

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON MISSILE DE- FENSE IN EUROPE

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burr, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, Burr, Collins, and LeMieux.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G. Lang and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Young, assistant to Senator Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator Burr; Anthony J. Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe, Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; Rob Epplin and Chip Kenneth, assistants to Senator Collins; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President's recent decision concerning missile defense in Europe. We're joined today by Michele Flournoy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Lieutenant General Pat-

rick O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. We're delighted to have you with us. We thank you for your service to the Nation.

I see that Senator Lemieux is also with us today. We're delighted that you are here. We give you a very warm welcome to a committee which works on a very bipartisan basis. I think you'll enjoy your service on this committee and we very warmly welcome you.

We also, if we have a quorum here, are going to take up military nominations when we have that quorum.

Last Thursday, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile defense in Europe. President Obama put it this way: "Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and American allies."

Secretary Gates called the new approach "vastly more suitable and a far more effective defense" than the previous plan to deploy ten long-range interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic.

I believe this decision will enhance our national security and the security of our allies and partners in the region. It will deploy demonstrated technology sooner to defend against the number one existing threat in the Middle East, the threat of Iranian short and medium-range missiles that can reach our forward-deployed forces and allies in Europe and Israel. Secretary Gates has said the existing Iranian threat "was not addressed by the previous plan."

The new European missile defense architecture will evolve an increasing capability as Iran's missile capabilities evolve. It is flexible and adaptable to circumstances. It will counter future Iranian missile threats, including long-range missiles that could reach the United States if Iran develops them. So it will offer supplemental protection of the United States to augment the missile defense security we now have deployed in Alaska and California.

Instead of abandoning missile defense in Europe, as some have suggested, the new approach expands and enhances our missile defense capabilities in Europe compared to the previous plan. Secretary Gates summarized the issue well by saying: "We are strengthening, not scrapping, missile defense in Europe."

The new architecture will be deployed sooner than the previously proposed third site would have been. Secretary Gates has said that the new security will be deployed starting in 2011, whereas the previously planned security would not have been deployed until at least 2017, assuming then that it met all the conditions required in our law, such as ratification by the Czech Republic and Poland and demonstrating that the security would be operationally effective.

As to the suggestion that the administration is abandoning some of our European allies, the administration's plan would involve more allies than the previous plan and would defend all of NATO Europe rather than only a portion of Europe. And Poland and the Czech Republic are being offered the first opportunity to participate in the new architecture.

The NATO view is positive. Last Thursday NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said: "I welcome that the United States today has

discussed at NATO how we can develop a missile defense which can include all allies and protect all allies. I welcome in fact that NATO will play a more prominent role in the U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe. That is a positive step.”

Now, the reason that he reacts that way is that the new plan would defend all of our NATO allies and our forward-deployed forces against that existing threat, rather than defending only a portion of NATO Europe that is not within the range of Iran’s existing missiles, as was the case with the previous plan. This is a substantial improvement for NATO.

Now, while some early statements from some Polish and Czech leaders were critical, later statements were supportive. For instance, last Friday Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said: “Poland will be an element of a new missile defense security. There is no question of the United States abandoning our region. If the scenario outlined yesterday by the U.S. President, State Department officials, and the Secretary of State is implemented, it will be a significant reinforcement of Poland’s defense potential,” he said. And on Polish TV he said: “We will have what we wanted.” This is the Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski. “We will have what we wanted. The presence of American troops and Patriot missiles is guaranteed.”

Czech President Vaclav Klaus earlier this week says he “fully accepts the decision.”

To those who say the new approach stems from Russian pressure, Secretary Gates wrote in *The New York Times*: “Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the President on this issue.” Secretary Gates added that “if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, that will be an unexpected and welcome change of policy on their part.”

Now, it would be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the door to cooperation with Russia on missile defense. If Russia were to cooperate with the United States and NATO, it would send a powerful signal to Iran. It could also, if Russia were to share the data from its Armavir radar, improve the capability of our defenses against Iran.

NATO has repeatedly supported missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia. In April I traveled to Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow with Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Collins. We had frank discussions with government officials in each country. We came back I think with the view that there appeared to be a possibility for a new approach to missile defense that might be acceptable to all and which might show Iran that its pursuit of missiles and nuclear weapons will bring countries, including Russia, together in opposition. This plan creates the possibility for missile defense to be a uniting issue, rather than continuing as a dividing issue.

I would add that it was clear from that trip that the Polish Government was focused, as Foreign Minister Sikorski said, on the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery and in U.S. personnel in Poland, rather than on deployment of the previously proposed long-range interceptors in Poland. It appears that now both nations are moving steadily toward such a deployment and I hope Secretary Flournoy will discuss the status of the Patriot issue.

The new plan is also consistent with the direction that was provided by Congress over each of the last 3 years under both Democratic and Republican leadership. Congress in our legislation told the Defense Department to buy more Standard Missile 3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against the existing short and medium-range missile threat. Congress established a policy to develop, test, and deploy effective missile defenses to defend our forward-based forces, our allies, and our homeland against the threat of Iran's existing and possible future ballistic missiles, and Congress directed that the Defense Department place a priority on developing, testing, and fielding near-term effective missile defense securities, including the Aegis BMD with its Standard Missile 3 interceptor, THAAD and Patriot, PAC-3.

In summary, I believe this new approach is a three- for. It addresses more directly and effectively Iran's missile threat, it maintains and expands our security commitment to Europe, including Poland and the Czech Republic, it opens the door to working cooperatively with Russia on a missile defense security that could not only provide greater protection to Europe, but also make a strong statement to Iran that Europe, including Russia, will take unified action against Iran's threat.

The balance of my statement will be placed in the record, and before calling on our witnesses let me recognize Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like to acknowledge Senator George LeMieux of Florida and welcome him to the committee. Despite the fact that he is an attorney, I look forward to working with him on the many issues we face today. This committee does work in a bipartisan fashion, but I also might say a very spirited fashion from time to time. So welcome, George.

I welcome the witnesses today. Since the end of the Cold War, we've prided ourselves on the strong and enduring relationships we've forged with our European allies, particularly in Eastern Europe. At a time when Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian aggression in the region—Georgia, attempts to intimidate Ukraine, other actions that have been taken—the administration is adopting a new European missile defense strategy that has clearly bruised some of our staunchest allies in Europe while encouraging hard-liners in my view.

The decision by the administration to back away from its missile defense commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland can only demonstrate to the rest of Europe that the United States is not prepared to stand behind its friends, that the United States views resetting its relations with Russia more important than commitments made to close friends and allies, and that the administration is willing to let Russia have veto power over the disposition of our missile defense architecture.

Missile defense in Europe is not and should not be viewed in Moscow as some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It's rather a reasonable and prudent response to the very belligerent threats the Iranian regime continues to pose to the United States and the world.

One of the troubling rationales for this new approach is based on the assumption that the long-range Iranian ballistic missile threat is not materializing as quickly as previously assessed and that the real threat is in the short and medium-range missiles. I agree the short and medium-range missile threats are a significant and growing threat, but I question the notion that we don't have to be as vigilant in developing our defenses against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Secretary Gates during the Bush Administration, recently said that intelligence reports on the Iranian threat as recently as January of this year were more troubling than what is being portrayed by the current administration. He said: "Maybe something really dramatic changed between January 16 and now in what the Iranians are doing with their missile securities, but I don't think so."

We all know the threat's real of Iranian ballistic missiles, real and growing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on both exactly what has changed threat-wise and why the new and old strategies are mutually exclusive, why we can wait until 2020, at least 3 to 5 years later than originally planned, to field a long-range security capable of defending both the United States and Europe.

Interesting about this whole decisionmaking scenario, which in my view was incredibly amateurish and ham-fisted: Months of negotiations were dedicated towards reaching an agreement with the Poles and Czechs in 2008, but a late night phone call was all it took to tell our friends to take a hike. According to news reports, the Polish Prime Minister was called at midnight, only hours before the administration formally announced its new strategy. I suppose that Prime Minister Tusk shouldn't be all too upset because he, unlike members of Congress, didn't have to wait to read about it in the morning papers.

And I must say the timing was exquisite, while the Poles were commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland—exquisite timing. Poland headlines read: "Betrayal. The U.S. sold us to Russia and stabbed us in the back." In the Czech Republic: "No radar. Russia won."

I urge the administration to take every step necessary above and beyond proceeding forward with the planned European missile defense strategy to not downplay the long-range Iranian threat and reassure our allies.

Also, I think it's worth noting the Czech Republic currently have NATO forces deployed, as well as 100 personnel deployed in Kandahar. The Polish currently have 2,000 troops in Afghanistan. I'll be very interested in the future to see how firmly the Poles and the Czechs stand behind those commitments.

There is very little doubt that in most of the world that this is viewed as an attempt to gain Russian concessions on the Iranian nuclear issue. That's the interpretation. It was Machiavelli who said it's not what you do, it's what you appear to do. I am sure that the witnesses today will make a strong technical case for abandonment of the long-range missiles to short and medium-range missile defenses. I have to tell you that there's more to this, far more to this, than a change in policy. This is a signal to our East European

friends, who are very nervous about aggressive Russian behavior in the region, and they have a rich history which to base their concerns on that we have sent the wrong message at the wrong time.

As far as this decision having significant beneficial effect on Russian attitudes towards Iranian nuclear buildup, we'll see. History shows us that unilateral concessions very rarely gain anything except increased demands from our adversaries.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

[Recess.]

Chairman LEVIN. Under Secretary Flournoy.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. We very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration's new approach to missile defense in Europe with you today.

We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic improvement over the program of record. Under the old plan, we were not going to be able to deploy a European missile defense security capable of protecting against Iranian missiles until at least 2017. Under our new plan, we'll be able to protect vulnerable parts of Europe and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed there by the end of 2011. And we'll be creating a far more flexible and adaptive missile defense security, one that can adapt to provide better protection against emerging threats.

As you know, the previous administration had planned to deploy ten ground-based interceptors in Poland, a European midcourse radar in the Czech Republic, and a TPY-2 radar elsewhere in the region. The decision to move forward with that particular configuration was made several years ago and it was based on threat information and technologies available at that time. But circumstances have changed significantly since then.

First, we now have a rather different intelligence picture; and second, we have made major strides in missile defense technologies in just the last few years. We are now in a position to put a far more effective missile defense security in place more rapidly than just a few years ago.

