learning and our adaptation, on our side, to this problem.

At the same time, the enemy is significant, agile, and adaptive. I would say the enemy has maximized the use of global technology and global information tools to his great advantage. Radicalization process has been accelerated. You talked about the Christmas bombing. Our understanding of that is about a 6-week process from, you know, contact to training to recruitment to dispatch to execution. 9/11, from when bin Laden approved it, was about 2 and a half years in the making. A more complex operation, but I think the point of that is, they have really improved their ability to radicalize people and bring them into the fight, which, of course, severely hampers our ability to disrupt and get ourselves involved in the process.

They have a captive audience. There's a lot of—a lot has been said about the media exploitation, their use of the Internet and chat rooms and spreading virulent messages, spreading false information. They have an advantage there; they can spread lies and untruths, and we obviously operate in a different environment.

My third point is just, for DOD, the implications vary by the environment and by the area where we are operating. In Iraq and Afghanistan, in the sort of theater-of-war context, we have a wider range of activities that range from the tactical to operational to strategic, tightly nested with the diplomatic and Department of State objectives, although down on the tactical end, obviously, there's a little more scope and scale of activities that we do, but the full range of information operations—supporting the host nation, supporting their media needs and objectives, and supporting the U.S. Ambassador in our National strategic objectives.

The key, here, in these areas is that we reinforce and establish the role and the sufficiency and the capability of the partner nation's security force. The DOD role is always going to be heavily on the creating security-space side, whether that's creating a security force's capability or creating space on our own, to allow these counterideology initiatives and efforts to take root and lead to governance and development and all the long-term factors.

The rest of the world, we have a different role, largely in support of Department of State colleagues, largely in support of the U.S. Ambassador in these countries outside of the—Iraq and Afghanistan. We have a well-developed, embedded information support team capability there. It's—manifests itself, as you've seen, Mr. Chairman, in different task forces and counterterrorism initiatives in the different theaters. And, of course, we still, there, work to im-

prove the capabilities of the host nation and to get them more and more in the lead.

I think there's many examples of success in each—within each of these areas. I included some of those in my statement.

For us, going forward, we know, within the Department, we need to continue along the path the Secretary has put us on, in terms of rebalancing our capabilities to address some of these areas that have been enabling or supporting capabilities, but really take a front seat in our ability to field and support these activities. We want to build our expertise. We're spending a lot of time on building regional expertise, the things that General McChrystal's been coming out with, about understanding the environment, understanding the culture. We're bringing those in and building those into our force development and into our forces and our pre-mission training and all of these sorts of things, which, for us, feed right into how we relate to the population, which is a primary step for us. We have, probably, more surface contact than anybody, and we certainly have a lot of young troops out there, and they have a vital role in this. They've got to understand the environment, understand the people, and we're placing emphasis on that.

Within the government, we continue, at the National level, the Washington level, to refine the strategies, do the best we can to define the lanes in the road. I don't think there's confusion on the lanes in the road, but, understandably, this is all a relatively new endeavor in the grand scheme of things, and we continue to learn as we go. And we'll continue to do that and continue to collaborate.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions and, again, thank you for inviting me here today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Reid.

Mr. Ambassador, before I call on you, let me call on our colleague Senator LeMieux.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE LEMIEUX

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing.

And I want to add my welcome, to the Chairman, for the folks who are here to testify today.

This subcommittee has an important role to play, not only for anticipating emerging threats to our Nation's security, but ensuring that our brave men and women in uniform are prepared to counter those threats. I add my thanks to you for the fight that you're doing to make sure that we're keeping our troops and the people in this country safe and free. I look forward to the discussion of the critical issues.

Mr. Chairman, with that, I'll submit the rest of my statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator LeMieux follows:]

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, thank you very much for the invitation to be here today. Thank you, in particular, for your interest in what we at State Department consider one of the premier issues of this period. I—you have my formal statement, let me just summarize some of the points.

For years, while I was outside the government, I had been arguing strongly that we needed to be doing a better job on countering violent extremism, and had to make it a top priority. And now that I have the opportunity to work on these issues as coordinator, I have to say, I'm both challenged and more than a little humbled by the prospect of doing so.

It is absolutely essential that we do what we can to undermine the al Qaeda narrative and prevent the radicalization of more individuals. We have done a great job at tactical counterterrorism, at taking people off of the street and keeping them from harming others, but curtailing the influence of militants and preventing further recruitment is obviously where the strategic imperative comes now.

The primary goal of countering violent extremism is to stop those most at risk of radicalization from becoming terrorists. And there are many different approaches for doing this, including social programs, counterideology initiatives, working with civil society to delegitimize the al Qaeda narrative, and, where possible, to provide possible alternatives.

Because—Senator Reed, good to see you—because, in particular, when we're talking about that part of the spectrum that is closest to violence, closest to being terrorists, we have to work from a lot of different angles, and we have to rely on a lot of programming where messaging itself may not do the job. So, that means that we have to work on capacity-building, on outreach to civil society, on education, as well as, of course, always having that messaging component. We have to work with host governments and NGOs, we have to work with clerics and other influentials who can have a role in communities where we may not have the direct, sort of, access that we have elsewhere.

Clearly, this requires us, in the U.S. Government, to work across boundaries within our departments, and across the interagency, because there are a whole array of organizations that will be involved in implementing these programs.

Because I consider this mission vital, one of the first things I did after being sworn in was to start developing a CVE team, something that did not exist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism before. Last fall, my office convened a 1-day interagency summit to examine USG/CVE efforts to consolidate lessons learned and to try to bring a little more clarity to the different lanes, as Mr. Reid has discussed. I think we're making progress there. We had very high-level attendance, and we were quite happy with the outcome.

I think we all agreed, then and now, that we really do need to understand the dynamics of communities that are at risk. Different agencies in USG have done a very impressive job to deepen the government's understanding, and there's been a lot of research and analysis done, both in the intelligence community and in academia.

Every community, whether long-rooted or part of a new diaspora, has a unique political, economic, and social landscape; and for that reason, we know that one-size-fits-all programming will not work.

It's critically important that our embassies be on the frontline, that they be able to tailor programs to the needs of the communities that they're addressing. And for—partly for this reason, I've spent half of this year and a lot of last year on the road, traveling in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, to talk about CVE programming.

You mentioned important social factors. Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan has urged us to address what he calls the "upstream factors" and confront the political, social, and economic conditions that our enemies exploit to win over new recruits.

I think it's important to understand that we're talking about two dimensions of the problem; on the one hand, those communities that are more at risk for radicalization, but we also, more broadly, need to beat back the al Qaeda narrative in the broader public, because this is an ideology that has brought appeal in many societies, even if the large majorities in those societies are not going to engage in violence. So, we need to also have a level of engagement with these countries that is based on mutual respect and common interests, and it needs to be a very direct kind of communication with them, to undermine anyone's legitimation of violence as a means for social change.

We're working hard to develop a variety of different CVE programs. One that's already in its second year is the Ambassador's Fund for Counterterrorism. This typically brings locally targeted programs and marries them up with soft-power tools and counterterrorism assistance to combat extremism. We give up to \$100,000 per grant to embassies for this kind of project.

S/CT has requested \$15 million in fiscal 2011 for new CVE programming, and we intend to use those funds to focus on hot spots of radicalization and recruitment; again, working closely with embassies, the intelligence community, and others who can tell us about the dynamics of these at-risk populations. We work closely with the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, with the State Department Representative to Muslim Communities, and USAID.

Let me just say, we have an excellent relationship with the Department of Defense. We're very grateful for Secretary Gates' leadership in this area and his emphasis on fostering a strong partnership with—between Defense and State. This cooperation is paying off as we explore new ways to collaborate and innovate on CVE programming. We're learning how to complement each others' strengths and efforts, and determine which CVE efforts are best done by the military and which are best handled on the civilian side. We've been in discussions with a number of different offices within OSD and the combatant commands to discuss funding issues and to discuss how we can improve delivery of programming.

We're also working to encourage foreign partners to do more in this area. My office hosted a CVE workshop with Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Dutch, Spain, and the U.K. in early November as a first step to developing a more cooperative CVE approach, and we'll have a follow-on in May.

Let me close by making two points. One, as we do this kind of work, it's vital that we hue to our values. As President Obama has said from the outset, there should be no tradeoff between security and our values, and so we've moved to rectify excesses of the past by working to close the prison at Guantanamo, forbidding torture, and developing a more systematic approach to dealing with detainees. All of these will help us undermine the al Qaeda claims about the nature of the United States.

Second, and lastly, I'm optimistic about our ability to make progress on CVE. As Mr. Reid said, this—these are still early days. We are going to innovate, and we are going to fail sometimes; but, I think there is a broad understanding, as he said, about the strategic nature of this endeavor, and I think there is, really, broad understanding, across the executive branch, of the importance of this work and just how vital it is for our success against the terrorist threat.

Thank you for your attention, and I'd be happy to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
General?

**STATEMENT OF LTG FRANCIS H. KEARNEY III, USA, DEPUTY
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

General KEARNEY. Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, Senator Reed, thanks for the opportunity to be here with my colleagues.

Let me just state upfront that what they have said, we are largely in agreement with, and we work in a complementary manner to achieve our objectives. We look to the National implementation on the war on terror and its four pillars, one of which is countering violent extremism, to nest our 7500-series global war on terrorism campaign plan for the Department of Defense. The description about countering violent extremism, its three strategic objectives and 12 subobjectives, all fit nicely into the discussions that my two colleagues have mentioned. And we recognize that we have moved, really, out of the main effort being attacking terrorists and their capabilities, to countering violent extremism as the forefront of the indirect methods that we now apply globally and in the two theatres of war to get at fighting violent extremism.

Our view of the world, not just the theaters of war, would indicate that crime, migration, and extremism all come together to create conditions that allow violence to emerge from those three threat streams.

We work twofold, both as a force provider, largely in providing troops that build partner capacity through security force assistance, and in that role, not only deliver the tactical and technical means to assist our partners, but also focus on values, rule of law, and working in a way that supports the people, so that it supports the counternarrative that we have and underpins the legitimate governments in those countries.

Second, we work as a synchronizer for the Department of Defense for the global war on terror, and so, we look across the spectrum of what our partners do. In countering violent extremism, in

particular, you'll find that we have the expanded regional PSYOPS program, where we have up to 25 military information support teams and embassies throughout the world working on the mission support plans that the Ambassador and his country team have for achieving their objectives in country.

We have civil-military affairs support elements that, again, are working inside of countries globally to achieve a good assessment to complement what the country teams have, and bring with them the ability to mobilize military capabilities to help in assessing and adjusting the conditions, again, that cause crime, migration, and extremism to flourish.

We also are the lead for the Department of Defense in countering threat finance, which is the fuel that allows the messaging and the message to get out on the street to do things, and a small piece of that is our counter- narcoterrorism piece.

But, largely, as we develop, for the future, as assistant Secretary Reid mentioned, we are looking at how to deepen the capabilities of our force in looking at development, diplomacy, and our normal defense tasks as the place where we need to get good immersion in understanding the background, cultures, language of the affected countries in which we operate.

We thank you for the opportunity to speak here today, sir, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kearney follows:]

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, what are you doing to make it less attractive for people to be converted to violent extremism?

Mr. REID. I'll—if you will, I'll start, Mr. Chairman.

On the front end, we have to take actions to protect ourselves. And, as I mentioned, the way we go about doing that and bringing in more and more our partner nations—involving them in this process builds the legitimacy of our actions, it removes the argument of “the occupier,” “the global dominator,” “the hegemon operating freely.” The more we bring in partner nations and transition them into the lead, I think, in the first instance in—of addressing immediate threats is an important step.

