

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Evan Bayh (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Bayh, Udall, Burris, Inhofe, Thune, and Burr.

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker, security clerk.

Majority staff members present: Peter K. Levine, general counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, research assistant; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Chris Joyner, assistant to Senator Burr.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH, CHAIRMAN

Senator BAYH. Well, good morning, everybody. The hearing will please come to order. I'm going to have a brief opening statement, Senator Burr; then I'll turn to you; and, Senator Burris, then to you. I understand Senator Udall may be on the way, and we'll then turn to him.

Gentlemen, I know you have prepared statements, but we'd love to hear you summarize them in some oral testimony, and then we'll get to some questions and some answers.

The purpose of today's hearing is to address the growing strain placed upon our Army and Marine Corps. We will receive testimony on the current readiness of ground forces with respect to deployed, deploying, and nondeployed units. We will also discuss the Army and the Marine Corps's ability to meet the combatant commander's requirements and to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

We are particularly interested in your assessment of the risks resulting from the continued commitment of combat forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the subcommittee will be interested to know your views of the current and projected readiness reporting system used by the Department of Defense.

Over the last several years, we have observed total force readiness decline as a result of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. While our soldiers and marines continue to showcase their training and valor, the overall readiness of the Army and Marine Corps has steadily decreased. Generally, this comes at the expense of our nondeployed units.

My concern is that in order to fully resource deploying units, we have chosen to cannibalize our forces at home and thus face an increased risk of being unable to respond to the full spectrum of global challenges, including potential domestic crises. Our current strategy is unsustainable and if not properly addressed, we face added risks and serious long-term implications for our Army and Marine Corps.

Additionally, we must shift away from a strategy that prioritizes reset only with supplemental funding. It is our shared responsibility to restore our Army and Marine Corps so that they can effectively and efficiently meet current and future threats.

This morning we welcome General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff, General, I hope I pronounced your name correctly.

General Chiarelli: It's fine, Senator.

Senator BAYH. My own last name is occasionally mispronounced, so I try not to do that to others.

Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; and General James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Gentlemen, I sincerely thank you both for your dedicated service to our country. I thank you for your time in attending our hearing today. I know that it took some time and preparation on both your parts and your staffs' parts, so I want to thank you for that. We look forward to receiving your testimony. I want to thank you both for your courtesy in meeting with me and offering to meet with me before the hearing, and I look forward to having a very productive relationship with both of you.

Having said that, Senator Burr, I'll turn the mike over to you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR

Senator BURR. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me express how forward I look to working with you on this subcommittee and on the Armed Services, as I do the other members. I thank you for your hospitality and generosity so far, and I think we'll carry this show on the road some and maybe get out across the country, and maybe to some of the North Carolina installations that we take great pride in.

Let me welcome both Generals today.

Senator BAYH. If you feed us, Senator, we will come.

Senator BURR. We will feed you to where you probably won't be able to leave.

Senator BAYH. Very good. You're going to test our lift capacity, is that right?

Senator BURR. I do want to thank our witnesses for not only being here today, but for their dedication and, more importantly, their service to their country.

Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee held a hearing last year on the same subject of current unit readiness. At the time, we had a full range of combat units and support personnel totaling 165,000 engaged throughout Iraq. We had committed to a strategy of a surge of forces to clear, hold, and build in cities and towns, to restore a safe environment and prevent a civil war. At the same time, we were training Iraqi security forces so they could assume responsibility for the protection and security of their countrymen against terrorists.

During that time we were working with our NATO partners in Afghanistan to bring security to the eastern provinces and increasing U.S. forces to over 32,000 to respond to an increasingly violent insurgency that was spreading to other parts of the country. At the time, the senior American commander in Afghanistan was requesting additional forces within a year to meet the emerging threats and Congress was asking military leaders if they had the available combat units to meet that request. General Cody, then the Vice Commander of the Army, testified before this subcommittee: "The current demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply."

Since then much has changed and yet certain factors remain the same. The most positive change has been the vastly improved security environment in Iraq as a result of the success of the surge and the rising competency of Iraqi security forces. This success has given our leaders the ability and flexibility to begin to responsibly draw down U.S. forces in Iraq, turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces under the terms of a new agreement with Iraq that seeks a peaceful transition without threat to stability to the country.