So let me start by discussing the current threat assessments. The Intelligence Community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, has been somewhat slower to develop than previously estimated.

In the near term what this means is that the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to our allies and our partners and U.S. deployed personnel and their families in the Middle East and in Europe. Needless to say, this concern is all the more urgent in light of Iran's continuing uranium enrichment program.

But as Secretary Gates has noted, we understand that intelligence projections can be wrong and can change over time. Iran's priorities and capabilities may indeed change in ways that we can't predict. So our new approach also hedges against the possibility

that threats from Iranian long-range missiles will evolve more rapidly than we currently predict. We would still have 30 GBIs deployed in the United States by the end of 2010, which will provide the United States with a sufficient capability to deal with any Iranian ICBM threat for many years to come. What's more, the information from the European forward-based TPY-2 radar that does remain part of our new plan will significantly enhance the performance of our existing U.S.-based GBIs. We will also continue to develop the two-stage GBI.

Let me now turn to highlight some of the technological changes that have allowed us to develop an improved approach to missile defense. As General O'Reilly and General Cartwright will describe in much more detail, improved interceptor capabilities developed in the last 5 years now offer us a more flexible and capable missile defense architecture. We've also significantly improved our sensor technologies. That means we have a variety of better options to detect and track enemy missiles and guide interceptors in flight to enable successful engagements. As a result, we now have missile defense options that were not previously available.

Our new approach, which the President has adopted on the unanimous recommendation of both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of sensors and proven SM-3 interceptors, which can be fired from both Aegis ships and from land. This means greater geographic flexibility, greater survivability, and greater scalability in response to an evolving threat. That's exactly what we mean by a phased, adaptive approach.

But before I turn it over to my colleagues to describe the security in more detail, I want to say a few words about how our new approach has been received by our allies. For us, one of the many advantages of this new architecture is that it greatly increases the ability of—our ability to work with our European allies and our partners to strengthen extended deterrence and our mutual defenses. The new architecture we are creating provides many more opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between the United States and our NATO partners.

Indeed, the reactions we have received from our allies have ultimately been quite supportive. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has hailed the decision as a positive step and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has described it as a real chance to strengthen Europe's security.

We have also begun discussions—actually, we began general discussions earlier this spring and now we're in quite specific consultations—with both Poland and the Czech Republic about their potential roles in a new missile defense architecture. Our Polish allies understand that they have the option of replacing the GBIs from the previous plan with land-based SM-3 interceptors in the new plan, and we will continue to seek Polish ratification of the missile defense basing agreement and the supplemental status of forces agreement. We are also on track once the SOFA is agreed to begin the regular rotations of Patriot batteries to Poland, as agreed by the previous administration.

We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure that they continue to play a critical and leadership role on missile

defense within the alliance. We have several joint projects already under way with our Czech partners and those will continue. We are already discussing several more, including the possibility of having the Czech Republic host some of the new system's elements, such as the command and control.

In short, we are standing by our allies in Central and Eastern Europe and we are in fact increasing our commitment to their defense in very real terms.

While we certainly welcome Russian interest in the new approach, as well as potential Russian cooperation in sharing data from their radars, this is not about Russia. It's never been about Russia. Regardless of Russian reaction, we will continue to do whatever it takes to ensure the security and defense of our European allies.

Let me end here by underscoring this point. Our new approach to missile defense in Europe allows us to provide coverage to vulnerable parts of Europe much faster than the old approach, and when fully deployed in phase four it will be even more capable than the program of record against the full range of threats, including longer range systems. Our new approach will also allow us to augment our current homeland defense against ICBMs that may evolve in the future. In sum, we are strengthening, not scrapping, missile defense in Europe. We look forward to working with members of this committee to make this new architecture a reality.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and we look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy.

General Cartwright.

General CARTWRIGHT. Sir, we'd ask if General O'Reilly could go second.

Chairman LEVIN. Sure, of course. General O'Reilly.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O'REILLY,
USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY**

General O'REILLY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify to you today on the technical aspects of the President's decision to use a phased, adaptive approach to provide missile defense in Europe. This new proposal is a more powerful missile defense of NATO, enhances U.S. homeland defense, is deployable to theaters around the world, and is more adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties.

The previous proposed missile defense of Europe consisted of four components: a command and control system, ten ground-based interceptors, or GBIs, in Poland; an X-band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an X-band precision tracking forward-based radar in southeastern Europe. Assuming a shot doctrine of two interceptors against each threat missile, this previous missile defense architecture had a maximum capability to engage five intermediate range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Europe, or five intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the United States from the Middle East.

The most valuable component of the previous architecture to the defense of the U.S. homeland was the forward-based X-band radar in southeastern Europe, which would provide early and precise tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East heading towards the United States, thus increasing the accuracy of the fire control instructions to our GBIs based at Fort Greeley, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.

We remain concerned about the future Iranian ICBM threat. Therefore we are retaining the forward-based sensor component in our new phased adaptive approach proposal. Moreover, we will also continue to develop the GMD, ground-based midcourse defense system, and begin testing against ICBM targets using representative Iranian trajectories.

A significant limitation of the previous European architecture was that the GBIs were being used in ICBM, IRBM, and MRBM defense roles. Although we have only tested the GBIs in IRBM, that is ranges less than 5500 kilometers, it is currently our only interceptor designed against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The earliest operational date of the previous architecture is now 2017.

Given the current threat estimate, by 2017 the European-based GBIs could be rapidly consumed by an attack of five IRBMs or MRBMs aimed at NATO countries, leaving no GBIs to contribute to U.S. ICBM defense.

Therefore, the previously proposed European defense architecture was insufficient to counter the quantity of ballistic missile threat faced by NATO and our forward-deployed forces and still provide redundant coverage of the U.S. homeland.

The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile defense capability is our achievements in developing faster and more accurate command and control, battle management, and communications systems which combine data from a network of different sensors, especially sensors that track missiles in the early phases of their flight, rather than using a large radar in a region. For example, our successful intercept of the ailing satellite in February 2008 was based on our ability to combine data from sensors around the world and provide a highly accurate track of the satellite to an Aegis ballistic missile defense ship and launch the modified Standard Missile 3-1A prior to the ship's radar even seeing the satellite. Although this is a very limited capability against an inoperable satellite, it demonstrated the great increase in capability of networking sensors to a missile defense architecture.

Fortunately, we have made significant advances over the last several years in missile defense technologies that enable the phased adaptive approach. The Aegis Standard Missile Block 1A, or SM 3-1A interceptor, is a very capable weapon due to its high acceleration, velocity, and its proven track record, and our ability to rapidly increase to over 80 interceptors at any one launch site.

Since we began testing the operationally configured SM-3 Block 1A missile in June 2006, we have successfully intercepted a target eight out of nine times in which we had launched an interceptor. We also are developing the next generation kill vehicle for the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3-1B, which uses the same rocket motor as the SM-3-1A, but has a more advanced seeker and fire control sys-

tem that uses external sensors as well as the Aegis shipborne radar.

We have already demonstrated the higher risk components of the new kill vehicle and are planning the first intercept test in the winter of 2011. We have had many demonstrations of using networks of sensors, including the most recent intercept by the ground-based midcourse defense system last December, when we combined the tracks of satellites, early warning radars, sea-based X-band radars, and forward-based radars on land and at sea to provide the GBIs with a very accurate track.

Additionally, we have demonstrated unmanned aerial vehicles as highly accurate forward-based defense sensors in intercept tests last spring.

Tomorrow morning we are scheduled to launch a pair of demonstration space tracking and surveillance satellites from the Kennedy Space Center that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight.

Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Shrieber Air Force Base, Colorado, we continue to develop new algorithms and demonstrate combining their sensor data to achieve even more accurate tracks than any individual sensor could produce. A more advanced variant of the SM-3, the SM-3-2A, has been under development since 2005. This interceptor will have more than twice the range of an SM-3 Block 1B. SM-3s are also more affordable than GBIs since you can procure four to seven production variants of an SM-3 for the cost of one GBI.

But the key attribute is that we can launch SM-3s from sea or land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the interceptor launch point between the origin of the threat launch and the area that you are trying to protect. This is a key enabler in intercepting threat missiles early in their flight.

We propose defending NATO in phases. Phase one would consist of Aegis ships with SM-3 Block 1A missiles deployed in the eastern Mediterranean and a forward-based sensor in southeastern Europe. We propose by 2015 deployment of the SM-3 Block 1B missile, which will have greater capacity to use the network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate threat objects. Scores of SM-3-1Bs would be deployed at land and sea-based locations.

By 2018, the deployment of the SM-3-2A missile, which could defend all of NATO from two land-based locations and one sea-based location. By 2020, our goal is to leverage the lightweight kill vehicle technology to develop a higher velocity SM-3 Block 2B missile to destroy MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs early in flight from launch locations within the theater of the threat launch location. Two land-based SM-3 Block 2B sites would protect all of NATO.

The timetable which I have presented allows for these missile defense technologies to be tested and proven prior to deployment decisions. An additional advantage to a phased adaptive approach is the applicability to missile defenses outside of Europe. As an example, if the land-based SM-3 site was in Hawaii it would provide significant protection of those islands.

We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that we have relief from rescissions and flexibility to spend

the unused fiscal year 2009 RDT&E and some MILCON dollars associated with the previous European site proposal. I note that both the House and Senate authorizing committees have very presciently included provisions in this year's national defense authorization bill that permit the Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding as an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certifies that this architecture is as cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available as the previous program. With this relief and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, we can pursue this architecture within our fiscal year 2010 budget request.

Finally, I was very gratified last Thursday when I was given the opportunity to personally meet with the members of the delegations of Poland and the Czech Republic that I have been working closely with for the past 3 years and explain that we were not backing out of our commitments, we would still honor our ballistic missile agreements for them to host our components of a missile defense architecture and other allies would also have that opportunity. Likewise, in addition to what radars in Armavir, Russia, or Gabala, Azerbaijan, the cooperative development of missile defense technologies by Russia and other countries are not necessary, but they would be welcome.

My assessment is that executing this approach is challenging, but no more challenging than the development of our other missile defense technologies. Technically challenging endeavors endure setbacks, but the engineering is executable and the development risks are manageable.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General O'Reilly.
General Cartwright.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC,
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General CARTWRIGHT. Chairman Levin and Senator McCain: Thank you for this opportunity. I've had the privilege of working in the missile defense architecture and warfighting requirements for over 10 years now, both on the Joint Staff as a combatant commander and now as the Vice Chairman.