Supporting that is, as Ambassador Benjamin talked about—and more in their lane, I believe—is the ideological, eroding the basis of their violent ideology. And the information programs that DOD brings into that, in support of enabling the spreading of the positive messages and doing a broad range of actions in the local areas that separate and isolate the insurgents and the extremists from the local population. Creating security space is an important step, but just as important is highlighting and exposing the fraudulent aspect of the ideology that they're spreading, and getting—and encouraging the local population to stand up for themselves. We have to break this—

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, let's take an example, right there. Exposing the fraudulent ideology. Now, what they've done is, they've taken the Koran and they've made it to say something that it isn't. So, what do you do to get out the message of what the true teachings of the Koran are?

Mr. REID. Again, our part is to create the space for that to happen, to break the intimidation cycle and the dominance cycle over those voices that are capable and willing and credible to speak in

the communities, and getting the governance—getting the district governors and the mayors and these folks involved, and allowing them to hold the shuras, allowing them to reconstitute the social order that has been fractured through intimidation and everything else that the enemy is doing. That's what we can do, and maybe more on the message side—

Senator BILL NELSON. Do those local officials know the true teachings of the Koran? Or have they been brainwashed into what the violent extremist version taught by some of the elements of al Qaeda are?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, Senator, as with any great religion, there are an enormous number of different streams within it. The overwhelming majority of Muslims, obviously, do not embrace a vision of their own religion that has violence at its heart. But, nonetheless, we do find it an important task to engage with influentials, and with clerical leaders, in different countries around the world to give them the media tools and to create the political space so that they can get that message across.

I think it's very important to underscore that the United States is not exactly the right megaphone, if you will, for what the true message of the Koran is. This is a dispute among Muslims. But, what we want to do is help them fight that fight and underscore, you know, the nonviolent message, and delegitimize those who would argue that the world is about war and conflict.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, for example, it certainly is not a teaching in the Koran that Muslims ought to be killing other Muslims.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No—

Senator BILL NELSON. So, how do you go about countering that, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, of course, we have a wide range—

Senator BILL NELSON. You said that Americans can't necessarily do it, so what's the plan of the United States State Department to get that message out?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, we're working with numerous different countries to build up their capacity. You know, most of them have their own ministries of religion and have extensive contacts with the clergy in their own country. We're enabling them to do a better job to broadcast a message of moderation and to identify those who preach violence as being corrupters of the religion. That's really one of our key initiatives is building the capacity in these countries to deal with these communications challenges and fight the war of ideas.

Senator BILL NELSON. And how do you build that capacity? What are you specifically doing with those religious leaders that you mentioned?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, there are a whole array of different kinds of endeavors. We may do people-to-people exchanges between leaders from Muslim communities in the United States in these countries, we may support different kinds of conferences, we may help these countries, especially through the activities of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, to strengthen their own ability to run modern communications operations in their governments.

There's really a very wide array of different kinds of programming that we can do in this area.

Senator BILL NELSON. General, your troops find a much more acceptable audience in those villages, don't they, when the deradicalization through what we've just been talking about, about the true teachings of Islam, is taught? Tell us your experience with your soldiers.

General KEARNEY. Senator, we've—there are a lot of great initiatives going on right now—one of them, the local defense initiative, underway in parts of Afghanistan—where our forces are down there, at the lower level, dealing with tribal elders, and having a conversation with them about, not only deradicalization and the tenets of their own faith—you know, we normally don't have that level of conversation. What we have is a conversation about how to empower them to make their own decisions, how to empower them to resolve disputes, how to give them back the opportunity to preach their version of how they read Islam to the people in their village. And that varies from village to village to village.

My experience in SOCCENT, as the commander there, with the symposia that we would conduct, hosted in Jordan, hosted inside of the Emirates, to moderate nations willing to come forward and speak, is that they want to have a conversation on religion and they would bring in folks to talk, at the clerical level, to us. But, largely, that conversation for the military is to give them the space, as Secretary Reid said, to allow them to be able to manage their populations in a way that they want to, and understand.

But, clearly, they have been infected—as you said, metastization has occurred with the al Qaeda message out there, and it gives them the space to not be under the pressure of either the Taliban, al Qaeda, some other radical, extremist organization that's causing—influencing behavior on their populations. They want their opportunity for them to lead at their level, to set their own tone, their own interpretation.

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator LeMieux.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you for those questions. And I want to touch back on that very important topic in a moment.

But, I want to take this opportunity to do something that we don't get a chance to do much, here in government, because we're always handling the crisis of the day and the crisis of now, to really focus on what the Chairman, I think, has done of good job of structuring this meeting on, which is emerging threats.

We know about al Qaeda in Afghanistan; we're fighting that war. We know about al Qaeda in the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We hear stories now of—and are concerned about al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa and other places in Africa and throughout Southeast Asia. My preamble is to this question: What's the number-one emerging threat that you see? What's keeping you up at night? What are you forward-looking at, a threat that might be different than the threat that we're facing today? And I'd like each of you to try to take a stab at that question.

Mr. REID. What is particularly concerning—and it relates back to the Christmas attempt—is the compactness and maybe the efficiency that they are applying to this process, because it really cuts

underneath our ability to detect it and do something about it. The tighter they compress that, the harder it gets for us.

So—and as you said, Senator, we know where the pockets, where the franchises are, if that's what—if that's a good word—or the affiliates, maybe. And we watch them. But, given our ability to understand what they're doing, which is limited, in the first instance, by our access to some of these areas—and clearly, in the Maghreb area, we have a limited footprint—but, given that standoff from which we observe and try to understand this, and the sources of information intelligence that go with that, we're only—we're still looking through a straw, in many cases. So, that is a concern.

At the same time, that straw, such that it is, we get a lot of pieces. And I'm sure you see this every day, "So- and-so is doing this, this person is doing this." You don't know which one is real, or which one is going to be the next one. So, we have a—sort of a broad net cast, we have small threads of information. And, within all of that, the enemy is maneuvering around to really defeat our detection and our knowledge system, and our border security systems, as well.

So, that's my greatest concern. It—and it leads over into some, you know, historical work about leaderless jihad and these other things, where—we're oriented very well now to networks and sub-networks, but still it's a relatively hierarchical approach to the problem. And when you got yourself radicalized, or your lone wolf, or these folks—

Senator LEMIEUX. Right.

Mr. REID.—who aren't connected, but are enabled by everything the other group is doing, that's—and they all have pretty good potential to do a significant act of violence against us—that is my answer to the question about—

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Reid.

Ambassador?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes, Senator, two answers. One of them is, I think, an elaboration on Mr. Reid's remarks. The—as the barriers to entry for sophisticated and deadly technologies fall, it becomes more and more possible for ever-smaller groups to carry out really dangerous attacks, and for individuals themselves to carry them out. And that is a really difficult problem for us to grapple with, because, obviously, the bigger the group, the more chances we have for catching it in our intelligence collection, and for having some kind of insight into it. The smaller the group, the more empowered the individual, the more difficult the challenge for us. And that is part of the reason why I think countering extremist ideologies is so vital, because if we can stop them upstream, when they're becoming radicalized, then obviously we have an easier job of it than when they're downstream and getting into all kinds of dangerous activities. That's one thing.

The other thing I would point out, which is something that I think we don't pay quite enough attention to, is the fact that there are other organizations out there that are looking more al Qaeda-like and seem to be interested in playing a global role in terrorism.

The one that probably keeps me awake most is Lashkar-e-Taiba, in South Asia, which, of course, was responsible for the Mumbai bombings. The Mumbai bombings did—attacks did kill a number of

Americans. And this is a designated group, and one we take very seriously. But, I think we need to build even greater concern and greater programming to target this group, because its target set looked very much like an al Qaeda target set, and if it decides that it wants to wage the global terrorist effort, then that will be a real challenge for us; it has a lot more men under arms than al Qaeda has.

So, those, I would say, are the two big concerns.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Ambassador.

General?

General KEARNEY. Senator, I worry at night about the decentralization of the idealistic message and the ability to mobilize without us being able to track, and I think my two colleagues have basically said the same thing. But, our success in eliminating leaders in these organizations, and their ability to communicate, which are two targeting lines in countering the extremist networks, have caused them to leap to operating on their own accord inside the intent of the al Qaeda message. And so, that means you can't see that.

Mr. Reid has talked about the ability for them to compress the timeline. They've gained agility because they no longer have to have hierarchical approvals. That, coupled with the ability for them to get people into the United States and the information that's on the Internet about our weaknesses, our threats, and the ability to use tools, here, that exist, that you don't need to smuggle in, worries me.

Industrial accidents. I you just look at our infrastructure and the way we move hazardous materials in the United States, we are potentially at great risk for people who are empowered, enabled, and, through knowledge that we have open in our society, to be able to take things.

The last thing I would say is, I worry very much about transregional actors who can cause eruptions in their region. And as we are looking at defending the homeland as one of our key pillars, that something spurs up as a result of a Lashkar-e-Taiba, you know, as they continue to try and trigger some kind of impact between Pakistan and in India, in the region. And so, it's keeping an eye on the ball forward as we protect the ball here at home.

Senator LEMIEUX. Well, I appreciate all of those answers. And I think the thing that I want to focus on, that was a common thread through what all of you said, is that—this lifecycle shortening of taking a disaffected person and turning them into a weapon. And if you look at—and it goes back to trying to stem the radical ideology in the first place, because, hopefully, if there's no water to put on the growing threat, you can stop it before it starts. There has to be that radical ideology. But, the disaffected person that can now be turned into a threat—and whether it's Major Hasan or whether it's Abdul Mutallab, or now we see this arrest of Colleen LaRose, who they're describing as "Jihad Jane," in Pennsylvania—this ability to take one person and very quickly radicalize them—and, as you said, General, with all of the tools that are available and all of the information that's available, to turn them into a weapon is—you know, that's very disconcerting.

I think the other point I'd like to make on this, Mr. Chairman, is that the combination of those disaffected people with nation-states that sponsor terror, I think, is the next thing, and that's something that worries me. It's one thing to have a tragedy, like we had at Fort Hood, which was horrific. It's another, still, if that disaffected extremist gets hooked up with some radicalized country that sponsors terrorism and delivers a threat that kills tens of thousands of people in this country.

So, one thing I'd like to ask you to focus on, and then maybe we'll have an opportunity to speak about it later in this hearing, is, What's the potential combination that you might see between these groups and then state sponsors of terror, whether it's Iran or in our own hemisphere? What I'm very concerned about is the combination of Iran with Venezuela, and the knowledge that we have, that Hamas and Hezbollah are trying to set up shop and do have some operations in this hemisphere. So, I ask you to focus on that, as well.

And I've talked a lot, Mr. Chairman, so—I know that Senator Reed probably has some questions, too. We can get back to it. But, I would ask that the three of you focus on that, and perhaps we can talk about it in just a bit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Reed?

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here today.

One of the aspects of our response to these threats is the coordination between agencies of the government. And I think that's a perennial challenge for any government against any challenge, any threat.

Let me, sort of, divide it into a couple of different areas. First, there are areas we have access to, and then there's denied areas. And start with Ambassador Benjamin, and then Mr. Reid and General Kearney about—Is there a formal division of responsibilities when—in those areas where we have access? Is it led by State? Coordinated by State? And then, those areas with nonaccess, is it, by default, led by DOD? So.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, the White House has been paying a great deal more attention to CVE issues in the last year. And the coordination is being undertaken through the CSG, the Counterterrorism and Security Group, which is, I think, one of the oldest interagency groups in the government, and there is now a sub-CSG devoted to CVE issues.

Obviously, on a lot of these issues—on specific endeavors, State has the lead, but there is a lot of shared responsibility, precisely because, as I think I may have said before you came in, a lot of the programming that is going on here is across interagency boundaries. So, this is really a—very much, a whole-of-government approach; and so far, you know, we've been quite pleased with the outcome.

Senator REED. Secretary Reid?

That has a nice ring to it, by the way. That has a very nice ring. [Laughter.]

Mr. REID. Senator, you're a handsome man, as well, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Mr. REID. The——

Senator REED. You've said enough. [Laughter.]

Go ahead.

Mr. REID. Our—there's a lot that gets written in the press, sometimes, about the Defense Department operating around the world, but, the fact is, again, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, everywhere we're operating, we're operating through, with, and in support of, and in coordination with, the U.S. Ambassador in every country. There is not a forced-entry component to this particular discussion.