The Congressionally directed ballistic missile defense review has provided the opportunity to review our objectives, the threat, the combatant commander's needs, and the technologies available to fulfill their needs. Our recommendations are not a departure from the objectives. The needs of the combatant commanders, however, reflect an adjustment in the balance of our capabilities in response to the threats they face today and the threats that are clearly visible on the horizon.

My colleagues have laid that case before you. You asked me to address the architecture and the broader implications of our recommendations across all of our combatant commanders. First in the objectives, we remain solid in defense of the homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies. The architecture remains associated with the phases of flight of a ballistic missile: boost, mid-course, and terminal. Integration of the midcourse and the ter-

minal is probably our most recent demonstrated capability. Mid-course is associated with the ground-based interceptors that are currently based in Alaska and California and usually associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles. The terminal phase, that phase in which the missile comes back down into the atmosphere towards its target, was demonstrated in our deployment of the theater high altitude air defense, or THAAD, capabilities in the SM-3 to Hawaii last July when we were defending against a potential launch of a TD-2 from North Korea. This was the initial integration and, rudimentary as it was, started to demonstrate the value of being able to integrate across the architecture the phases of flight, the weapons, and the sensors.

We still remain committed to addressing all of the range of ballistic missiles from short to intercontinental ballistic missiles, and all of the various launch venues, from pads to silos to mobile launchers. These are critical to our combatant commanders in their addressal.

We also remain committed to what has been referred to as rudimentary threats, the two, three to five missiles potentially coming out of a rogue nation. But in addition to that, the combatant commanders need the ability to defend our forces in the field deployed and our allies against raids. We have seen in the video clips over the last couple of years the raid-type demonstration, salvo launches out of Iran. These are troubling.

Current systems are developed for point defense, can handle two or three inbound missiles. We need to move forward to be able to handle these raids. They are critical to the defense and they are critical to our combatant commanders.

On the other side of the coin here, as a friendly, we remain committed to the defense of the homeland, a theater capability, which is emerging with the SM-3 and the THAAD systems, and our point defense capabilities, which are handled by our Patriot PAC-3 systems. The point defense systems that we have deployed today are capable of handling large population areas, seaports, airports, bases where our forces are deployed. Theater systems are for the general area associated with a combatant commander's area of operations and they are necessary and they are emerging as the greatest need that we have today, that we face out there against these short and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Adaptive and responsive are two attributes that we find critical. As General O'Reilly said, the first leverage point that we have in our technologies is the common command and control system. This is a global system. This is not a regional system. This is not a platform system. This is a global system that integrates sensors, weapons, puts them together in a way that optimizes their use in the theater and across the globe.

Fixed, relocatable, and mobile systems are also critical to us. The fixed systems are the easiest to operate. They are the most permanent. They give you an enduring capability. The relocatable systems accept the fact that the threat may change, that the enemy may change their approach to the problem, and in days or weeks we are able to move these relocatable, mostly sensors, some weapons, to places that are more advantageous based on the threat that emerges. Our mobile systems are the most adaptable. They are

available to reinforce. They are available to fill in which threats change quickly, and they are globally deployable, most notably on the Aegis platform.

Any weapon, any sensor, is where we're headed. Our ability to net together any weapon and any sensor and create the opportunity for a fire control solution is critical to the architecture as we build it.

We are in the process here, as we demonstrate in the European architecture and the phases, moving to a construct that General O'Reilly alluded to when we shot down the errant satellite, which is to understand that, particularly with our SM-3 and our Patriot, the weapons are far more capable than their organic sensors. They have greater kinematic ranges, they have better ability to intercept if they're put with a more capable sensor.

So what you see in the early phases, phases one and two of this Europe capability and moving to phase three, is really the acknowledgment that we are pairing longer range sensors with weapons that are capable of flying longer ranges, but are currently paired with sensors that can't see far enough to get them out there. That's probably the biggest advantage and the biggest differentiation between phases one, two, and three.

There are hardware differences, but the reality is what we're doing here is taking advantage of systems that we already have, pairing them up with sensors that can reach out further and address the threats. They also, these new sensors, are able to address raid-sized threats. Organic sensors can handle a very limited number of inbound targets. These newer, larger sensors that are relocatable, that we are putting out, are capable of handling raids and capable of seeing much further out, and therefore give us a much greater defended space.

Another attribute that we're very interested in with this new architecture is the idea of a collective defense. This is not a U.S.-only approach. In other words, first and foremost many nations have bought the Patriot system. Many nations have bought the Aegis system. They can be integrated and are being integrated into this architecture and this command and control system. Probably the most visible example are the Japanese and their integration of their Aegis systems. The South Koreans are following very quickly behind that.

The many Patriot systems that are deployed, particularly throughout Europe and the rest of the world, are easily integrated into this system. That to us is a very high leverage issue. In other words, we don't have to buy all of these weapons, nor do we have to buy all of these sensors.

In the case of indigenous systems, for instance the Arrow associated with the Israelis, we are integrating that weapons system into this architecture. That opportunity gives us a great amount of flexibility as we move to the future. We're also integrating other nations' sensors into this system. So this opportunity has a much broader leverage point in its collective nature and its ability to integrate both U.S. systems that have been sold abroad and indigenous systems from other countries into the architecture.

That allows us also to adapt to the threat as it emerges and where it emerges, and we are not locked to any one single location to address the threat that evolves over the next few years.

The last attribute that I'd like to talk to in this architecture is the multi-mission attribute. Today we are focused on ballistic missiles. The reality is that we have challenges with cruise missiles. This command and control system, these weapons systems, can be adapted, can handle cruise missile type capabilities. They also are capable of handling air threats, and we can adapt this into our warning system and we can also bring this system and are about to demonstrate over the next couple of months online to be able to handle space situation awareness, something that is the number one issue associate with STRATCOM's space mission, our ability to do space situation awareness. These sensors, based on software programming, can handle that mission as well.

So we get several bangs for the buck, as the chairman said, more than a three-fer really here, sir, I believe, out of this system. It is adaptable, it is resilient. It has the ability and the flexibility to go after the threats as they emerge, to lead turn the threats when necessary, and to reinforce in areas where we did not plan to be.

I thank you for this opportunity and I stand ready for your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you.

Why don't we try a 7-minute first round. We have a number of Senators here.

General Cartwright, is it correct that the new approach that was approved by the President has the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs?

General CARTWRIGHT. It does, sir, and also the combatant commanders.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that this is a strong support from the Chiefs?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is unwavering.

Chairman LEVIN. Can you—did the Chiefs have a role in developing this recommendation?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. We did this under the aegis of the ballistic missile defense review that was directed by the Congress. We had started this review actually 3 years ago when we adjusted many of our buy rates towards the SM-3 and the development of the THAAD. That was an input from the combatant commanders that came in during one of our defense senior leader conferences. We have worked that hard with the combatant commanders, and the Chiefs and the commanders believe this is the right way to go.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there's been a suggestion that this new approach represents a reduction in our security commitment to our allies, particularly to Poland and the Czech Republic. My question is this, General. Would you and the Chiefs make a recommendation that diminishes our commitment to our NATO allies?

General CARTWRIGHT. I can't forecast what we wouldn't do, but I've never seen that trend.

Chairman LEVIN. It's also been suggested and stated that this is a better, faster way to deal with the Iranian threat. Is it?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is, and also the North Korean threat.

Chairman LEVIN. You've described as to why it is, so I'm not going to ask you to go through that again. But do the Chiefs agree that this is a better, faster way to deal with the Iranian missile threat?

General CARTWRIGHT. They do. There is particularly solid support both from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations as they move forward. The Chief of Naval Operations has a very large play in this as we move to the SM-3. His support both at sea and now on land of that system is solid. He is a strong advocate for that approach.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, it's also been suggested that this recommendation and decision was aimed at placating Russia. Is that at all a factor in the Chiefs' recommendation?

General CARTWRIGHT. Not in the Chiefs' recommendation, no, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Secretary Flournoy, you quoted Prime Minister Tusk of Poland, and there were some early comments from some Polish leaders which were very critical. It seems that the later comments, as I quote in my opening comments, are much more supportive. But nonetheless, you've quoted Tusk as saying that this represents a real chance to strengthen European security. Is that the Polish position or is the earlier position the Polish position?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I believe that what I quoted from the Polish prime minister is the Polish position. I think that some of the early reactions, frankly, were based on erroneous and speculative press reporting. It was before they had actually been briefed by us on the full degree of the plan. It was before they'd had a chance to talk with President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and others. I think once they understood what it was we were actually proposing, they're quite pleased with the proposal.

Chairman LEVIN. Why was there not an earlier briefing or conversation with them?

Ms. FLOURNOY. There were earlier briefings on missile defense in general and some of the ideas we were thinking about, going back to the spring. I think as we got closer to a decision one of the challenges we faced were we started to have a number of leaks from various discussions, and again that led to speculative reporting. So I think that accelerated the time line for actually making the decision public. We wanted to set the record straight.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, you say that you met with the Poles and the Czechs, I guess recently?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Last week. A team of us went out last week, yes, before the President announced his decision.

Chairman LEVIN. That was before?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that the same meeting, General O'Reilly, that you made reference to?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. What was the reaction or the response at that meeting to what you told them?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think at those meetings they were taking in a lot of information. It was somewhat contrary to what they had read in the press and therefore expected. But literally over the course

of the day, I think the reaction became quite positive. Particularly by the time we got to the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, and were able to brief all of the NATO permanent representatives there, we got a uniformly positive response.

Chairman LEVIN. Were the Poles and the Czechs part of the NAC meeting?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. They were at that NAC meeting?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, they were.

Chairman LEVIN. That was a uniform response?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. They were all very supportive and then, by then, looking to discuss, well, how do we actually solidify our continued participation in the new architecture.

Chairman LEVIN. Were you at that meeting at the NAC also?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. No, no. I'm asking General O'Reilly.

General O'REILLY. Yes. Secretary Flournoy and I briefed the NAC that afternoon.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you describe the reaction at the NAC, including the representatives from the Czech Republic and Poland, as she did?