The combatant commanders, obviously, work within their areas of responsibility, and they work very closely with the country teams, in every instance. We have, and the combatant commanders have, their theater security engagement plans, and they are all nested with State's strategic plans and the mission-support plans, and we work in support. So, in terms of who's leading, in our view, we're supporting in those areas outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator REED. And, General Kearney, from your aspect of it?

General KEARNEY. Absolutely, sir. I mean, clearly, in our role as a synchronizer, we conduct semiannual forums, where we bring together our partners in DOD and our partners in the agency, and some—in all the interagency and our partners in certain international countries—to begin to work together to ply the strategy and translate that into operational actions to do that. And out of that comes taskers to different communities that largely are accepted by them, in a group way in there, so that the lead is identified, largely, by State, I mean, in most cases, because it goes through the country team to do things. And we support, through the geographic combatant commander, the plans that he has laid out, that we provide forces for.

Now, we have certain niche areas where we provide a lot of leadership—counter-WMD, terrorism, building partner capacities, security force assistance and those things; but, it doesn't really matter whether it's a denied area or a permissive area. We really have a government lead that is the Department of State, in most of those, where we have an ambassador; and where we don't have an ambassador, we have a country that's responsible for that—say, Somalia—and we work through the Embassy in Kenya, with our partners there.

So, largely I think it's—there's good bilateral coordination and multilateral coordination that moves together in regional pockets. If you could stitch that together into a better quilt, with stronger thread, that's probably need—needs to be where we need to go, sir.

Senator REED. There's an area that's implicit in a lot of the discussion, and that is cyberspace, in terms of countering the message and delivering a positive message. Once again, is—are you comfortable that we've organized our efforts effectively to deal in that area, in that cyberspace?

Mr. Secretary?

Mr. REID. I think we're still work—we're still learning. The challenge in operating in the cyberworld is, you can find many examples of well-accepted things that happen in the physical world. When you try to draw a parallel of that type of activity, and particularly with defense activities, into the cyberworld, you very quickly get into an area that all of the—attorneys in all depart-

ments get very uncomfortable with, about the legal aspects of Defense involvement.

And on the Defense side, of course, the decision to stand up the Cyber Command has been made, it addresses a defensive and—the full range of challenges there. And we’re going to move forward and implement that, and strengthen our defensive capabilities, while continuing to work in the interagency, across the government, to identify where the boundaries are, in terms of Defense-led activities. But, it’s clearly complicated. I would not profess that we fully understand, or that we’ve fully solved the problem, but we’re applying a lot of energy and effort, and got a lot of smart folks looking at it. But, it will be, many cases, sort of case by case and learning as we go about use of Defense authorities, but also about the particular applications and where we get the greatest effect.

Senator REED. Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I agree with Mr. Reid, this is an enormous challenge with, really, endless implications in—if you look at the history of terrorism, the Internet is probably the most important technological innovation since dynamite, and it’s enormously difficult to deal with all the different aspects.

We, at State, are working very hard on building capacity with our partners around the world so that they can deal with all the different manifestations of terrorism that are on the Internet, in terms of both spreading the ideology, fundraising, recruitment, organizational logistics, and the like. And that is a central part of what we do.

Some of the more defensive issues are nested both at DOD and in the intelligence community. And, of course, those would probably best be discussed in another forum.

I think that we are still working on how we organize ourselves for these things. We’re certainly well out of the starting blocks, but the challenges keep multiplying.

And I think that, for us in particular, in the context of this hearing, it’s important to note that we are working a lot with NGOs and others to ensure that there are lots of contradictory messages to the al Qaeda narrative, to the al Qaeda ideology, that are on the Web. It’s a challenge to get it in a way that is attractive to those who are at risk of radicalization. But, if we are going to master this, we’re going to have to master the Internet, I think.

Senator REED. General?

General KEARNEY. Without question, it is the domain at which competition for the influence of the people is the greatest, has the most immediate impact, and has the widest spread. I think it’s where we are most nascent. I think we continue to learn, and I think it’s a house divided on authorities to provide opportunities to counter, opportunities to influence, opportunities to take apart their message and provide an alternate message. And I think we are working through that, Senator.

I don’t think that Cyber Command will be the command that does that. They will deal with how we move through and negotiate that, and where and what we’re negotiating on. But, the content of the message—it’s where the conversation is being held. And I think we need to move with alacrity to lay out the roles in how we’re going to do that. We provide a small piece of that in our com-

mand, and have some technical expertise through our psychological operations piece, but it gets nested in the content of the message, and really is only a multiplier to what needs to be led by policy and the competing narrative, and then walked down into the people who are going to execute the conversations in each one of those different sites on the Internet where they are being held on a daily, hourly, and minutely basis.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BILL NELSON. Some of my proudest moments are seeing Americans abroad doing their daily task at a local level, be it a lieutenant, a captain using CERP funds in addition to being a warrior, and helping rebuild a community, seeing USAID doing, just, tremendous stuff; the devotion of our diplomatic corps, and so forth.

But, once you get above that local level, where Americans are really trying to make a difference down there, I get worried about, number one, stovepipes—that one organization can't cooperate, or the communication is not there with another—and I worry about balance, balance between the military and the civilian agencies as we are trying to counter this terrorism. So, would you all address those issues of balance and stovepipes and how do we break them down?

Mr. REID. Sure. Do you want me to keep going first? Do you want to go first?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. You've done a great job. I'm happy to go first, whatever you like.

Mr. REID. No—thank you, Senator. And it's clearly an area where I think we have tried just about everything. The flattening of the stovepipes—the cylinders of excellence, other might call them—clearly is something we've taken on. And, as you said, it starts off on the ground and it tends to work better at lower levels. But, I would say, and as you have probably seen at the one-star/two-star levels of command, we have implemented and had the big-tent approach to our interagency task forces—you know, and many cases, by invitation, you know, “Come on in”—and the interagency has done that. If you've been out to the Jyada—in Belad or in Bagram, those are good examples of where we have brought in everyone that was willing and able to come and participate and get involved. And it isn't sort of the older model of a liaison officer, an LNO, with a telephone back to their headquarters, it's someone that's actively involved and part of the team, as much as we can possibly do that.

And on the defense side, and our leaders—you know, one thing that's occurring, of course, is—those that were the lieutenants several rotations, or now several years ago, are growing through these ranks; and in many cases, this new dynamic, this new interagency warfighting, is about all they've experienced. So, unfortunate that this is going for so many years; but, in terms of building our—and rebaselining our understanding of how we operate, I think that is happening.

As you get further up, you know, I can just say, from our end here, I used to be a Special Forces operator, I started the war with General Kearney in—that long ago. And what I see here in Wash-

ington is—and Ambassador Benjamin mentioned it—we’ve got more and more groupings where we’re bringing people together. He talked about a subgroup on CVE under the counterterrorism group, these types of things. We’ve reorganized, in OSD, to have focus on strategic engagement and to have the right structures to plug in, here in Washington, with the other agencies’ groups and with the multiagency groups. That’s the approach we’re taking, and always looking for more opportunity to do that, to break down those barriers.

The communications effort, I think the NCTC has done a very good job of bringing collaboration forums together on the networked information systems at all classification levels. Very difficult to do, but month by month, you know, I’ve—I have new ways to do my job, to interact in the interagency, that I didn’t have, you know, a year ago or 2 years ago. So that—I think that is how we’re trying to tackle it on this end, as well.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. First of all, Senator, I agree with you completely that it’s really stirring to go out to a mission and to—for example, I was just in Nairobi—and to see both the people who are doing public diplomacy, the USAID people, and the people who are working on the military’s MIST teams, all talking about how they’re dealing with CVE issues. And I really do think that, at that level, the coordination is quite inspiring and quite positive.

Obviously, in large bureaucracies, stovepiping is a big issue. I think one of the solutions is to establish, early on, priorities that are shared by the senior leaders. And I was really pleased that, when we did our summit on CVE, back in November, we did it jointly with NCTC and we had everyone, you know, at the office director desk or assistant Secretary level around the table, and there was really a great deal of agreement, and also an understanding that we can’t get this done if we embrace business as usual.

So, you need to both have the excellence that’s working at the grassroots bubbling up, but also the insistence from the top that we avoid the usual meaningless fights and get things done.

As for the issue of balancing between civilian and military, again a work in progress. It’s no secret that our friends across the river get a little more, in terms of resources, but we are, as I said, grateful to Secretary Gates and his team for emphasizing the need for a rebalancing there. And we’re also grateful to our DOD colleagues for making it clear that they want to get the job done and that we should look at how we do this best and not wait for every other reiteration of the, you know, very long budget cycle.

So, we are working with others around the government to ensure that worthy projects get funded and that the counternarrative—countering-violent-extremism mission gets accomplished.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, take, for example—we’ve just gone in Afghanistan, and gone in successfully in this town, Marjeh. And I don’t know the specifics there, but let’s just take town X. We’re moving in, the military moves in and clears, first—okay, you want to stabilize the community. We’ve got to give attention to adequate water, we’ve got to show folks how to do crops instead of poppies, you’ve got to attend to education of the children, you’ve got to attend to training of people so that they can have a decent living, a

gainful employment, you have to be concerned about their medical care.

Now, that's a mouthful, and we haven't even gotten into protecting the rights of women, okay? To stabilize that community, you're going to have to look at all of that. So, what do we do, General? How do we break down those stovepipes? Do we come in with a comprehensive package? And who's going to coordinate it once you all have cleared an area?

General KEARNEY. Senator, I mean, it's a good question. I don't think it's hard to lay out, it's just hard to execute. Obviously, before they went into Marjeh, and any town inside of Afghanistan or Iraq, there was an effort to build a phase methodology of security operations, followed by the beginning, an introduction of our partners, both from the host nation and our interagency partners and our international partners, and we've laid out a plan that, when the security situation was at a threshold, we could begin to work on development, governance, and those kind of issues.

You've seen partner—or, Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They are normally the lead for an area to come in, and they are about to become state-led, in almost all cases; they are, in many cases, right now. They have a security complement that comes with them that allows them to be able to work those things.

You have Civil Affairs Teams that are in there initially with the military security force that's going in to do the operation, doing those forward-area assessments to be able to provide information back to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams so that they can begin to do things.

This has been laid out in a very consistent way under General McChrystal's plans, as he is working forward to do things, in a campaign architecture that had—we now are robust enough in Afghanistan, both in our interagency partnership, our NATO allies and other allies, and in our force structure, to be able to do that.

Not 18 months ago, my son, Captain Kearney, was commanding a company in the Korengal Valley, and he was the lone ranger. When he talked to the tribal leadership about their lumber business, he was the person bringing things back, and a measure was made on whether it was worth investing in that. Even though we were there spending human treasure to achieve an end state, it wasn't resourced properly with expertise from our partners with funding, and with a campaign methodology that was going to get us there. We are moving in the correct direction in Afghanistan as a team effort to do things, and largely that's because we've deployed the people to the field to do that.

Senator BILL NELSON. Is this working to counter violent extremism?

General KEARNEY. I think right now it is optimistic, in our view, that it can work. I don't think that we will be the people who determine whether or not this will counter violent extremism. It will really be the governments, at the local, tribal, provincial, and national level, that can adjudicate disputes for the people, allow them to practice, in their own cultural ways, those things that need to be done there.

But, I will tell you that it's different in every valley, every regional command, and every country as we do these things. So, the

approach that's working in Afghanistan, in Marjeh, may not be the same approach that will work in another portion of that country, and clearly is not the approach that will work somewhere else to counter violent extremism. It is a start in that particular environment.

Senator, as we counter these narratives, the "S" is huge, plural. And they are all different, they are all nuanced, they are all ethnically, religiously, culturally based, and each one requires the same detailed solution at that local level as the architecture to support it does at our level as we bring assets to bear.

Senator BILL NELSON. Each of you has said, today, that you all are, quote, "largely" working together. What can we do, in the Congress, to help you bridge the differences so that you're not "largely" working together, that you're more completely working together?

Mr. REID. I would just emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, the point that Ambassador Benjamin has brought up a couple of times. And from our view, in Defense—and you talked about the balance—the best thing you could do for us would be to expand the resources and the capacity within the diplomatic side of the house, in the State Department.

You know, we're arm-in-arm with these folks on the ground and they're involved in the fight. They'd like to have more, we'd like them to have more. Whatever could be done to build that up would be the biggest thing you could do for us. I know that the—working within the authorities and all the legislation and all those things that we have, I think we're pretty comfortable there. It—the challenge is just, as I said earlier, in finding what our role is and where the limits are. But, I don't advocate that there needs to be a big realignment there in this effort. But, strengthening the capacity within the State Department would certainly be a boost for us, as well.

Senator BILL NELSON. So, Mr. Ambassador, you think there is a resourcing and capacity gap?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I do. I agree with Mr. Reid, I think he's got it right. I think that when we can bring more to the table than—you know, than—that always makes things work better.

I will tell you that I was just out holding a regional meeting with a number of posts, and we were talking—we were in Athens, and I was talking to people from, I believe, Iraq and its neighbors, so lots of countries in that region, talking about what we wanted to do in terms of countering violent extremism programming, and one of General Kearney's colleagues, a three-star, was with us, and we realized, after about 20 minutes, that he had never been in such a long conversation about such a small amount of money, so—that is, that we were bringing to the table.

We are resource-constrained in this area, and we would really appreciate any support. And, of course, the long-term political importance that the Congress lays on this mission is an enormous boost for us, in terms of doing our work. And that's what we look to you for.

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to turn to Senator LeMieux, but let me tell you, it just drives me bats when I hear, "Well, we've got the resources to dig a well, but we don't have the resources to go

over here and help with education.” And we’ve got to figure this out, some way.

Senator LeMieux?

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to make a point on a thread that we’ve discussed and that the chairman was talking with you about, as well as Senator Reed, and then I want to turn to a question on a different topic.

On information operations, we have not done as good of a job, I think, that we could have. And I think you said, General, you know, our efforts were in the nascent stages, and we’re building on them.

When I went to Afghanistan at the end of October, I saw one of your folks, General, Colonel Craft, who I think now is back in, maybe, North Carolina, but he was there, working with the Afghan commandos. And we were very impressed with what he was doing, where he was setting up these local radio stations, where he was working with the local governor, and he was getting out the information, so that when the Taliban said, “The Marines just came through and killed a bunch of women and children,” which was a lie, they were able to get out accurate information quickly, have a place where people could get their questions answered.

And it occurs to me, and it occurred to my colleagues on that delegation visit, which was Senator Whitehouse and Senator Burr, that, in terms of this kind of marketing—and that’s not the right term—but information strategy—you know, the United States of America does this better than anyone in the entire world. You know, we get out a communication strategy, whether it’s to—on a political campaign or to sell goods and services—better than anyone in the world. And I have—I’ve had this conversation with General Petraeus, and I understand that, in Iraq, we actually use some outside folks from Britain to help us.

But, I would just encourage you to be mindful of the fact that there are tremendous resources available to you, outside of the traditional military and government structures, to put in place to help sell our message, whether you’re trying to counter the radical interpretation of the Koran, or whether you’re trying to get the information out to people on the ground that we’re doing good things, not bad things. So, I wanted to make that point.

The question I have for you is—I want you to talk about Iran, and I want you to tell us what your views are of Iran as an emerging threat to this country.

Mr. REID. I’ll go back to—for this discussion, Senator, to your question or your comment about the linkages between state sponsors of terror and the radicalization and the broader problems we face. And when you asked that question, the first thing that occurred to me was this example of warfare we saw in the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, in which you had a very strong and very effective Hezbollah-armed activity. And this falls into this area that we are currently trying to get our arms around, some refer to as hybrid warfare. And I agree with you that this is something we should be concerned about, because it brings, yet again, another wave of challenges, and it will put us, if we have to face this type of warfare, in a position where we will be relearning, again, you know, applying lessons we’ve learned in this broad

counterterrorism fight, combined with other lessons and other methodologies, some of which maybe have been—have not been things we’ve been doing a lot of lately. So, that combination of an unregulated terrorist organization, working at the behest of, or in support of, an aggressive state sponsor, is particularly alarming for us and what we do about it and how we organize our capabilities. And, I know, going forward—and there is a lot of ongoing work on this to really sink our teeth into what the implications are.

More broadly, to your question, sir, obviously we’re concerned about what’s coming out of Iran, in terms of its nuclear program. The administration has signaled a desire to move towards a different approach, a pressure approach. We’re engaging with our allies on what those approaches might look like. You know, I would just add that, you know, where we want to focus that is on—really on the bad actors, and not do it in a way that affects the majority of Iranian people that are not involved in what’s happening with the elites in the regime and their global, sort of, terrorist conglomerate that they’re fielding.

So, it is absolutely an area of great concern in that regard, as well.

Senator LEMIEUX. Ambassador?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, there’s no question that Iran was, and remains, the number-one sponsor—state sponsor of terrorism. Its support for Hezbollah, for Hamas, for a number of smaller Palestinian rejectionist groups, remains, you know, the main enabler of those groups. And as a result, it is a primary impediment to achieving peace in an absolutely critical region. We remain concerned about their efforts to engage in all kinds of destabilization.

I would make two points in this regard. One is that, I think that what we need to recognize is that as—if Iran continues to thwart the will of the international community, and continues with its nuclear program, that the prospect of Iranian-backed targeting of U.S. and other Western interests will rise. I don’t know that we expect them to do anything rash in advance of a real confrontation, but we can’t rule it out, and we are being very vigilant about that. We continue to be very concerned about the arming—the really significant rearming of Hezbollah since the 2006 conflict.

I would add one note that I think underscores an advantage that we have here, and that is that, as a state, Iran is deterrable in a way that al Qaeda is not, because we can, you know, of course—they have assets, they have territory, they have all kinds of interests that they want to protect—and that this has in—really, over the last 15 years, been a major reason why Iran has not been targeting us in the way that they did in, say, the early ’80s. I think that the Iranian leadership learned a lesson in that regard about the foolishness of going after U.S. targets. But, the government there has been increasingly hard-line and, in some ways, unpredictable, so it’s certainly a country that we are watching very, very closely and examining—trying to keep an—close tabs on what they might be up to.

Senator LEMIEUX. General?

General KEARNEY. Senator, no shortage of effort on our part to look at what is clearly the number-one sponsor of state terror, has

efforts underway to be able to capitalize on what is going on in the world today, and is constantly testing and probing the limits of what they can achieve against their regional adversaries by holding them hostage by surrogate organizations that work for them, largely in the Levant in the Middle East, and, of course, have tentacles that exist all the way down into south Central America, and again, have the ability to ride on the communication lines that migration, crime, and extremism have moved on historically.

The Iranians are a worthwhile adversary. They think, they probe, they test, they're well resourced, they are people not to be taken slightly. But, as Ambassador Benjamin said, they are a state, there are things you can do against a state. We have an overwhelming capability to take action against them, should the United States choose to do that at some point in time, and inflict, you know, harm on them and their infrastructure and folks.

But, at the same time, there is a rising population of youth who are interested in learning, growing, active in the Internet, and are—at the same time, you have to balance actions that you might take or consider against what you would gain or lose through actions that would reverse a growing population that seems unsettled with the leadership and the direction of their country, that is growing and growing over time.

So, a very, very interesting place, where policy options and—combined with military options all have to be weighed with great measure by our senior leadership, here, as we plot the way ahead. And I think there's a lot of effort underway to think about that, at this point, as we look at trying to deter where they are going with their nuclear energy program and the potential for weaponization.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, General.

And I think, you know, Mr. Chairman, this really is compelling testimony on this topic, because we hear, from the Ambassador and the General, that Iran is the number-one state sponsor of terror.

And a point I made earlier, which I want to just talk about for a second before I turn things back over to the Chairman, is that I think we're all focused on Iran, we're all worried about the combination of a terrorist, with Iran, delivering a destructive terrorist attack to this country, whether it be a chemical weapon or a nuclear weapon—that's something, I know, that's on your radar screen.

Where I would ask you also to focus is not just to look east for that threat, but to look south, because I am concerned, with Ahmadinejad visiting Venezuela and Hugo Chavez on multiple occasions, and trying to project Iran's force into Latin America, and its presence, and visiting countries like Bolivia and visiting—excuse me, not Bolivia—Brazil, who is an ally of ours, and the growing concern about Hezbollah and Hamas. We know there are terrorists already in Latin America. We know that our allies in Colombia have been fighting the FARC for several years. We learned, this past week, that a Spanish judge has brought forward information that he believes that Venezuela, working with ETA in Spain and with the FARC, were trying to assassinate President Uribe of Colombia, and other Colombian officials.

So, I worry, and what keeps me up at night is that that terrorist threat could come from the south, with a combination of Iran and

Venezuela and Hamas and Hezbollah, to our country. And so, I ask you to be vigilant about that, as well.

I think that, because of all the other problems in the world, we have looked—we have lost our focus on Latin America. And we have some—to the Chairman's point, we have some wonderful people in the military, as well as in the State Department, who are doing great work down there. But, please keep your focus on that, because I think, in terms of emerging threats, we all know Iran is the real existential threat, I think, to a lot—to the Middle East and to Europe and to us. But, we have to look at dangerous combinations that could occur to the south.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

You all have been an excellent panel. The challenge of countering violent extremism is a challenge of the entire globe. The Christmas Day bomber got his training in Yemen. Special Operations has a lot going on in Somalia. There's a lot going on in Indonesia and the Philippines. Indeed, there—in the Maghreb—there is no part of the globe that is immune from this, so the challenge is significant.

I want to thank you all, for this panel, and let me call up the second panel. And thank you very much. [Pause.]

We want to welcome Douglas Stone, the President and Chairman of Transportation Networks International; Scott Atran, the Professor of Anthropology and Psychology at the University of Michigan and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice; and James Forest, the Director of Terrorism Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy.

Welcome.

[Panelists expressed thanks.] Senator BILL NELSON. Your statements will be inserted in the record. And so, I want to start out by saying, okay, you've heard the United States Government, what sayeth thou? Who wants to start?

[The prepared statements of General Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest follow:]

General STONE. Sir, I was sitting by Dr. Atran, and I think I would like to defer to him. He was taking very good notes on this topic.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT ATRAN, PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AND JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Dr. ATRAN. All right, let me just give you an indication of where I come from. So, I—

Senator BILL NELSON. Pull that mic a little closer.

Dr. ATRAN.—I go out into the field and trek with Mujahideen and talk to their leaders—the leader of Jamas Lameel or Lashkar-e-Taiba. Last month—a couple of months ago, I was with Khaled Mashaal, the chairman of Hamas Politburo, and Ramadan Shallah, the general secretary of PIJ. And I go out—I talk to the leaders, and then I go out into the field and talk to the kids. I sit with them as they watch the Internet, I talk to suicide bombing families, cousins; I trying to figure out what they do. And I think that—I'll talk about Iran in a second. I think that one of the great shortfallings in our current approach is that there's really no one out there

studying things, in depth, in the field. I mean, many legislators and policymakers think that there is actual studies, I mean, that are publicly available, that can be replicated and that can be falsified if they're wrong, not gut-feeling studies, and not from the clandestine agencies; there's really nothing going on out there. So, people don't know, unless it's after theater, after they've already blown up a place, what really is going on among the kids. And I think if your committee really wants to be relevant and solve the radicalization problem that you pose for yourself, you've got to know the pathways that lead these young people to violence, so you can know how to take them away from violence. And again, I don't think there's much of anything being done.

I think we're fixated on technology and technological success. You know, when some guy, who is one of the most reputable men in his country, okay, swallows his pride and love to come into an American embassy and say his son is being dangerously radicalized, I mean, even a moron could pick that up. I think we're spending billions of dollars on widgets, and very little on engaging socially sensitive people who know what the dreams and visions of these things are, how to leverage nonmilitary advantages, how to create alliances, how to change perceptions, they just are poor at it.