General O'REILLY. Yes, very positive.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of the Russia issue, General, I'm asking you this question, General O'Reilly, about the possibility of U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation. Is there any advantage in that technically to us if there were such cooperation? If we can work out something with Russian radar, for instance, is that of value to us?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir, it would be. Again, as I stated before, it's not necessary. However, both the geographic locations of Gabala and Armavir provide different views of the Iranian missile space and that would enhance our accuracy of our early tracks. And not only that; those are very large radars and they have significant power to not only observe Iran, but the entire region way beyond what our smaller forward-based radars would. So there would be a technical enhancement of that.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of that radar, have you had discussions with the Russians? Have you had technical discussions with the Russians? Have you met with them?

General O'REILLY. Over the past several years, yes, sir. Not since—the last was May of this year.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, if we were able to involve the Russians somehow in a missile defense system and gain the benefit of their radar information, for instance, in addition to being useful technically, not necessary but advantageous, as General O'Reilly has just told us, would there be a positive powerful political signal to Iran if we could involve Russia in a joint missile defense?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think anything we can do to show Iran a united front would be very helpful. I also think it would help to get the Russians over the hump of not viewing any of our missile defense activities as threatening to them. It's never been the case and it shouldn't be viewed as such.

Chairman LEVIN. Did we cave to the Russians in doing this in any sense?

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. I was part of many of the decisionmaking meetings. That was not the driving factor. This has never been about Russia.

Chairman LEVIN. General Cartwright, do you agree with that?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do. I've been in most all of those decisionmaking processes with the Secretary.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses, and I won't take too long because the issue has been decided, been decided in really remarkable fashion, in the category you can't make it up.

For Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer, the news came in a call hastily placed by President Barack Obama shortly after midnight on Thursday in Prague. In Warsaw, his Polish counterpart Donald Tusk initially declined to answer the phone from the White House as he guessed the purpose from the unusual timing and wanted to prepare a response.

I'm so pleased to hear that our allies now are pleased and happy, but I guess the report of yesterday that says "President Kaczynski has said that if he meets President Obama at today's UN General Assembly he will not try to hide his disappointment over the anti-missile shield decision." Kaczynski, presently in New York, is quoted on TV in 24 News as saying "I do not intend to say that we are satisfied." It goes on.

The foreign minister of Poland said: "I hope this will prove a salutary shock, especially for the right end of Poland's political spectrum," Sikorski told TOK-FM Radio, adding "It could lead some to rethink the dream of basing everything on a bilateral alliance with the United States." "We are a European country and here first and foremost we must seek our security guarantees." I think that message is very clear, so I'll ask to have included in the record these many comments.

Chairman LEVIN. They will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator MCCAIN. And Mr. Chairman, I have over a long life had many, many contacts and relationships with individuals and leaders and former leaders of both Poland and the Czech Republic and I can tell you their comments to me are not that they are satisfied. In fact, they were surprised—midnight phone calls—and very much disturbed by what is perceived to be by them and in the world a unilateral concession to the Russians in order to hope that we can get cooperation from the Russians in trying to address the Iranian nuclear issue.

So all I can—I guess I should have to comment also that, as short a time ago before this committee on March 10, 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, testified: "Iran's 2 February 2009 launch of the Sofir space launch vehicle shows progress in mastering the technology needed to produce ICBMs. Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing missile systems with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads."

In 2009, NDA stated: “Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and Central Europe and could have an ICBM capability of reaching the United States”—this was in May, just last May—the United States before 2015.

General Cartwright, you stated back in February that the technologies for boosting satellites into space “are compatible with an intercontinental ballistic missile type capability.” You did clarify that this was not a long-range missile, but it was the path towards that, and that we should be concerned with it.

I don’t have access to intelligence information, but I think perhaps one would interpret your remarks today as a significant shift from testimony a short a time ago as last May. Is that an accurate assumption, General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think from the standpoint of the space launch that the Iranians conducted and their demonstration of the ability to stage, that they are getting at the early phases of an ICBM capability. I still believe that to be the case. But they have several phases that they must go through yet that will take them measured in years rather than months to accomplish.

Those phases are very visible, and that’s one of the key considerations for us to watch. Any time you start to work with reentry vehicles, any time you start to move in that direction, that is very visible activity and generally takes a nation several years to accomplish. That doesn’t include mating it to a weapon.

So we are concerned about the progress and the technologies that the Iranians are demonstrating them. The pace at which they’re demonstrating them has been stretched out more than we originally believed was going to be the case.

Senator MCCAIN. Then I guess, General Cartwright, isn’t it true that the North Koreans made came as—was not anticipated by the intelligence communities? I think I can provide a factual record to substantiate that.

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the twist in the North Korean case in the Taepodong 2 systems has been the movement toward the space capability, which demonstrates again probably the same or similar—

Senator MCCAIN. The question, General CARTWRIGHT. Did we miss? Did we have wrong intelligence information about the progress that the North Koreans had made, both in their nuclear capability and their missile capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that the intelligence, as you say, sir, has been wrong on that.

Senator MCCAIN. I guess I have one more question. I understand that now it will be sea-based, part of our missile defense shield will be in sea-based missile defense weaponry; is that correct?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Does that mean that we could anticipate a budget request for more ships?

General CARTWRIGHT. I’d have to go back and look. Right now we are modifying existing ships and existing classes of ships.

Senator MCCAIN. We’re certainly giving them additional missions.

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, General O'Reilly. Based on previous conversations that I've been privileged to have with the three of you and based on a sense of the Senate amendment that Senator Sessions and I presented to the Senate that was adopted on our defense authorization bill just 2 months ago in July, I would guess that you will not be surprised to hear that I am disappointed by the administration's decision to scrap the Polish-Czech ground-based midcourse defense and go to this new system.

I am disappointed and frankly troubled because I believe that it opens a much greater risk of a period of time during which we, the United States, will not have an adequate defense against an intercontinental ballistic missile, long-range missile, fired, launched, from Iran against the United States. That's serious stuff.

I understand every strategy that one adopts has risks, but to me in making this judgment to change direction based on the intelligence, which I'll get to in a minute, to give a somewhat greater protection than the Polish-Czech system to our allies in Europe and the Middle East, we are giving less protection to the continental United States if we are targeted by an Iranian long-range ballistic missile.

Let me come back and just explain why I get to this point. What's the Iranian threat? I understand the intelligence that you've described. I was going to quote General Maples and General Craddock earlier this year talking about their concerns about an ICBM program development by the Iranians. I want to take a look at some of the intelligence that you base this on. I'm going to ask for a briefing on it.

But here's my concern. If we now have reached, based on an updated threat assessment, the conclusion that the short and medium-range missile programs, ballistic missile programs of Iran, are further developed than we thought, to me that suggests even more likelihood that their ICBM program may be—may break out sooner than we currently estimate, which is 2015, and face the U.S. with a threat.

The ground-based interceptors—there was a Congressional Budget Office report which I know I've discussed with you before, which had a big effect on me. It just came out in February of this year, and it had two maps. I've got it too small here, but one basically shows the protection that the silo-based ground-based interceptors in Poland would give to the United States. It covers the entire United States. What's the significance of this? Some people call it redundant. "Redundant" is a word that may to some people mean unnecessary. We properly build redundancy into our planes, our helicopters, our ships, our tanks. Why? Because if one system fails we want to make sure that there's a backup system to protect us.

We're talking here about the potential of a ballistic missile attack on the United States of America. Fortunately, we have the two sites in California and Alaska. But the ground-based interceptor in Poland gave us what I believe is our desired, our best strategy

here, which is the so-called shoot, look, and shoot option. A missile is launched from Iran, we have a first shot from Poland as it's ascending. If we miss it, we've got a second shot from California and Alaska.

With the alternative that you're proposing here, most of the United States west of the Mississippi only has protection from those two sites in California and Alaska. They don't have that first shot at that incoming missile from the Polish site. Now, I know you've said in the proposal you've made that the SM-3 Block 2A variant will be—is expected to be ready in 2018 and it will increase the defensive capability to include long-range missile threats to the United States. SM-3 Block 2B hopefully will be ready by 2020, will provide a significant defense against the ICBM threat.

But here's my concern. The ground-based interceptor is built, the ones that we're going to put in Poland. It's ready to be tested. Something we may want to deal with on the floor when the defense appropriations bill comes up, they've taken a lot of the money out for the testing of those ground-based interceptors.

Incidentally, they were supposed to be ready in 2015.

I think they still can be ready in 2015 at the Polish- Czech sites if we give it adequate money. What's holding it up is not the technology developments; it's Congress holding back on money.

So the ground-based interceptor we're going to put in Poland is done. It just is ready to be tested. Those two other systems that are part of the new proposal, which would give us the redundant protection of the United States against an ICBM from Iran, the SM-3 Block 2A and Block 2B - - I may be overstating it by saying they're paper missiles, but they're in an early development stage. They're nowhere near where the GBI is. So that's why I am so concerned about the impact of this decision on the protection of the United States from an Iranian ICBM.

I suppose one question I'd ask—I think if folks were here from the previous administration they might say, although maybe you'd quibble, or maybe even I would quibble a little bit, that their program was to do both of these things, to develop systems to protect Europe and the Middle East from the short and medium-range missiles, but also with the Polish-Czech system to protect the continental United States from a long-range missile shorter.

So I guess I had a lot to say, so I used most of my question time. But why not do both? Why not accept your proposal for the improved defense of Europe and the Middle East from the short and medium-range missiles from Iran and continue the Polish-Czech system, which provides the redundant, but I'd say—God knows, I think all of us would like to feel that we've got two shots at a missile coming toward the United States from Iran, rather than putting all our hopes in one.

General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. Much of what you say was in the calculus of at least my perspective and the Chiefs as we worked our way through this. I'll defer to General O'Reilly, but the addition of the ten GBIs in Poland from a mathematical standpoint—everybody worries about the ambiguity of that, but the difference in probability of success was somewhere between a .92 as it stands and using the interceptors from the United States. Adding the

interceptors from Poland got us up maybe as high as .96, but probably in the .95, .94 area. That's a major investment.

What it did not do was twofold, what worries us the most. The first is—

Chairman LEVIN. I'm not sure what you mean. You say it added very little, is that the point?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. In probability of success of the engagement, it added very little.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very little to the defense of the United States against a long-range missile?

General CARTWRIGHT. To the defense of the United States against an ICBM threat from Iran.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I'm surprised to hear that. As you know, that's not what the Congressional Budget Office people—

General CARTWRIGHT. I'll defer to General O'Reilly to go through the data.