In the military there's rewards and promotion, as there should be, for operational prowess and success in combat. And that's the way it should be for fighting and winning battles. But, if, indeed, the object of the United States military now is a political mission, as well, to democratize, to help democratization, it is not currently up to par. There is no rewards or promotions for being socially savvy and culturally sensitive, to knowing what is going on among the people. There is just no structure for it. And I think this is a terrible, terrible mistake, given the mission that the United States has right now.

Senator BILL NELSON. In last Thursday's New York Times, there was a column by Kristof, and he said basically what you've said, that reports suggest that the U.S. will provide 150 million in military assistance to Yemen, it'll also provide 50 million in developmental assistance. But, how much of that assistance is going into education, where you can send a kid, for \$50 a year, to school?

Dr. ATRAN. I—you know, people talk here, a lot, about things like brainwashing and recruitment. I see almost none of that. I see young people hooking up with their friends—you'd be surprised how many whole soccer teams can go to Iraq and get themselves blown up—I see them hooking up with their friends and going on a glorious mission. I mean, nothing more thrilling, adventurous, and glorious than fighting the greatest power in the world today, and jihad is an equal employment employer, and anyone can do that. And it's got to be at the level of peer-to-peer relations, not so much talking to community leaders. Even in Afghanistan, you've got new guys—23-year-olds, not tribal elders—who are running the opinions of these young people. You've got to get them where they meet—in their barber shops, in their restaurants—know what's going on with them, and steer their message, not from the top.

I've found that Salafis and Wahhabis are the only ones I have ever encountered in the field who have actually gotten people not to do suicide bombings, you know, that have been committed. So, you can utilize these guys.

I see confusion. You know, we were with the NYPD and others in Riyadh, and—the NYPD and the FBI have marvelous, marvelous programs. And I think the FBI's program is—on deradicalization, is probably the best in the world I've seen. They're all over the world. But, they're there in Saudi Arabia, you know, the Prince is there, and they're saying, "We've got to stop the Salafis," when 99 percent of them are Salafis, including the Prince. There's just no cultural sensitivity that I can think of. It's gotten post-talk; after the fact, people come in, and then they realize they have to know what's going on, on the ground.

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to hear from the other two, but, in essence, then, you say, what we just heard on the government panel is just more of the same.

Dr. ATRAN. I—

Senator BILL NELSON. And you're saying—

Dr. ATRAN. You've heard it, I—

Senator Bill Nelson:—you're saying that the United States Government really doesn't understand the concept of violent jihadists.

Dr. ATRAN. No, I don't think—I think there are people in the government, quite a bunch of people in the government—I think Doug Stone understands what's—well, he's not in the government anymore—

Senator BILL NELSON. It's too bad that the first panel didn't stay so they could hear this. May we send a transcript to each of the first panel?

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just say one more word on Iran.

So, we just finished the study. We have a massive study going on in Iran right now. And again, based on fieldwork, what we're interested in is finding out whether the people are committed to acquiring a nuclear capability, a nuclear weapon. We find that about 11 percent are. The more you provide carrots and sticks—that is, the more you do material incentives, either for or against—the more this 11 percent becomes devoted to trying to acquire a nuclear weapon in Iran.

So, I think the studies themselves can offer very surprising insights into what's going on in their people—in these people's minds—in the case of Iran, but also in other areas.

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Forest, do you want to add to this?

**STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS STONE, PRESIDENT AND
CHAIRMAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL**

General STONE. Well, sir, I would like to start by placing my own involvement in context. I was the commanding general over Task Force 134 during the surge; I had responsibility for all of the interrogation and detention.

Senator BILL NELSON. And that was in Iraq.

General STONE. That is correct, sir. I have, however, served a couple of years—or a couple of years, in total, between Pakistan

and Afghanistan. I do speak those languages and have spent a fair amount of time trying to study it as a reservist.

With that, I'd like to, sort of, pick up on a couple of themes.

Senator BILL NELSON. Please.

General STONE. First of all, sir, I'm quite specific about who the enemy is, and I refer to them as "violent Islamists." And for them to be successful, they must recruit in significant numbers. And, sir, when the Chairman mentioned earlier to the former panel, "What should the cohesive vision be?" my answer, sir, would have been to focus on reducing recruiting, to make that the single effort amongst our entire government effort. And ask yourself the question, Were it that we did that, would not—whether it be the Armed Forces and how they fight its—the Department of State, each agency, and the wonderful work of these great Americans—but, if every effort they did was to limit recruiting, sir, OCONUS and inside our own country, alone, would that not be the right aligning vision?

It was said earlier, in the earlier panel, "You can't see them." That's not true.

Senator BILL NELSON. That you can't what?

General STONE. You cannot see them, you can't find them. That's not true. Every community they live in knows who they are, in general. Our issue is, we don't know the community, to what Dr. Atran points out.

You know, terrorism is a warfighting technique. The true enemy are violent Islamists, and their effort is an effort to convert the Ummah, the greater body of the Muslim religion. And I get—I have, I think, sir, 49 speaking engagements. I don't go to any of them anymore unless there are Muslims there and it's something like a Rotary Club. And you know why, sir? Because those are the individuals who will make a difference in our country about how our country responds when the next effort really goes on in this country.

And so, my definition of victory has been, for the last 6 years, that this ideological war ends when nonviolent Muslims feel empowered and cause violent Islamists in their faith to be marginalized. You notice, sir, that I said "this ideological war" and that "non-violent Muslims must feel empowered." And ergo, sir, our powers of government need to facilitate that end objective, that they are empowered and that they cause the violent Islamists amongst them to be marginalized.

We need a national campaign. Little question about it across multiple disciplines. And I've written, in my paper, what some of those might be.

But, I would like to pick up on what was just mentioned and say that it's abhorrent to me that our leadership, fighting in these battles, no matter where they're at, can't speak the language, can't read the texts, can't argue the arguments in the context that the others argue them.

You know, sir, in Task Force 134, the way we reduced recidivists—recidivism, through a combination of things, but one of the was that we had 143 Imams who were able to translate the 80-plus arguments against the violent Islamic beliefs and turn those thinking patterns around—after, sir, they had a basic education to be able to read the Holy Koran themselves. So, it's appropriate if our

leadership should understand that, as well. It was true in the second World War. We had a significant number of German speakers, and Japanese speakers. It isn't true now.

So, we need to engage in directed efforts to both demystify the threat and to disarm it. And we need to establish metrics of success and new definitions of what winning really means, and new definitions of what fighting really means in an active and engaged problem-solving.

I believe, sir, we have to align with the Muslims of our communities. You know, the United States is a Muslim nation. We have Muslims in our Nation. I speak to them, I'm with them, quite frequently. They're as concerned and as engaged, in their own way, but they have no aligning understanding of how to do that. But, they'll tell you, "You need to be involved in cyberspace, you need to be involved in community groups, you need to be involved with educators, you need to be involved with prison officials, you need to be involved with our religious leadership, and you need to be involved with our families." Because, essentially, sir, what we need to do as a country is out-recruit—out-recruit and offer alternate ideologies and different dialogues than most—than those that are being offered by the violent Islamists, the Web sites, and the places that they go.

Most importantly, we have to be mindful that every single tactic represented by the former group that was sitting here and all of those that are out doing the hard work of our Nation's defense, that they not employ tactics that will enhance the ability of the enemy to recruit. And ask yourself each time, "Is what I'm doing facilitating, or not, that recruiting objective?"

And some of these, sir, in tribal warfare, are counterintuitive. And in that context, I might even ask you to rethink the desperate act, the terrible act, of 9/11. If the real goal of violent Islamic behavior is to convert the Ummah, what was the act of 9/11?

So, concurrently, we must demonstrate that whether they're a detainee or a citizen, that we respect the rights of an individual and preserve their dignity.

I write, sir, in my paper, about the three fundamental steps of radicalization. They're not particularly difficult to understand; and, in questions, if you like, we could discuss them. But, what is less studied in our Nation is how to address it—or, the radicalization process. And critical to our defense is learning who this enemy is and how it is that you counter this process, wherever it may attempt to recruit, and then to attack this nonkinetic objective with the same competency that we use kinetics.

Along with the Muslim community, we need to create a global counter initiative which results in slowing this radicalization and resultant recruiting. This is asymmetrical warfare. It's a form of warfighting, but it requires what we've learned in combat when it's been successful and what the great civilian agencies, who were formerly mentioned, practice today. And that is, education, alliance with Muslim religious leadership, interviews, interrogation, detention, direct countering of ideological claims, and the engagement of families.

For violent Islamists, any rule of law different than God's law, or Sharia, is also violently inconsistent with their belief. And at

your leisure, sir, I would love to speak to that topic as it relates to our own Constitution in its thread.

With that, sir, I would turn it over to your other panelists.

Senator BILL NELSON. Give us your thoughts, Dr. Forest, about all of this. What do you think about the government panel?

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to interrupt. I mean, this has been fascinating. I've got another hearing. Is there any way I can just ask a few questions, or should we wait?

Senator BILL NELSON. Of course, of course.

Senator GRAHAM. I mean—okay.

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, one, thanks for having this. This is a very timely topic.

And, Dr. Forest, I'll let you speak in just a moment.

But, I'd love to be here for the whole—I'm just a big Doug Stone fan. I'm—I knew him as Major General Stone. I'm sure our other two witnesses have got a ton to offer. But, I just want to put on the record the role that Major General Stone played in Iraq.

Camp Bucca was a military prison in the southern part of Iraq, in the Shi'a part of the country, that was being used by the American military to detain Iraqis that we thought were part of the insurgency. When Doug took over the—couple of weeks before he took over, there was a riot in the prison. People had been in that jail in the southern part of Iraq, at that time, for a couple of years and never seen, really, a human being at all. And the Sunnis were beginning to believe that this jail was an American prison being operated in collaboration with the Shi'a elements of Iraq. And it was a nightmare. And they literally had riots, and it's just amazing that a bunch of people weren't killed.

When General Stone took over, he transformed that prison from being a insurgent breeding ground to part of the COIN success story. He brought in moderate Muslims to talk about what the Koran actually meant. He created an education program within the prison—and I was there, as a reservist, when he did it—where the Minister of Education came in and certified the Camp Bucca education system as being Iraqi-compliant. In other words, if you graduated from the program in Camp Bucca, you were acknowledged by the Iraqi government as having graduated from an Iraqi school system. So, we were giving people the opportunity to learn to read and write and get a fifth-grade education, which made you eligible for employment throughout Iraq, with the government.

In addition, he created a job training program, where the people at Camp Bucca were given job skills, like making bricks. So, when someone was released from Camp Bucca back to Anbar Province, where the fight was going on, they had had a opportunity to learn from other Muslims what the Koran actually said, they had an opportunity to get an education that made them more employable, they had a job skill that was relevant, and they went back to Anbar as part of the solution and part of the problem. And there were people within the prison camp that were irreconcilable. And the very first thing he did was to try to evaluate each prisoner, and break them apart. Because the ones that were on the fence, that planted the IED for 500 bucks because they had to feed their family, basically were in a prison system where the radicals controlled

the prison. So, he broke those groups apart, making sure that the ones that were reconcilable had a chance to come out of the prison and be a part of the solution.

We had 21,000—or 24,000 people, at the height of the war. Having those people out of Anbar gave us breathing space, in terms of the surge. But, what had been seen as a military prison arbitrarily confining Iraqis based on what the Shi'a government wanted, became, in the eyes of the Sunni politicians, a humane, well-run prison, and he opened it up to all Iraqis and the press, including Sunni politicians. And it got to be so popular that when people were released, Sunni politicians would speak. I was at one of the ceremonies where we released, like, 150 people, and their families were there, and it was a very emotional event.