The two things that were most troubling for us was the potential for building more than three to five of these missiles, ICBMs, by Iran, that we would need to have scale and be able to address at an affordable price a large number of missiles. Now, maybe that's ten. I don't know what they're going to do.

The second piece was that—and you referred to the last administration. The second piece that was very compelling to us was that in the discussion of a boost, midcourse, and terminal. We now have a terminal. The GBIs give us a midcourse. We have no boost, no credible boost capability. What this development program does—and I agree with you, it is more than paper, but in that class—it gives us the potential to get at the boost phase, which is by all accounts and all analysis the most effective way to take on the threat. The threat is most vulnerable as it is ascending. It can't defend itself, it can't maneuver. It is very ballistic at that stage. If we can get it at that stage, we can thin out the threat substantially, if not eliminate it.

That was the most compelling discussion about the technology to be that weighed in our decision process, sir. So I don't disagree with you and redundancy is something that we're looking for. We went with the redundancy of getting all three phases of flight as a balancing activity that was available to us now, rather than putting all of our eggs into the midcourse, very expensive, very sophisticated intercepts.

I take your criticism.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate what you've said.

My time is up. I just want to say that my hope would have been, of course I'd like to see us develop a boost phase capability to knock down a missile, but the consequences of an Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack on the United States are so catastrophic that—and we're just a day after Ahmadinejad speaks to the United Nations with the most poisonous, primitive attacks on the United States—and Israel, but the United States we're talking about, really the west—that I would have preferred to see us go with parts of the new system, with the whole new system, and continue the Polish-Czech development, because that would have given us the midcourse, shoot-look-shoot, and an investment in a capacity we'd like, we really need to have, which is the boost phase as well.

We'll continue the discussion. My time is up. Thank you.

Ms. FLOURNOY. May I add a response? Is that okay, sir?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. I think you're entitled.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you.

I just wanted to say that our boss, Secretary Gates, as a former DCI is very aware of how we can be wrong in our intelligence estimates. I think as I watched him go—he's also the Secretary that signed the program of record. So as I watched him go through this decision—

Chairman LEVIN. What does that mean, "program of record"?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Meaning the old—he is the person who put forward the previous plan in the previous administration.

So as I watched him go through this decisionmaking process, he asked a lot of the same questions that you've raised. In order to support the new system, he had to be convinced of a couple things: first, that we could still defend the United States homeland should an Iranian ballistic ICBM threat develop earlier than what was being predicted; second, that we would have options, technical options, should the development of the later blocks, Block 2 of SM-3 missile, be either—either fail or be delayed.

He raised those specific issues. I think in designing the new architecture, by putting in the TPY-2 radar early that closes the notch in our coverage for the homeland and gives you that extra ability to see what's coming at you and makes the GBIs in the United States more effective. Second, we are going to continue the development of the two-stage GBI as a technological hedge.

So he asked exactly the questions that you're asking, Senator. But he, working through the details, became convinced that this system could and would adequately protect, fully protect, the United States homeland even as we move towards a more cost-effective way to protect Europe over time as well.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have the greatest respect for Secretary Gates. I'm reassured that he asked the same questions. But I'm not reassured by the answers, as he apparently was.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman's comment about the poisonous rhetoric of Ahmadinejad I think would be shared by probably every member of this committee. Poisonous indeed they were, and I think we all recognize what the Iranian threat is and want to deal with it.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess I would agree with the last two questioners, particularly when Senator McCain said this thing's done anyway. You guys have made up your mind. We'll do all we can through our process to change that.

I just want to get in the record a couple of things that I observe. I coincidentally happened to be in Poland when President Kaczynski made the statement, when he said that he believes the United States will honor the agreement to build the missile defense in this country. "A deal was signed"—I'm quoting now—"and I think that, regardless of which administration is in power in the United States, agreements are going to be honored."

He asked me the question, are these agreements going to be honored? I said yes, these agreements are going to be honored; America doesn't do this.

In addition to the statements that were entered into the record by Senator McCain, the betrayal, no radar, Russia won, one of them he overlooked was in the second largest newspapers: "An ally we rely on has betrayed us in exchange for its own better relations with Russia."

Just one comment. We were talking about the significance of the boost phase and yet this budget virtually kills one of the things we were working on, the kinetic energy booster, and then the second test of the ABL.

What I want to do is, in keeping with the time—when we talk about the fact that we're somehow going to do a better job for Western Europe and Eastern Europe by accelerating our activity and becoming more aggressive with the SM-3 and the THAAD, it's interesting because this budget calls for the termination or at least no more THAADs and cuts the SM-3s down from 24 to 18.

Just real quickly, for a yes or no question: Are you going to make an amended request in terms of the THAAD and the SM-3 in light of this new development that apparently happened since the budget request?

General O'REILLY. No, sir, we're not, and the reason—

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, could he explain it?

General O'REILLY. The reason is the policy, the funding policy up until now, sir, was we would buy missiles I pieces. That's an exception to the rule for the Department of Defense and MDA was allowed to do that. Starting this year, we no longer have that option, and when we fund we're actually funding \$400 million more for SM-3 and THAAD missiles this year than before, because we're buying those missiles in their totality.

So we are spending \$400 million more than previously on those interceptors and we're buying them in full-up, full production price that we pay for.

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that's fine. I heard that before and I don't agree with that.

Of the people at this table up here, the one I think should be most concerned would be the Senator from Maine, because as I look at the overlay map that Senator Lieberman was using, but mine's a little bit larger, as to what our capability, what our protection is right now with what we have in Alaska and California, it even cuts Maine in half up there. I want you to know that, I say to Senator Collins. You should be concerned.

But it shows that the capability is from the western United States. So obviously something coming from the west, that gives us a good capability. Something from the east, obviously it does not give us the capability that makes us comfortable. During the Bush Administration—and all of you were around at that time—they emphasized, this is not just for Europe; this is for a potential ICBM that comes to the United States.

Now, with that in mind, I want to get a couple of things in the record just to show what is happening over there. I can remember—and I've said this several times up here and there's not time

to give the whole story—when we were talking about the Taepodong 1 capability that we thought was developing in North Korea, our intelligence estimate said on August 24, 1998, that it would be another couple or 3 years, and they fired one 7 days later, on August 31.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepodong 2. The current range of North Korea's missiles is five times further than it was in 1990. North Korea has sold ballistic missiles to several countries, and technology. I don't think there's anyone in this room on either side of this table who doesn't believe that anything that North Korea has can very easily end up in Iran.

But then on February 3—this is very significant—a satellite, three-stage liquid-fueled rocket demonstration, the key technology—the same propulsion that it takes to send up a satellite could be used, as you have said and I think someone else, I think Senator McCain, already quoted you, General Cartwright, when you stated on February 10 that that same technology could be used for—so we all understand that.

Now, this is what I'm getting around to. The Department of Defense in the 2009 Missile Defense Agency, they said: "Iran continues to develop ballistic missile capability of striking Israel and Central Europe and could have the ICBM capability of reaching the United States in 2015." I think several of us have said that now, so let's assume that that's a fact.

Let's assume also that the SM-3-2B would have the same capability as a GBI would have had as originally designed. I don't think anyone's going to disagree with those two things. So the question to me is very similar to the question, but I'm asking it a little different way, of Senator Lieberman. That is, if we were to have stayed with the GBI—it was going to be 2013, we all understand that. Well this is what the estimates say. This was put together and I'm always gone on that assumption.

Then they said, well, maybe, since we slipped a year, it could be 2015. So let's just say 2015, or if you want to go all the way to 2017.

Now, shift over to the SM-3-2B. I think we discussed and I think it was in the written testimony of one of the three of you because I saw it, that that would be 2020, and that was repeated by Senator Lieberman. So regardless, if you put those three things together, if they have that capability by 2015 and we could have had the capability of knocking it down by that time or even a year later, no matter how you match these up it's another 3 years of exposure that we would have as a result of shifting from the ground-based interceptor to potentially the SM-3-2B.

Where am I wrong?

General O'REILLY. First of all, sir, it's always been that once we start construction it's 5 years to build the missile field. That's been consistent for the last several years. It's when that start point will occur has always been what has moved those dates 4-1/2 years for the European midcourse radar.

For the 2B, it is not a brand-new development. I was responsible for the development of the GBI and the THAAD and the Patriot and now I'm responsible for the SM-3. Looking at that, the SM-3 is more of an evolutionary technical growth, built on existing

components and built on more mature models than what we've had before. We also, as we testified earlier this year, have a much more extensive test program in order to validate this. Our decision process previously was we were deploying the GBIs, but, as we stated earlier, most of the testing, including all of the testing against ICBMs, remains to occur.

In this approach, those time lines were extended because we were laying out a program that tests first. Then decisions are made based on those tests, including operational assessments: Should we go forward? And yes, sir, that does extend time, and that's when we arrived at the 2020 timeframe.

Could it occur earlier? Yes, it could, but we have laid in that significant amount of testing.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but, as Senator Lieberman said, when we're looking at the ground-based interceptor capability, it's ready to test, ready to go. I still believe that as a result of this that we are exposing ourselves in the eastern part for probably 3 years. Any way you line up these numbers, I think it comes to that conclusion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator REED.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. General Cartwright, in countering potential threats like the potential threat from Iran, do we solely rely on our anti-missile defense?

General CARTWRIGHT. No, sir. There is a robust program by Central Command to address them across a myriad of different capabilities. So missile defense is but one element. There is an offensive force element, obviously, and a credible one, that is represented by the Central Command. There are also activities associated with counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, consequence management, both here in the United States and overseas, to protect our forces and to protect populations.

So we try to go at this as holistically as possible. This is but one element of that deterrent strategy.

Senator REED. And it's your professional judgment that this approach strengthens that holistic approach to the defense of the Nation and also our forces in the field against missiles?

General CARTWRIGHT. It does from a technical standpoint. I believe that it also does from a standpoint of what most warfighters would talk to, which is in the eyes of your enemy have you presented a credible case that would potentially influence their decision process. When you bring all your allies in line and you're able to speak with one voice and they can see that that is mounting against them, that has to have an influence on their decision calculus.

Senator REED. Let me follow up with another question. Unfortunately, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as has been suggested in some of the questions, is a current problem. If for example a threat would either shift from away from Iran or another threat would arise, this system has I think inherently more flexibility because of its sea-based and its mobile sensors to be shifted onto that threat; is that correct?