Finally, he instituted a rule-of-law program, that I worked with him on, that made a lot of sense. Every detainee, every 6 months, got to appear before a panel of military officers or NCOs to make their case that they were rehabilitated or shouldn't be confined. The release rate went from, like, 5 percent to 30 percent. People thought there was a way out, it rewarded good behavior. And the warfighter had a better idea of what they were doing; they were less likely to object to a release because they saw how the prison was being run. And before then, the Marines said no to almost every release, because, from their point of view, it's just one more guy to fight.

So, Dr. Stone—Major General Stone—what you did in that prison, I think, was one of the key elements of the surge being successful.

I would just as a few questions and not take so much of the time.

We now have a problem before us in Afghanistan. We have 1200 bed spaces available in the military—American military prison. And we're not going to get any more bed spaces. We had 24,000 people in military prison in Iraq, which gave the warfighters some breathing space, but we have 800 people in what used to be Bagram Air Base Prison, and 400 bed spaces. So, when we capture somebody on the battlefield, they have to really look and hard if—whether or not we can confine them in an American military prison because there's just not enough bed space. And the Iraqi—the Afghan legal system is very immature. So, you have a real dilemma, from the warfighter's point of view, and that's one of the reasons I'm working with the administration on detainee policy.

I do believe that Guantanamo Bay is the best-run prison in the world right now, but the image of Guantanamo Bay, in the Mid-East, particularly, lingers. And we need to break that, because it is still a recruiting tool, to this day. And one problem with Guantanamo Bay being open is that our allies will not turn prisoners over to us, because the politics of them potentially going to Guantanamo Bay makes it impossible. Our British allies, our best friend in the entire world, they have a policy where they won't turn detainees over to us because of the Guantanamo Bay issue.

So, my plea to the Congress is, let's look at detainee policy in a rational way. Let's have a way to keep the irreconcilables off of the battlefield. There are 48 people at Guantanamo Bay this administration has identified as too dangerous to let go, but will never be going to criminal court, for various reasons. That is allowed under

the law of war. But, there are plenty of people at Guantanamo Bay, and other places, that we may turn around.

So, what I would recommend to this committee is that, when we look at our detainee policy, there has to be a component of detainee operations that General Stone implemented in Iraq, that we need to do more than just be a prison, we need to be a center of—it needs to be part of the war, we need to open these prisons up to Muslims so they can come in and see what we're doing, just like we did in Iraq.

We need to have programs for the reconcilables, so the recidivism rate could potentially go down. In Iraq, it became 1 or 2 percent. And what he did is, if you were released from Camp Bucca, someone had to sign for you in Anbar. A community leader had to vouch for you. And, boy, that really worked. So, that's something we might want to be looking at as we deal with the detainee policy.

And one last thought. There are more people to capture. And we just can't kill everybody, because you're losing valuable intelligence. Right now, we don't have a jail available to American forces. The Afghan prison system is limited in what it can do in taking war detainees—war of terror detainees. If you catch someone in Yemen, the Afghans are not going to be very open-minded to becoming the American jailor. And we're not using camp—excuse me, Gitmo. President Bush stopped using it for about a year before he left. This President, President Obama, hasn't put anyone in Gitmo, and I understand his concerns about doing that. But, that's unacceptable. We need a confinement facility we can be proud of that allows the irreconcilable to be held off the battlefield as long as they're dangerous, and somebody who is reconcilable to be turned around, and that's what's missing here at home. It worked in Iraq. My goal is to create that same scenario here at home, because we will capture more people in this war.

So, I would just ask General Stone—

Senator BILL NELSON. I just want to say, it sounds like we need to hire General Stone as the head of the prison.

Senator GRAHAM. I—well, I don't know if he'd do it, but we sure need to have his fingerprints on how to do it.

Now, he went to Afghanistan to talk about how you break out the irreconcilables from the reconcilables. And I hate that—this is just so important to me. Pol-e Charkhi Prison is the main prison in Afghanistan. They had a riot in December of last year, wasn't it, Doug?

General STONE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. Well, I went through that prison, as a reservist, right after the riot; you could still see, you know, bullet holes and damage from fire on the walls. But, in one prison cell, they had a chart of how to make an IED. The prison was being run by the Taliban, they were conducting operations in the south from the prison. They were using cell phones to conduct operations. And the number of insurgents in the jail was probably the highest percentage of anywhere in Afghanistan.

So, we've finally broken that apart, because he went over there, and we're going to build a new jail, and we're going to try to get the hard-core, big "T" Taliban away from the small "T," and try to turn around Afghanistan.

We need to be doing the same thing for a confinement facility here in America, because we need one here, in America, eventually. Gitmo has served its purpose, but now it's a—more of a problem than it is an asset. That's unfortunate, but that's a reality.

General Stone, could you comment on what I just said, and share with—

General STONE. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM.—the commander how great you are—I mean, with the Chairman how great you are?

General STONE. Well, thank you, Senator.

If you'll allow me one, sort of, sea story, but it is material to our—and your—hearing, sir.

Sitting during the surge, while windows were being blown out in the building that we were in, which was the main courthouse, judges, who had been intimidated—26, I think, or so had been killed, the remaining ones were still coming under armed guard to serve a sentence against Iraqis—sitting in the front row was Colonel Graham and myself as we watched an intimidation effort against a member wilt once the eyes of the public and others were on them.

The rule of law is so fundamental to how we engage in this global battle that it can hardly be underestimated. And each country, going back to the Ottoman Empire and after the split, has its own form of rule of law that balances Sharia with a different form. And in Pakistan, for example, you can see the two courthouses, on either side. What we need to do is understand, in our own government, what that means. And it does mean, ultimately, imprisonment or detention.

That leads to the second dilemma. Inside prisons—historically, inside prisons, whether you go back to Azam or Sayeb Khatab or—pick your favorite, you know, leader—you will find that they came out of a prison system. And I ask you, Senator—in my earlier comment I meant, very specifically, to say OCONUS, as in outside of the United States, but to be specific about continental United States, and to consider, as an element of the emerging threat, the same picture that I talked to you about in warfare as possible here in our country, and ask if perhaps an analysis of what the violent Islamic threat—the recruiting efforts, the radicalization going on inside of our prison systems at various levels should not a—considered a legitimate target of this war. And I could list a panoply—of those kinds of things, Senator.

But I want to thank Senator Graham, both for his service to the country as a colonel—that's the only position I'll ever be allowed to say—but also to point out how important the concept of rule of law, of religious leadership, of engaging, is.

And, with one last comment, the Muslim religion, the Koran, is—does not have a separation of church and state; it is God's word. And because of that, it is—how you live on a secular and a nonsecular life are merged together. And so, our own rule of law, this being the body that makes the law, across the street where they execute it, and the other side of the street where they judge it, is not—is foreign, in many ways, to any violent Islamic belief.

And so, when we say we are being attacked, the question that you need to ask is, Are we being attacked because of who we are,

because Westernization is a threat? The answer is yes. Modernization a threat? No. Many, many, many of these individuals are highly competent, in terms of modern techniques. But, what it really is asking is the question, Can we, as a people, have a constitution if Sharia is the threat against it? And that is something that our population needs to engage in.

And my last comment would be, to the point that you made, sir, or I think it was you, in the last meeting, What should we do? And I think of all of the agencies and all of the branches in all of the government, this Congress, of anyone who's in touch with all of our American citizens, should know as much about this threat as anybody. And they ought to be able to speak, in their own communities, about the threat, and be perfectly crystal clear, and engage with the Muslim communities there, because that information will be our defense; and their alignment, just as it was in Iraq, just as it can be in Afghanistan, will be our defense.

Senator BILL NELSON. Before I turn to Dr. Forest, and before you leave, Senator Graham, did you—any of you—did you get the impression, when I asked the question of the first panel, the government panel, about the twisting and distorting of Islam, that they seemed to gloss over that and not have an understanding? As a matter of fact, there was a specific answer—was, “Well, there are many complications in this religion.”

What do you think, Dr. Stone?

General STONE. Sir, I think our government leadership is not specific enough in definition of the target, of the enemy, of who they are. And I think—there are so few books written on the relationship between the United States and the Arab world, despite the fact that, frankly, our Navy was founded to fight the first fight of an Arab nation. The Marines carry a Mameluke sword from the first battle of Tripoli. This history is ancient, as far as our country goes, but the reality is, the understanding is just minimal.

I would ask that all of our leadership speak these languages, that they understand, contextually, what is going on. I don't consider myself an expert, in any way, shape, or form. I'm an electronics executive, that's what I do. I'm a businessman. I pride myself on making 40 percent of my taxes come back to the government, and paying my employees, and hiring more employees. But, I will tell you, sir, if I were a businessman, in dealing with this, I would not let my employees get away with not knowing the very specifics of the people that they're engaged with.

And so, 100,000-foot comment, that it's all very different, very tribal, is true. In our own Nation, we have hundreds of different “tribes.”

Senator GRAHAM. But, may I interject? I think his question is a very good one. This concept, that this is a murky problem, that there is no distortion, is kind of hard to figure out. General Stone understood that distortion was going on, and he confronted it directly. And I think that's your question, is that what we did, or what we did at Camp Bucca, was, he put people in front of the insurgents and said, “No, this is what the Koran actually means.”

And I think that's his question, Doug, is—this idea that distortion of Islam can't be dealt with, I reject. You dealt with it in Camp Bucca.

General STONE. I wholeheartedly reject that thesis.

Senator GRAHAM. And what he's asking for, I think, is a system that we could employ, in our own jails and in our own communication strategy, to actually deal with that.

General STONE. I mean, Senator, my expectation of our leadership is that they know this enemy as crystal clear as they would know any enemy that they would ever fight. And I would ask—and they're simple questions—do our leader—does our leadership know this enemy as well as the leadership in this country knew, in the second World War, the two fields that they fought? And if the answer to that is yes, then we are in good shape. But if the answer to that is no, we are not. And in my judgment, the only way to engage this enemy is to understand, it isn't the Muslim nation, it isn't even but a small percent of the Muslim nation, and that the individuals who are being attacked are as much the Muslim nation as anybody, and that, if we align with them, they will filter this out, they will find them. And that's what we found in the detention centers in Iraq, but that's also what you find in many, many communities around the country. And I think I've been to most of them recently. They understand. What—our job is to help them do that.

Now, helping them is very different than some other means that you could have. And I come back to my aforementioned recruiting comment. As a businessman, I don't manage what I can't measure. And so, I think we need clear measurements around this, and not hyperbole. We need to be able to say, as we said in Iraq, when General Petraeus gave me permission to do my program—and trust me when I say General Petraeus took the greatest risk in the war by (a) hiring me, and (b) allowing me to make those changes. In my judgment, he did. What he said was, "Tell me what you're going to measure as success." And I said, "Sir, we will take 10 or 15 percent recidivist rate, and we'll lower it to 1 or 2." And then, Senator, he put it on the board every 2 weeks to see if I was doing it or not. That's the expectations we should have of our leadership.

And so, Senator, when you ask the question, if it's not specifically answered and not specifically measured, I find that unacceptable.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it was not answered this morning. As a matter of fact, the subject of this hearing is "Countering Violent Extremism," and we started talking about deradicalization, in the first panel. And any emphasis on trying to reeducate Muslims about what true Islam is, was minimized in the first panel. You have clearly, by your actions, by your deeds, as the head of that prison—you've shown otherwise.

General STONE. Sir, if you'll allow me one comment. And I hate to hog this mic, I really do. But, the reality is that most of the Muslim nations have a high illiteracy rate. And what happens when you have a high illiteracy rate, you can't read your own text. And if you can't really read your own text, then you are—you have to show deference to the individuals who portend to have read it, who, themselves, likely cannot. And therefore, the very precise answer to the former question that you asked the panel was—it turns out, if the illiteracy rate is what it is, they can't read the Koran, they have their own political agenda, at a tribal level, or a cultural level, they are going to skew the arguments for participation in the Muslim faith, whichever direction they want. Sometimes those are

towards violent Islamic behavior. Because you were quite precise, the Koran does not call for the killing of innocents or Muslims. It's precisely the opposite of that. And the 80-plus arguments that we ultimately got out, by taking al Qaeda members, understanding what their arguments were—some of them turned, some of them gave us that, some of us helped, actually, articulate the counternarrative—we turned it, we got education started, we let them read the Koran themselves, facilitated conversations, countered the arguments, and a large percentage backed off the fight.