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct, sir. That is why we retain the mobile. It is probably the most expensive, but it gives us the greatest opportunity to hedge against an enemy who obviously has a vote in how their represent the threat. We're not exactly consistent on always being able to predict who we're going to fight with next.

Senator REED. Right. So if—and it's been raised here and it's a very, very sobering and legitimate point—through proliferation of a Taepodong to a country that now is not on our list, that site in Poland might be of absolutely no use to us.

General CARTWRIGHT. That's true, sir.

Senator REED. General O'Reilly, can you just give us an idea of the tactical risks associated with bringing on the SM-3 Block 2A? You described it's building on a proven product, not a completely new system, but what are the technical risks you will have to look for?

General O'REILLY. Sir, it would be the—we are applying the same type of seeker technology that we are developing for the 1B, and we've actually tested it on aircraft. We've observed missile launches. We have a very well characterized design for that, for the 1B. That is also, that design is going to be carried forward for the 2A. We might say, it's a very good design and it also has applicability, if not exact use, for a 2B.

The second is the booster itself. It's a 21-inch booster. The GBI for reference is a 25-ton missile. The SM-3-1A is a 1-ton missile, 25 times smaller. The 2B is 2 tons, twice as big. But that technology, the way we steer it, the way we operate it, give it aerodynamic control, is a direct scale from what we are doing with the current missile.

So that is—and we understand the flight environments. So we're able to qualify the components on the ground before we fly them.

Senator REED. So you're reasonably confident that you can overcome any technical issues and come in on time, as well as on target, we hope?

General O'REILLY. Sir, absolutely, because the time lines we have laid out take into account having problems and having failed flight tests and recovering from those problems. So this is not a very aggressive time line, given where we are in the development of this.

Senator REED. I would—let me ask another question. If intelligence developed that would suggest the threat period is moving forward, you have the opportunity to accelerate the program?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir. In fact, just to give an idea of the maturity of these technologies, our first time we fly the 1B next year we will actually intercept. Typically, you have four or five flights, but we understand this technology to the point we don't see the benefit there. We could always go back to a contingency deployment, where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense will tell me to deploy a capability that hasn't been fully characterized. We do that today in Japan and Israel and we could do that here.

Senator REED. Just a final question, General Cartwright. It goes to the number of ships that the Navy will need to carry out this strategy. You've indicated you're in the process of converting Aegis destroyers or destroyers—

General CARTWRIGHT. The Spruance class. There are cruisers and destroyers there are capable of this.

Senator REED. And you're doing it. Part of that also would involve forward basing, I presume?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. What we're working on right now is the early stages, what we were calling phase one, is mostly associated with ship-based capability. Then we move to land-based because that's infinitely cheaper and doesn't tie down a multi-purpose ship to one function. But we always retain the capability to surge.

What we're thinking right now—and this is early stage CONOPS—is that we would like to see the ability to have two ships per station for three stations, so a total of six. That's generally the way we operate in Japan versus North Korea. That allows one off station, one on station. A magazine on any one of these ships is 100, plus or minus, the capability of 100, plus or minus, missiles.

Senator REED. I know, I think, that Spain and Norway, as well as South Korea, Australia, and Japan, have Aegis systems, and you're actively talking to them to augment our efforts?

General CARTWRIGHT. That'll be part of the way forward over the next year, is to sit down and talk. The burden-sharing opportunities here are significant. Many countries have Patriot, as I said. I would ask General O'Reilly also—the financial contributions of countries like Japan towards our R&D have been significant.

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir. In the case of the Block 2A, they have invested \$1 billion.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator LeMieux.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your warm welcome to the committee here today, and I will strive to work in a bipartisan way, but also, as Senator McCain said, be spirited when appropriate.

I also want to thank Senator McConnell and my Republican colleagues for the opportunity to serve on this committee, and say good morning to Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright and General Cartwright O'Reilly. I haven't had a chance to meet you yet, but look forward to working with you.

The first thing that I'd like to discuss this morning—and I'm very impressed with your testimony—is to talk about when the change of intelligence occurred and when the new technology became available that would dictate a change in policy. In preparing for today's hearing, I saw the comments from Secretary Gates originally recommending this ground-based missile defense system to the prior administration back in I guess December of 2006, and I have comments that are here before me which I'd like to read to you from Secretary Gates when he appeared before this committee in January of 2009. He was asked by Senator Wicker: "Is it your view that in any event it's essential that the United States continue its current plan for missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe?" The Secretary said: Well, as I said earlier, we have not had the opportunity to pursue this in the new administration and discuss the administration's policy on it. I will say this: All of the

NATO heads of government unanimously last April in Bucharest endorsed the importance of a NATO-wide European missile defense capability. So this is a commitment that has been made by the alliance and so I think we at least need to take it very seriously.”

There was also discussion in that same meeting from the Senator from Alaska, Senator Begich, concerning the ground-based missile defense system that's placed in Alaska. Secretary Gates, in responding specifically to Alaska, added that “I think having a layered defense such as we are building, that includes the ground-based interceptors, is very important.”

So my first question to you goes to, when did this new intelligence occur? Secretary Flournoy, you said in your opening statement that the Intelligence Community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short and medium-based ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly and that the longer range has been slower to develop than previously estimated. So if you could answer my questions on when did we have this change in intelligence, and then also we can maybe speak to when did the technology improve so much that you would have this change in policy?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, thank you for the question. I want to be careful since we're in open session, but there have been three NIEs, national intelligence estimates, to my knowledge on this issue. There was one in 2001, one in 2006 that informed the development of the program of record, the old approach, and then one that was done, that was completed in the spring, so after Secretary Gates testified, of this year, in '09.

It's drawing from that most recent estimate that these—that's where we're basing our judgment. I would certainly—I am sure that our colleagues from ODNI would be happy to come brief members on that in detail in a closed session.

But I would just say that, on Secretary Gates's comments about NATO's endorsement of a BMD system and the importance of GBIs, I think he would not have agreed—since he is the one who signed the program of record, who presented it to our NATO allies, he would not have agreed to this new architecture and in fact championed it if he were not convinced that we are not breaking, we are strengthening, our commitment to the defense of our allies, and that the new system offers both the coverage that we need for homeland defense and better and faster coverage that we need of our forces and allies in Europe.

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of technology, the two parts of your assessment of why to have the policy change is: one, this change of intelligence, which I understand I guess from your comment is this year, spring of '09; and then also there seems to be this convergence of a technology change that happens. When does that occur, that we now believe that this sea-based system is better than the ground-based system?

General O'REILLY. Sir, first of all, we are proposing both ground and sea-based in this capability.

But in 2006 when this design, and before, when this design was developed, we had only flown one GBI, not in a test. We had very few actual flight tests. Since then we've had I believe it's 19 flights. 17 have been successful intercepts. We had not deployed our most powerful radars and our sensors. We did not demonstrate until a

few months ago, until April of this year, the great capability, far greater than was estimated, for unattended aerial vehicles.

So we have in fact executed the program, the technology program. But we learned from it, and as we learned from it, number one, it became evident we did not have to rely on the assumptions that we were making in 2006 that you had to have very large missiles, they had to be a fixed site, and you had to have large radars in order to track, precisely track, complex clusters that are associated with a missile in flight.

So based on what we have learned, a tremendous amount over the last 4 years, when you relook at what is a more survivable network of missile defense capability, it became evident to us that this was in fact not only more survivable, gave you greater capability, but what really surprised us back then, because I was part of that, was looking at the number of threats we'd have to handle simultaneously.

So what we have observed is the fact that very large numbers of missiles can be simultaneously launched. As I said in my earlier testimony this year, it is my primary concern. So by intercepting early, we're going after the countermeasures, which we have always been worried about. But the amount of raid size was what drove us to a different type of architecture to handle and grow and respond to those raid sizes.

Senator LEMIEUX. When did you come to that conclusion, General?

General O'REILLY. Sir, I would say over the last—I've been continuously working this since the early part of this decade, and it became evident—as we completed each test, this became more evident to us, our post-flight reconstructions of what's occurred. So I don't believe that it's a well characterized representation—

Senator LEMIEUX. I'm just looking for a timeframe, General.

General O'REILLY.—that there was some sudden decision. I would say that we executed the technical program that was laid out over the last 5 years and we were continually updating our assessments as we went through that.

Senator LEMIEUX. My time has expired. I just wanted to make the point and understand that when the intelligence change happened and when the technology change happened and when you had come to those decisions that would lead to this policy shift and when Congress was notified based upon those decisions. So I don't have any further time to ask those questions, but I think the point that I'm trying to make is that I believe, in echoing Senator McCain, that there was a need for this body to know that there was a significant change in policy. It looks like you made those decisions some time earlier this year without this body knowing.

But I appreciate your comments today and thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCaskill has a commitment, so I would switch places with her here.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill.

Senator MCCASKILL. And it's coming at a price. Just kidding.

I think the way this was rolled out is problematic. I think it's a problem that this appears to have appeared to come out of whole

cloth all of a sudden. The fact that I think that Czech and Poland were notified, what, at midnight, and we were not notified at all that this was coming—I think you get everyone agitated by the way this was rolled out. I would just say that as an opening comment. I think it was not done as well as it should have been done for this kind of major shift in our missile defense policy in this country.

I noticed in the 2010 budget you have asked for a cut of \$1.2 billion in missile defense. But yet clearly by scrapping this I know you're talking about—I know Gates talked about this is more economical. But I—and obviously, General O'Reilly, you now the kind of record we've had on bloated costs as it's related to the missile defense program.

I think the SM-3 costs around \$65 million apiece. I'm trying to understand and reconcile, if you were working this over the last few months, how do you reconcile the request for cuts to the missile defense program if we are going to be adding SM-3s? How is the money going to work out here?

General O'REILLY. Ma'am, first of all, our cost estimate is around \$10 million is what we're paying today for SM-3s, versus \$65 million. Now, a GBI is, the latest estimate, is \$70 million, which is closer to the cost you have. But the SM-3 is a much smaller missile. That class of missile, it's very reasonable that that's the right cost. That's very similar to a THAAD cost.

Senator MCCASKILL. What were you envisioning cutting with the \$1.2 billion? When that figure was submitted, where was that money supposed to be coming from? The GBIs or the SM-3s?