Now, it isn't to say it's going to work in all cases. It won't. As the Senator said, there are going to be some—and as my good friends who run the deradicalization programs throughout the world will tell you, there are some that will be locked up for life; they can never come out. It's just a fact of reality.

Senator BILL NELSON. General, wouldn't it be something if our American leadership, as represented by the panel, or by others, that—we don't have to pick on the panel that was here—would understand the Koran, that, of all of the prophets in the Koran, the three most important prophets, called messengers, were Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed.

General STONE. Sir, there are many wonderful facts of the religion—Jesus is the only—the prophet before Mohammed—the only one permitted by God to do miracles. Mary, the same Mary—is the same Mary mentioned in the Christian faith. Gabriel, the same angel that brought the message to—and we could go on and on and on.

You're right, sir. But, it is not, alone, enough. What is—what, alone, is enough is to engage a conversation and a understanding with our citizens in our country—and, in this regard, sir, I'm very focused on the defense of our own Nation—to engage in a conversation with those community members, and work with them to find solutions, because they will know who the enemy amongst us is. They will know. Or they will know enough. As the Doctor just pointed out, somebody's going to walk in the door and say, "I'm worried about blah, blah." And then we have to have the ears to listen and the heart to understand it and the mind to have—be able to put in context what it is they're talking about.

Ultimately, sir, I think you will ask the question, What is our biggest concern? And I'm prepared to answer that.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, well, I'm going to get to that in a second, but I want to hear from Dr. Forest.

You have been very patient, and thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF JAMES J.F. FOREST, DIRECTOR OF TERRORISM STUDIES AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Dr. FOREST. Well, Chairman Nelson, thank you for—and it's an honor for me to be here.

I've prepared some remarks to really address just the military's role in combating violent extremism, and the conversation has obviously gone in multiple directions from that. But, I would like to just address a few aspects of the military contribution to fighting violent extremism in this counterideology domain.

First off, before I speak, I'm proud to represent the Combating Terrorism Center. And several of my colleagues there had helped me prepare a lot of these remarks that are now in the formal record. But, I need to, first and foremost, note that these remarks are my own, they do not reflect the—necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Military Academy, the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. They're my opinions, only.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, we invited you here in your individual capacity, but you are also a professor at West Point.

Dr. FOREST. Yes, sir. And I'm going to address how I teach my cadets at West Point the issues of violent extremism that have been addressed today in both panels.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, now, I don't want you reading your comments.

Dr. FOREST. No, I—

Senator BILL NELSON. I want you just talking to us.

Dr. FOREST. Yes. I'm going to actually pull out, I think, three of the most important aspects of this.

That military troops and officers are actually contributing, in the case of what we just heard in the prisons, is one great example of this. But, providing the sort of safe and secure spaces within which this dialogue can take place is one fundamental aspect that the military contributes to the fight against violent extremism.

The religious aspects of violent extremism—and there's a whole other range of violent extremism that we're not talking about—the ethno-nationalists, the separatists, the leftwing/rightwing groups here, existing in the United States of America and other countries, as well—we're not talking about those right now. We're just talking about the religious—and a specific religion, at that—form of violent extremism. It's really wrapped up in the essence of interpretation of the sacred texts. And when you've got interpreters competing each other for the validity and the credibility of their narrative, you're going to have this contested terrain that we're now based with, a largely violent struggle involving a very minority individual group—population within the Muslim world who have misinterpreted various aspects of the Koran, and then trying to achieve a political objective drawn on the—that—those misinterpretations.

So, what—coming back to this issue of what the military does, they create safe havens for dialogue and for counternarratives and for counterideology conversations to take place, whether it's in prisons, or in village halls, or even online. So, these are the sorts of things that the military does in terms of combating violent extremism in that aspect.

A second aspect that was asked, but not really answered in the first panel, was, What are they doing to directly combat the ideology itself? And, for a number of reasons we can't go into here, there are restrictions, huge restrictions, on what the military can do. They recognize the problem, they recognize that communicating with both populations that have been terrorized, and are being terrorized by these extremists, and the extremists themselves. Both of those channels of communication need to be taking place, but there's very limited capability and legal authority that they're authorized to follow through in those areas. But, it's a necessary

sphere of activity that, unfortunately, they're not able to engage as much as they'd like.

But, I want to really drill down on this very important part, in terms of the military versus the Department of State and other agencies involved in countering violent extremism. When you're trying to influence the perceptions, the hearts, and the minds of our allies and our adversaries, there is no substitute for physical presence. And we found this out in multiple dimensions, whether it's prisons or wherever we are. Whether we are engaged in the Philippines, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, wherever we are engaged, there is no substitute for physical presence. And I think that's really where the rubber meets the road, in terms of violent extremism. The military troops are there, they're doing the job of a lot of these other agencies because they're there, and because they recognize the job needs to be done. And that's just the military approach; they recognize a job needs to be done, and they do it to the best of their ability. So, that's the second aspect.

The third aspect, kind of, comes back to what General Gates has been saying—I mean, Senator—Secretary Gates has been saying for a number of years, that soft-power activities can have a lasting impact on diminishing the resonance of anti-government messages put forth by these violent extremists.

So, these aspects that the military is involved in, that are addressed in the formal statement, they're fundamental and they're necessary, but they're insufficient on the part of the military doing them alone. The success of our countering-violent-extremism strategy has to involve the entire realm of government agencies. Military forces alone cannot defeat violent extremism, but they are involved across an entire spectrum of activity in struggle—in support of the struggle that we're all facing.

So, thank you.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, thank you.

General Stone, you wanted us to ask you one more question. Why don't you restate that question, and answer it, please.

General STONE. Well, sir, I thought you were going to ask what keeps us awake at night. And these great minds, on my left, no doubt, have good thoughts on that. I heard what was formally mentioned. And, while I didn't disagree with it, I was somewhat surprised by the response.

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just put that in context with your question about the Koran. About 70 percent of the people who join the jihad do it outside of their country of origin. They used to be mostly medical students and engineers, in the old days; now they're increasingly marginalized and poor. Not disaffected so much, but flailing about for some social identity. There's no clash of civilizations, there's a collapse of cultures. And so, they're making connections horizontally.

Almost all—well, 80 percent, as of about a year ago—joined the jihad, had no religious education at all. They are sort of born-again into it. And they find it, and it grabs them when they're young people, motivates them. So, the important thing is to get them, there. In a confined space, like a prison, you can sit down with the Imams and you can talk to them. But, out in the wild, where there people are radicalizing, you've got to get them, with their friends, to come

to these different understandings of where Islam can go. There is no program out there for that, that I see.

Senator BILL NELSON. Is it curious that, in the first panel, that the word “madrassa” was never uttered?

Dr. FOREST. Let me just say something about the madrassas. You have 30,000 madrassas in Indonesia. Only 50—and I know each one of them—have been involved in the jihad.

You have, also, tens of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan. But, they’re mostly for the rural poor. They’re good recruiting items for the Taliban. Lashkar-e-Taiba doesn’t want to touch them. Why? Because just having madrassa education means they’re not going to have computer education, they’re not going to be good in languages, they’re not going to be good in GPS. And, increasingly, Lashkar-e-Taiba wants those kinds of guys, because those are the guys who can meld into Indian society, or Australian society, and get something done.

So, the madrassas are a very particular problem, and we have to count—and be very careful, because in places like Pakistan and Indonesia, they are an outlet, okay, for the rural poor. And it really is only two-tenths of 1 percent of the madrassas. So, we can’t just go off, like, saying, “Oh, well, it’s the Salafis,” or, “It’s the madrassas.” We have to be very focused on which ones to deal with, and how to deal with them.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, any concluding thoughts?

General STONE. Sir, I would just offer that the North American Command should be at these kinds of emerging- threat meetings. I—

Senator BILL NELSON. Good suggestion.

General STONE. And I—there was an orientation, I think, in this hearing, looking as if it was “over there.”

Senator BILL NELSON. Right.

General STONE. And I would argue that that is, perhaps, not the greatest threat.

I would argue, as well, sir, that there’s a very clear distinction between Taliban and al Qaeda and that movement, and they are profoundly different—synergistic, in some respects, but profoundly different. And to know the difference is to understand the difference in the—of the enemy we fight.

Dr. FOREST. Sir, if I may, on that regard—

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, please.

Dr. FOREST. There are a number of things that al Qaeda is actually vulnerable on, beyond the religious dimension, that I think could also be exploited in a counterideology narrative program. Not only are they worried—and internally, we’ve been monitoring this on the jihadi Web forums—they’re worried about their own religious misinterpretations, and they’re engaged in a struggle to convince populations in the Muslim world that they have a correct reading of the Koran.

But, there’s also a lot of questions about their strategic competence. There’s questions, internally among al Qaeda members, that they’re debating, about tactical guidance, about the abilities and capabilities of new recruits. A number of them, putting them in the suicide- terrorism pipeline, because they have nothing else to offer al Qaeda. So, there’s a number of areas that we could also

attack al Qaeda's narrative. They're desperate for cash. We see this in a lot of their video and the audio statements. They lack integrity. They fight amongst themselves about preferential treatment given to the Saudi and Egyptian members versus the Pakistani or Indonesian members. And, of course, the biggest issue that we still have not really capitalized on is, they are the only Muslim organization in the world that routinely kills women and children, and celebrates when others kill women and children. And they have killed eight times more Muslims than Americans, or than infidels, in their attacks over the last 9 years.

I think these are little tidbits of facts, which cannot be disputed, which can be part of a very strong counternarrative that we should push out there.

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just—I'll conclude with just three things.

I think we've got to concentrate on preventing radicalization at a peer-to-peer level. Then we have to counter radicalization. One of the ways is by decoupling, for example, al Qaeda from the Taliban and from the Somali courts. And the third is, we have to deradicalize. I think General Stone's program in Iraq was fantastic. The way Indonesia or Saudi Arabia or Turkey deal with it is as a public health issue. It's legally very hard to do this here. But, I think, outside of the country, it's the best bet. And I know the FBI wants to try something like that here, and I think it would be a really good move.

Senator BILL NELSON. Before we conclude, you want to give me your comments on the success, or lack thereof, of the Saudi rehabilitation program?

General STONE. I—have you been there?

Dr. FOREST. I have not been there, no.

General STONE. We've been there. It's expensive. It has a lot of money. Within the context of that culture, a very specific cultural context, it shows both success and promise.

Bringing in other members from other tribal backgrounds and national backgrounds is going to be, by definition, less successful. No matter how hard they work, no matter how hard they try, it is going to be difficult, for any number of reasons, not the least of which is, the program mandates family involvement, and you're not going to bring Yemeni family over and treat them.

So, the answer to your question, sir, is, it is a tremendous step forward, I believe, in the Muslim world. Tremendous. To have done it, to have initiated it, is to be complimented by the entire global citizenry. But, to oversell it as a solution for all things, or even that the methodologies for all would work, is wrong. And I would argue that, in my own development of my own system, we used pieces of it that surprised me, were inordinately effective; and we were unable to use other pieces, because they didn't culturally fit.

So, the answer to the question, sir, is, it's very, very hopeful, but it is not an answer for all things. And we need to learn how they got success, when they get it, and how they get failure, when they get it, and they do.

And I would—the last comment I would make about all of the programs associated with deradicalization—and perhaps one of the finest is in Singapore—is that they all, ultimately, come to a realization that some people can't be released. They just can't. And be-

cause they can't be released, that changes the nature of the radicalization and deradicalization work. All of them, sir, have education. All of them, sir, have clarity about what the Koran says. All of them have argument—ulema—involved with the conversation. Those are effective. And all of them, ultimately, bring the families back in, one way or the other, in the community. That can only be done locally, sir.