General O'REILLY. No. The reduction in the cost—there is three major parts. First of all was the termination of the KEI program. Second was the termination of the multiple kill vehicle program. And third, the largest, was funding which we were not able to propose that we had previously envisioned for the European site, due to the congressional restrictions on using that money. That covered actually more than the \$1.2 billion.

There was additional funding added by Secretary Gates again to address, to procure more SM-3s and more THAADs.

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Let me turn to Russia for just a minute. This I think, whether it is intended or unintended, clearly pleases Russia. As usual, we have no assurances that they're going to cooperate any more or do anything in addition in terms of our policies towards Iran, Afghanistan, or NATO.

I never really understood Russia's concerns as to what we were doing there, and obviously we now have projection as to Russia conducting operations and missions off the east coast. We get no substantive offers from Russia in terms of dealing with the Iranian threat and the ballistic missile threat from Iran. They have a dominant foothold in Central Asia and in many ways we have to rely on their approval to get the stuff for our troops coming through the northern distribution network into Afghanistan.

Have we gotten anything from Russia for this?

Ms. FLOURNOY. We did not seek anything from Russia for this. This was not about Russia. Our going through the ballistic missile defense review, this was about how do we ensure that we can deal with Iranian missile threats to our forces and allies in Europe and

also to our homeland. So this has never been about that. In fact, we've been very clear, for example in the START negotiations, that our negotiations on offensive forces are not connected to anything we're doing on missile defense.

So we haven't made that linkage and so we have not sought that. I think there is a broader question about how reset in the relationship is going, whether that's possible, whether we're seeing reciprocity on the other side. But that's a different conversation.

Senator MCCASKILL. What have the Israelis expressed to you about the policy change?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I have not had any specific conversations with the Israelis about this. But I would say that—and I would just underscore General Cartwright's point—that the kind of ballistic missile defenses that they're building will be able to be very integrated with the architecture that we're envisioning as well.

Senator MCCASKILL. Were they informed of this policy change contemporaneously with Congress or with Czech and Poland? When were they informed of the policy change?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I know that it was discussed last week when Minister Barak was here to meet with Secretary Gates. I do not know if they had any prior consultation before that.

Senator MCCASKILL. Are we reassuring the emerging democracies in the Ukraines and the Georgias and the Polands of the world that we're really committed? I just worry about their perceptions of this move. Do you have any comments about the emerging democracies and what this says to them about our commitments?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, I think when we went to the North Atlantic Council one of the things that became clear as the permanent representatives got beyond the erroneous press reports and started digesting what we were actually presenting to them, they—the reason we got such a positive reaction is they saw this as a strengthening of U.S. Article 5 commitment to the defense of Europe and to extended deterrence.

So I think that that has been the intention. That is in fact the reality of what's in this program. And I would hope that the others on the periphery of Europe would see that same signal.

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

I believe Senator Collins is next, although I need an updated list. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Cartwright and General O'Reilly, two of my colleagues have brought up what I believe to be the key issue for us. That is, does this new strategy provide less protection to the continental United States? Now, I will tell you that it was never clear to me that the third site was primarily intended to strengthen the protection of the United States. I was under the impression that the two sites in California and Alaska were adequate to provide protection to the entire continental United States from an ICBM attack launched by either the Iranians or the Koreans.

But I must say that the map given to me this morning by Senator Inhofe does cause me to question the assumption under which I was operating and the lens through which I was viewing this new strategy, because, as he has pointed out, it just barely covers most

of my State of Maine. So could you address this issue, which is, after all, a very important issue to this committee, of whether or not the two sites that we have now in California and Alaska provide sufficient coverage to the continental United States? General O'Reilly?

General O'REILLY. Yes, ma'am. Our analysis indicates we do have coverage. I've testified and my predecessors have testified to that. I will have to look at and understand the details of this new analysis that I'm hearing about today that we don't.

Senator COLLINS. General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. I'll let us go back through the analysis, because we haven't seen the chart. But I would also say that as we move forward on the SM-3 Block 2 development, those ships certainly can protect our deployed forces and friends and allies overseas. They can also come home. And they live here, and they can be moved to areas that we think have some sort of increased vulnerability in the future, for which we don't know why today, but could emerge. So part of what we're trying to understand here as we move forward is how do we accommodate something that, either through an analytic process, through a test process, or through a new threat, somehow disadvantages any part of the United States, and how can we ensure that that's taken care of?

We talked a little earlier about defending Hawaii and the challenges of Hawaii. The same applies as we look at the rest of the United States, whether it be Alaska or Maine or down in the southern end of Texas and Florida.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I would ask that you get back to the committee with an analysis of the CBO study since the maps do give me pause.

Madam Secretary, you've said three times this morning: This is not about Russia. You've literally said that three times. Are you saying then that you do not expect that this new approach will enhance Russia's willingness to cooperate to deter Iran? I had thought that would be an advantage of this new approach, but you've said very emphatically three times this morning: This is not about Russia; this has nothing to do with Russia; we haven't asked anything of Russia. I find that very troubling.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, we would certainly welcome both Russia's new view of our missile defense efforts. We would welcome their willingness to cooperate in things like the radars and sharing radar data and so forth. We would welcome strengthened cooperation on things like on Iran and proliferation writ large.

What I was trying to communicate is that those things that we would welcome did not drive the substance of this decision. That's what I was trying to say.

Senator COLLINS. But do you in fact expect that this new approach will encourage the Russians to be more cooperative with us in deterring the Iranians?

Ms. FLOURNOY. We have never believed that our missile defenses posed a threat to the Russians.

Senator COLLINS. No one who has looked at it believes that.

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, I know. But for whatever reason, they did. So if they now look at this, this architecture, new architecture, and

finally understand this doesn't pose a threat to you, and that opens the door for further cooperation, we would welcome that.

Senator COLLINS. Finally, as a Senator who participated in the trip with the chairman this spring, I have to tell you that, while I think there is merit in the decision the administration has reached, assuming we can clear up this map, that is—I am appalled at the poor communication and consultation with our allies. That clearly could have been done in a far better way.

When I look at the public comments by the Polish officials, it seems evident to me that what they did is first give their real impression of alarm and shock and then, when they realized that this was the decision and they were going to have to live with it, they then modified their public comments to try to accept the reality. I'm just at a loss why there wouldn't have been better consultation with two allies whom we value so greatly.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, if I could, we had begun consultations in the spring. We certainly would have liked to have had more time for consultations and for the rollout. One of the things that happened is as we got more detailed in our consultations, things started to leak. There started to be a lot of erroneous discussion in the press. That actually had an impact on—not on the decisionmaking. I think the decisionmaking was proceeding on an analytic basis, that we were getting ready for a decision. But in terms of the rollout, it made us try to get the decision and the facts out sooner rather than later, so that we could correct the record on what this decision actually involved and what it was about and why it was being made.

So we too would have preferred a longer period for consultation and rollout. But leaks and speculation in the press sort of forced us to go sooner to set the record straight.

Senator COLLINS. General, did you want to add to that?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the Secretary has it about right. I would love to have had a lot more time. We believed that we were on a path both analytically and politically to explain alternatives, and we looked through a very broad range of alternatives as we've worked through this missile defense review. Some of that was taken away by just the fact that the information leaked early and then was developed into a position that was erroneous from a factual standpoint.

I think that we have gone back to our allies and we continue to go back to our allies—another I would say positive opportunity here is we're dealing with preparing the fiscal year 2011 budget. One of the things we wanted to do was to give the Congress a full year of review of this activity. So in other words, this is a budget that the services are just now submitting to the Department, and we will bring up and have opportunity with the Hill for a full year of debate about this way forward.

We lost some of that in this rushed, accelerated release. But we still are on a path to have a full year of debate about the fiscal year 2011 budget and its support of this concept.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As one of five Senators who voted against the original proposal to put the systems into Poland and the Czech Republic, I think this is just a very important step forward in terms of how we approach our National defense and also our international relations. The reason that I was opposed to the original proposal was due to the cost and the static nature of the technology, at the same time that it was widely being viewed as provocative of Russia, at a time when the Russians actually, as I recall, were offering to cooperate on alternate sites such as the site in Azerbaijan; and also that it was not really as proposed doing the job that we were expecting it to do in terms of the threat from Iran.

What I'm seeing in this particular proposal is really the way things need to be done, and I congratulate all three of you. We're putting mobility into a system. We're putting maneuverability into a system, so that it can address not simply multiple operational threats, but multiple strategic threats, at a time when we are really bogged down resources-wise because of our commitments in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. And, importantly, it allows the adaptation and the innovation of new technologies as these concepts move forward.

I quite frankly would hope we can start thinking in this way when it comes to the disposition of troops in places like Afghanistan, which worry me very much, that we're going to be bogged down, local defense, when we are facing an enemy that is highly mobile and loves to take advantage of the fact that we get in these static positions.

So conceptually, strategically, I think this is a very strong step forward. I think it's very important for us as we consider this to consider also the letter that General Jones sent. Mr. Chairman, I had to step out of this hearing. I'm not sure if it was mentioned in terms of the hearing, but General Jones, the National Security Adviser, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, former commander of NATO, under his own signature wrote a very strong letter in support of this, talking about how this new architecture will protect Europe sooner, will have greater capability, greater survivability, flexibility, be cost effective, and will provide an added layer of defense to augment the United States. I think that's a pretty strong statement.

General Cartwright, your testimony I think was very powerful today in terms of the background that you've had in this and the conceptual observations you brought to the table.

I think this is something that we've been needing. The major comment that I would have, Secretary Flournoy, goes to the point that you've now heard four or five times, about the need to do a better job explaining the linkage, quite frankly, to our larger relations with Russia. You've just made the point, I think quite well, in terms of the response you gave to Senator Collins. I think the message needs to be very clear as we're moving forward here that this clearly was not done in response to any demand from Russia, but at the same time, in the context of overall relations, it's not necessarily a bad thing as long as we're acting clearly and solely in the National interest of the United States.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would agree completely.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and that letter will be made part of the record that you made reference to. It has not been referred to before and I'm glad you raised it.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you said the ground-based interceptor would take 5 years to deploy, which I think makes Senator Inhofe's point. The same year that we predict Iran will have an ICBM capability that could reach the USA is 2015. The SM-3-2B won't be fielded until 2020. Doesn't that expose us for that 5-year period between 2015 and 2020?

General O'REILLY. Senator, once we're given the approvals to begin the construction, yes, sir, it's 5 years. The issue we've had is the current restrictions I have require us to go through testing that will take us to 2013 before the Secretary of Defense is in a position, with the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, to then certify that the ground-based midcourse defense system will work in a European scenario.

So 2013 would be the earliest we can see programmatically where we could begin, and that actually takes you to 2018. Also, through—

Chairman LEVIN. Is that for the previous system? It's unclear. What are you referring to?

General O'REILLY. The current program, the GBF's in Europe.

Chairman LEVIN. Before the change?

General O'REILLY. Before the change, yes, sir. I'd clarify.

Also what is clear is that's pure construction time. We do need the approval of the countries, and there is an extensive amount of implementing agreements also required before you can begin that. So we saw the 2017–2018 timeframe as optimistic based on the approvals necessary in order to begin.

Senator THUNE. I want to come back—I want to come to—and I don't know how much this has been covered already. But Secretary Flournoy and General O'Reilly, the new approach to European missile defense calls for sea-based defenses to be deployed to theater in the 2011 timeframe. But the Congressional Budget Office in their report from February of this year found that deploying sea-based defenses is the most expensive option. In fact, the CBO wrote: "That system would cost almost twice as much as the original European missile defense proposal, a total of about \$18 billion to \$26 billion over 20 years."

The CBO study assumed the Department would need to buy additional ships to permanently station three Aegis cruisers in the region. So how does the new proposal for European missile defense meet threat Obama's stated goal of having a system that's cost effective, you have said earlier in your remarks that this is the cost effective approach, when CBO says that a system like that would cost twice as much compared to the system that you're intending to scrap?

General O'REILLY. Sir, what they were referring to as I recall, but I'll go back and verify, was protection of all of Europe at one time. In the phased approach, what we're looking at is pacing technology and pacing our current capabilities with the threat that we know exists today, which is a focus in phase one on the southeastern part of Europe that we know is threatened today by Iran.

Their study was looking at today's technology if you had to proliferate it over all of Europe, and that caused a significant higher number of ship stations that would be required. Also, we are in fact combining the greater range of the SM-3-2A and the 2B with land-basing, which optimizes the coverage that you can have of Europe. So through a combination of as the threat grows we would deploy in phases, as we said, and that would significantly reduce the costs and extend the coverage that we would have from much fewer bases than what they were assuming in their study.

Senator THUNE. Do you have that analysis? Does that include cost estimates of this proposal relative to the third site? Because CBO is the only number that I've seen. I assume in your analysis—you say it's more cost effective to do it this way. Is that something that's available?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir, we do have that. As we were going through the ballistic missile defense review, cost analysis is part of that review for these different options.

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, if I could just underscore, the CBO and the IDA studies both costed out a sea-based only architecture, which would be very expensive. Once you move the majority of the interceptors onto land, which is what we envision doing, the cost effectiveness goes way up. It's much less expensive. So the sea-based piece of architecture really plays a role in the initial phases while we're developing the land-based sites, and that's just to cover the southern part of Europe that's currently under threat.

Then as a surge, sort of flexibility element, should under a particular contingency a part of Europe is under threat, or a part of the United States is under threat, we can surge sea-based assets to complement the land-based systems.

But they really costed out a totally different concept, which is different than what we're proposing.

Senator THUNE. The 2010 defense budget request, there was an ask in there for funds that would be included to convert six Aegis ships to provide missile defense capability. I guess my question is what other funds were going to be required to field sea-based defenses in accordance with the new European missile defense approach?

General O'REILLY. Sir, as I said in my statement, we are asking for the opportunity to utilize fiscal year 2009 funding for European defense which has not been released to us because of the criteria of the ballistic missile defense agreements being ratified in both Poland and in the Czech Republic and the constraint on testing.

So if we had access to that funding in fiscal year 2009, then we'd have sufficient funding in which to meet the time lines, especially the earlier time lines, of developing the unmanned aerial vehicles, all the research and development that we've referred to, the long-term development, and get it started now, as well as the short-

term deployments focused on 2011 and the testing which we are proposing that goes with this.

Senator THUNE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just echo what some of my colleagues previously have said. That is, I think this is a real abrupt change which sort of kind of got dropped on everybody. Probably the most notable example of that are some of our allies in Europe. I think it's interpreted, at least there, as the U.S. sort of betraying their interests after we'd made commitments, that we're not following through and honoring those commitments.

So I have questions about these cost issues. I have questions about coverage issues, some of which were raised earlier in Senator Lieberman's discussion and questions. But I also have a lot of questions about the perception that this creates among people who have been very friendly to us and very reliable, and also the issue that's been broached about whether or not this was designed to curry some favor with the Russians in dealing with the Iranians.

All that I guess is sort of conjecture. But I certainly hope that at the end of the day that these decisions weren't predicated on those, that we've got good sound criteria that will enable us to protect the United States and protect our allies and do it in a cost effective way. But many of the concerns that have been voiced today are concerns that I share.

So thank you all very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

When you made reference, General, to constraint on testing, you were referring, I believe, to the requirement in the laws that there be operational effectiveness shown by testing before deployment; is that correct?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir, that's exactly right.

Chairman LEVIN. That's what you were referring to?

General O'REILLY. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to ask a question talking about defending against the Iranian short and medium-range missiles. I agree with the Department's renewed emphasis on countering the short and medium-range missiles. I understand that Iran's short and medium-range missile capability not only poses a threat to our strategic assets and allies in Europe, but also our allies' strategic assets and forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility; and the Iranians' short and medium-range ballistic missiles can have drastic effects to our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our forward operating bases in theater that are critical to our logistical supply lines. Our partners in the Arabian Gulf I think are very concerned about these ballistic missile capabilities, particularly as it pertains to defending their critical infrastructure, obviously, the oil facilities. This has numerous implications for our efforts to provide our forces with the fuel that they need to consider and carry out their missions in theater.

I applaud Secretary Gates's initiative to use the annual Manama Dialogue in Bahrain as a multilateral forum to discuss the development of a shared early warning and air and missile defense framework amongst his counterparts in the Gulf area.

But can you provide the progress the Department's made in utilizing our Arab Gulf partners to build this strategic framework for a ballistic missile defense shield that would protect our forces and strategic assets against the Iranian ballistic missile threat?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, ma'am. Manama was but one dialogue. CENTCOM is currently running a center of excellence to ensure that the countries have the opportunity to see in detail what the opportunities of an architecture similar to what we're proposing here could offer to them. We put in Israel one of these new X-band radars for just that reason.

One of the most difficult activities associated with the Gulf is that everything is on a bilateral basis. The reality is no one single country can mount either the defense or the offense alone to protect against this kind of threat. So much of what CENTCOM is working on in the Gulf is the understanding amongst them of how they can leverage off of each other. Whether they buy Patriot systems, indigenous systems that are built, other countries' systems, netting them together will get them a much more effective defense than working on a pure bilateral basis.

He, General Petraeus, is having significant progress, making significant progress, in that dialogue. As we start to introduce these new systems, I think most of those countries are very interested in buying additional Patriots, and we are moving our Patriots around, demonstrating to them what the capabilities are, not only in the modeling and simulation, but in the actual physical presence of those weapon systems, and moving them quite a bit so that multiple countries see it, but also so that Iran watches those movements. Quite frankly, these are very powerful steps as we move forward. The more we can layer that further out to the Israelis, the Jordanians, other countries out beyond the Gulf in the Middle East, to start to demonstrate a collective approach to this problem, the more valuable the deterrent aspects of this capability are.

Senator HAGAN. Let me ask one other question. I understand that the Department of Defense plans to field the land-based Standard Missile 3s by 2015 and is in the process of consulting with our allies, once again particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based version of the Standard Missile 3. But given the problems that we've experienced with Poland and the Czech Republic in the ratification process with regards to stationing radars and ground-based interceptors, and in addition the extra communication problems just recently, what lessons can we utilize to expedite this process?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think we have begun discussions with Poland about hosting, being a potential site to host SM-3s. What we've made clear to them is that we are not falling off the agreement that the previous administration signed with them, which covered a very broad range of security cooperation, to include the Patriots, to include a U.S. garrison in Poland, and so forth. So that is all still under way.

In fact, we could go ahead with the ballistic missile agreement that we signed with a minor modification to the annex that simply substituted SM-3 for GBI as a referred-to system if they choose to proceed with us along this path.

So I think with Poland the path is very clear should they decide to continue on down that path with us. In the Czech Republic, the discussion is not about hosting land-based missiles, but it is—because of this networked system, there are many other kinds of data fusion, command and control, ops center. There are all kinds of ways to participate in this system, and we are actively in discussions about that with the Czech Republic, who have already expressed to us that they very much want to remain a leading partner with us in the new architecture. We're just in the process of figuring out the details of what that will look like.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.

Just one question for—I guess if we take one question each on a second round if it's needed.

General O'Reilly, you gave a speech in Boston on Monday and you said that the new European missile defense plan is a "much more powerful missile defense proposal than the previous one." Can you just succinctly tell us why in your judgment? You've given us I think the essence in your earlier testimony this morning, but kind of just sum up: Why do you believe that this approach presents a much more powerful missile defense proposal than the previous one?

General O'REILLY. Sir, in that discussion, which was to an international audience, the point I was making was that, as I've testified before, my greatest concern as the Director of the Missile Defense Agency is to be able to counter the proliferation of missiles that we see and the large, specifically the large raid sizes. That is becoming more evident around the world as more launchers, more missiles, and more exercises show that many countries are demonstrating and practicing that capability.

In the previous defense architecture we had, we had a limited number of missiles that we could intercept at any one time. So this proposal allows you to put significantly more and rapidly expand the firepower of a missile defense system. That's a term that hasn't been used often, "firepower" in this case. But it is; it's firepower against missiles that have been launched against you.

The firepower of this system is significantly higher. As General Cartwright and others have said—and we are all concerned about the threat predictions—we would like to get from a less rigid—or to move from a more rigid missile defense to one that's more adaptable and quickly flexible, so that if the threat changes we can very quickly increase that firepower and increase the orientation of it.

Chairman LEVIN. We will insert in the record your remarks of September 21.

We will insert in the record Secretary Gates' September 20 op-ed in The New York Times.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. And if there is no other questions, with our great thanks for your testimony this morning and all your work on this, we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.]