Dr. ATRAN. In places like Morocco or Uzbekistan, or even Egypt, although there is some acknowledgement that they have a home-grown problem, at the local level there is not much at all. It's taken as, sort of, the normal course of events, and it's attributed to the jihad international or the West. And there is no real deradicalization program I know of that's successful in these places.

Another one, I think, where it is inordinately successful is in Turkey. Not the PKK. But, in terms of Sunni jihad, they've basically stopped it, turned it around, cold. It's truly a marvelous program, and that's a result—

Senator BILL NELSON. And are they doing that through the tribe, like Saudi Arabia is?

Dr. ATRAN. No, they do it a little bit differently. So, it's the Turkish National Police that is in charge of this, which is a fantastic organization. Now they have about 250 people doing their Ph.D.s in places like Colombia and Texas, here in the United States.

What they do is, someone goes to Afghanistan, Pakistan. They come back. They're picked up by intelligence or the police, or the—word gets around the neighborhood pretty fast. Then the Turkish police, which is—it's not, you know, midnight—what a—midnight, what was that movie, *Midnight*—

Dr. FOREST. I don't know.

Dr. ATRAN.—where they treated the Turkish police as, you know, horrors. They're very sophisticated. They go—they find out—they come to the family and say, "Look," just what the NYPD does, "we don't want a problem, you don't want a problem. I really don't know who your kid talked to, but what can we do with you so that it's not a problem?" And then they work it out, together, so much so—I mean, you know, they give presents at Ramadan. If a sister can't find a job, they figure, "Well, can we help her out?"

The end result is, now they're getting much too much information from their former jihadis. They're calling them every day, saying, "Well, you know, I have a tip there, and I have tip here," and there hasn't been a serious plot since Istanbul, back years ago, in 2003.

So, it's working with the community, with the families. In places like Iraq, Afghanistan, it's working with the tribes. But, here it's working with marginal neighborhoods. Again, every country is different.

General STONE. Senator, I—this has been bugging me, and I need to say it. There is an orientation—and I heard it even in some of the questions—that if we were to take in—and this is not the right word, but nation- building—and just bring the education and the medical system and everything up to par, that that would fix the problem. The answer is, it might, but it might not, because this

is an ideological problem. So, even the poorest of all poor, if they believe in something different, will not be a threat.

So, I would caution that a broad, sweeping statement about doing these kinds of things, in generalities, outside the country, or even inside the country, are not going to get us where we want to go, necessarily. But, again, to be very—it may work in some specific cases, where it's exactly the right thing to do, but in some cases it's exactly the wrong thing to do, writ large, because it will be taken advantage of by others.

So, again, coming back to the specificity of really knowing the enemy that—the issues, and to be so granular in our thinking that we have a specific campaign, not a broad, sweeping one, I think is absolutely vital, sir.

Dr. FOREST. Sir, while deradicalization programs deserve our support, there's much more that I believe we can and should be doing to prevent and counter radicalization in the first place.

There's a area of research I've been working on, called "strategic influence." And the argument there is that, if we spent as much energy and time and resources on trying to strategically influence nonstate actors and the populations that they're trying to influence as we do on strategically influencing other state-based entities, I think we'd be, definitely, a lot better off in combating violent extremism.

Dr. ATRAN. Again, let me just say, we've got to have knowledge, in the field, of what's going on, and we don't. In Morocco—in Morocco, where five of the seven Madrid bombers grew up in the same neighborhood, within 200 meters, another five within that 200 meters went and blew themselves up in Baqubah. They weren't crazy people; they went to the same elementary school, with Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, but they radicalized, listening to chants on the Koran from radical Imams and radicalizing one another, as kids do, moving in their parallel universe. But, you could walk in that neighborhood and anyone could point out to you who was going to go to Iraq. You could see how they dressed, and how fast they dressed.

In Saudi Arabia, it's very different. In Saudi Arabia, the way you pick it up is, who's not going to the family mosque? Because everybody goes to the mosque. And everybody's been going to the neighborhood and family mosque for years. So, if they all of a sudden stop going, it—you know—you have a good bet that they're on their way.

But, we have no people out there who know these things. You know, I was walking around with a friend of mine, Marc Sageman—he's a former CIA field agent—and I said, "Marc, why isn't there anybody here looking at this? I mean, you know, you could spot them." He says, "You can't. I mean, agents can't do that. You know, they have to work through the Ambassador, they have to get permission, they write reports, and analysts, but you can't just go into the field and figure out what's going on." That's a big mistake.

General STONE. And, Senator, if you think, suicide bombers in Somali have come from our own United States. I don't know the mental condition of Army Major Hasan, I don't know his mental state or what was going on with him, but what I do know is, he

broke an oath to support and defend the Constitution, a Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, and ultimately chose another oath.

So, the concept of radicalization, however we want to bring it about, is here. And we need to engage it here, as well as there.

Dr. ATRAN. Just to take out Major Hasan, he sent 21 messages to Anwar al-Awlaki, basically seeking to do jihad, something. He wanted a meaning in life. Awlaki only sent him back two, without any operational implications. It's not that the Internet imams are out there, basically, recruiting them, pulling them in. They're just there.

As one kid in a French prison said—I asked him, “Why did you join the jihad?” He said, “Well, I was walking down the street one day, and someone spit at my sister and called her a ‘sal Arab,’ a dirty Arab.” I said, “Well, that’s been going on for years and years.” And he said, “Yeah, but there was no jihad to join then.”

So, it's out there, and people are choosing it, and we've got no real competition for these messages out there.

Senator BILL NELSON. What do you think we ought to do to get our government more sensitized to the message that you all have here?

General STONE. Senator, I wouldn't know. I—I, you know, I'm a citizen. I'm—that's the proudest title I've ever had. It's the only title I really want. And I think it's my job to do what I can do as a citizen, period. You are the representative of our citizens. And so, I will rely on what I said earlier that, this house is—it's the people. We're speaking to the American people when we're talking to you. And so, it is, in some respect, as their elected representatives, to bring to them the message, that I think is very real, about how to defend our country, how to stand behind our country, how to engage in the protection of our country, in this time, as it has been in every period of time before. There's no difference in this regard. We are defending the Constitution and our fundamental belief that is the spirit behind the declaration that lifted that Constitution into reality.

So, I think it's the job of our elected representatives, as much as it is anything, to get out and to engage them.

And the converse of that will be true. I submit to you, sir, that American citizens, once understood—once they understand, with a level of granularity that is not hard to communicate to them, they will have expectations of this government that far exceed anything this small panel could put on the plate for you today.

So, my suggestion would be, go to the people and educate them—our people, our citizens—and ask them how—what do they think—and you will find an unbelievable wealth of patriotism come forth to do the right thing for the Nation.

My answer would be: Go to the people, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. The two commanders in that most violent part of the world, that we're concentrating on, Afghanistan and Pakistan, are General Petraeus and his commander in Afghanistan. Now—

General STONE. General McChrystal, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. You said, General Stone, earlier, that General Petraeus understood and supported you, what you were doing in the prison in Iraq. Do you think that he sufficiently under-

stands what has been presented by this panel today that he is trying to apply that in the Central Command area of responsibility?

General STONE. Sir, there would have been no success in the surge, no success in my program, were it not for the leadership of General Petraeus. He was a risk-taker, as any great leader will be, understood the culture and the context of it.

I have no question in my mind, General Petraeus understands this enemy and needs—and what to do. I also know that General Petraeus is a general, and that this problem is much broader than just the leadership of a military combatant commander.

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you think General McChrystal understands this, as well?

General STONE. Sir, I've had the great honor of serving with General McChrystal multiple times, when I was in Pakistan, in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan, and I would say the same thing for General McChrystal. We are challenging those leaders to do things, not just in their spectrum of military warfighting, but also embracing a much broader set of resource deployment issues. There's no question in my mind that the aforementioned leadership know how to win this war in the locations they're at.

What I would question is whether or not they have all those resources of the various kinds that they need to get that done. And that, I don't know.

Senator BILL NELSON. And the resources that we've talked about here are the resources of being able to get to young people to get them to understand what true Islam is, and not be diverted into some extremist form of violence.

General STONE. That's a pretty good characterization, sir.

Dr. ATRAN. Can I just say something about Afghanistan? We came—the United States military came to Afghanistan with no knowledge of the Afghan people, really. They didn't know and understand what—who they were, what it meant, how the society worked. They're getting that, they're forced to get it.

But, I think, still, it's much too halting. So, we have this human terrain system experiment, for example, where you send out teams, into Paktia and Helmand Province, with combat ethnographers embedded in infantry units in order to provide nonlethal services, like medical services, to a village. They're very good at making ties, even—the women, especially, like women medical officers. But, then they're taken out and put in another infantry unit, so all of the local contacts have been lost.

But, even if that worked, I think it would be a disaster for the cooperation with the academic community and the social science community and the universities in this country. Ever since the Vietnam War, there has been a deep antipathy and antagonism between military operations and projections of power on the part of policymakers and the academic establishment, outside the, you know, political guys, at the major universities. The idea that there are trained social scientists, with uniforms and armed, and who could be forced to harm and kill local people, will alienate American academic community entirely, and for good. And that would be a tragic mistake, because, unlike Vietnam, most of the people in the academic community do believe that this problem of extremist

violence is a serious problem and must be dealt with by the United States.

So, again, we've got to be a little better, and more sophisticated, and branch out, in terms of who we bring into the field, because right now there's only military guys in the field. There's nobody else, except them and the clandestine services; and so, you're getting nothing, in terms of, I think, reliable knowledge that can be put out in the public, criticized, falsified, and then changed to fit the situation right. That's the way science works.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, if you take that suggestion, you're talking about unleashing the civilian agencies of government instead of a military agency that has led this effort, of necessity, because that's how we've been organized; letting the civilian agencies go out and lead this effort.

Dr. ATRAN. You know, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research has funded 54 Nobel Prize-winners, including social scientists—the Office of Naval Research, the Air Force Research Office, the Army Research Office, the National Science Foundation—they have, already, the ways to go with people into the field. It's being blocked, okay? It's being blocked at the level of the Surgeon General's offices, who don't—who are scared to death that there's going to be someone out there who's going to be accused of spying or will get hurt or something like that. So, there is no work—the agencies exist, the ways exist. Okay? Even the funds exist. But, the people don't exist, because it's being blocked at a governmental level. I think, if it was unblocked, a lot more people and a lot more knowledge and a lot more savvy would be available to the government and the people of the United States.

Dr. FOREST. Sir, this basically reinforces what I said earlier about there being no substitute for physical presence when you're trying to influence, and strategically influence, populations in these areas.

General STONE. The colloquial term, sir, is whether or not the environment is permissive or non-permissive. You've heard this term. There are restrictions for those going to permissive environments versus nonpermissive. And what the—both the colleagues on the panel would be arguing is that we need to recognize, that's not this enemy, that's not how we fight this enemy. Both—you have to have a presence of diverse capabilities focused on different skill sets and focused on the very specific effort at—and my argument would be, that focus needs to be counterrecruiting, stop the recruiting. Once you stop the recruiting, you stop the insurgency. And I'm using "insurgency" in a global sense.

That's, I think, what these two gentleman were saying.

Dr. FOREST. And, you know, on that piece, the military should be recognized for doing a tremendous amount of great work—

General STONE. Absolutely.

Dr. FOREST.—in the last 10 years in developing, training, and educating their soldiers and officers to deal with these kinds of challenges in totally new ways that they never had to before.

Senator BILL NELSON. Huge difference—

General STONE. Huge, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON.—than when I wore the uniform of this country, which was during Vietnam. Huge difference, and these

young NCOs and young officers that are out there—I mean, they’ve suddenly had to learn, right on the ground, things other than being a warrior. It’s marvelous. And that’s what we tried to attempt to get to in this hearing today. I can tell you, the way I will run the next hearing, either your panel will be first or all six of you will sit at the table together so that we can get that interchange going with the existing governmental leaders.

So, thank you for an exceptionally stimulating hearing. We are very grateful.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]