Because of the security and stability in Iraq, we have decided to commit additional resources in Afghanistan. The President recently announced an additional deployment of 21,000 Army soldiers and U.S. marines within the next 8 months. As we speak, the 82nd Airborne out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is assuming command at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan for the next year, and in the southern part of the country elements of North Carolina's U.S. Marines out of Camp Lejeune will be taking up the point to conduct operations against the Taliban.

Congress faces critical decisions in the coming months on emergency supplemental appropriations and fiscal year 2010 defense spending. We cannot afford to delay emergency supplemental appropriations needed to support that expanded operation in Afghanistan, the drawdown of forces in Iraq, and the reset of combat units back home.

Furthermore, we cannot afford to cash our check on success prematurely by reducing the funds available in the readiness of our forces. We must remember that our military forces continue to struggle to restore the balance in long-term readiness across a full spectrum of threats. In order to respond to their mission requirements, they need personnel who are ready, with adequate training, and have combat-ready equipment. They also need a robust invest-

ment in new equipment over the next 5 years to fully reset combat units with the best available technology and systems.

I look forward to an update from our witnesses on efforts initiated last year to improve the readiness of our non-deployed forces, including the decision in January '07 to increase the number of combat ground forces in the Army and the Marine Corps. In the next 3 years the availability of additional forces will add time between deployments to allow for full spectrum training for mission-essential tasks and more time spent with families, which we all know is lacking.

Another area of interest is our witnesses' plans for the transfer of units directly from Iraq to Afghanistan, especially what's being done to ensure that personnel receive adequate training, intelligence, and equipment for their new area of responsibility. Given the strain on equipment in recent years, I'm also interested to know their services' investment strategy to re-equip forces and to restore repositioned stocks to levels required by our operational plan.

Mr. Chairman, I once again thank you for this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for being here.

Senator BAYH. Senator Burr, thanks to you and to your staff members. I look forward to working with you to ensure that our armed forces have the equipment, the training, and the troop strength to carry out the important mission of protecting America's national security interests. I'm grateful for your devotion to achieving that result.

Senator Burr, we welcome any opening comments you might have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have very limited opening comments. I want to thank you and Senator Burr as ranking leader for being a part of this subcommittee, and I just want to thank our military personnel for all that they do for us. I will have a few questions.

My favorite saying—I want all the military personnel to hear this statement: We are able to do what we do in America because of what you do across the world for our protection. Just keep that in mind. We appreciate your commitment and your effort and your dedication to making us the strongest country in the world.

Every time I see one of you guys, whether you're a private or a four-star general, I salute each and every one of you. God bless you, and I'll have some questions for the Generals during the question period, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burr. I believe we all embrace your sentiments of pride in our armed forces. I think you have someone who's a native of Illinois on General Chiarelli's staff, so he has very capable staff with him here today.

Gentlemen, thank you. We look forward to hearing from you. I think, just to recap, we all recognize the strain that's been placed upon your brave soldiers by the duration and the pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and perhaps the changing nature of the

threats that face our armed forces. We're here to make sure you have the tools to get the job done.

So we look forward to hearing from both of you. We will enter your written statements in the record, so feel free if you so desire to summarize. We are interested in what you have to say.

General Chiarelli, maybe we'll start with you.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY**

General Chiarelli: Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Burr, distinguished members of the subcommittee: I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current readiness of U.S. ground forces. This is my first occasion to appear before this esteemed subcommittee and I pledge to always provide you with an honest and forthright assessment and my best military advice as requested.

I've submitted a statement for the record and I look forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of my opening remarks. As you are aware, President Obama is preparing to submit his fiscal year 2010 defense budget to Congress. Earlier this month, Secretary Gates outlined key recommendations and projected changes specific to Army programs and organizational structure, and I expect you have related questions. However, I believe it would be premature for me to provide much of the details ahead of our President, our Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff of the Army George Casey. It would also be inappropriate for me to speculate on past or future decisions. Given these constraints, I will respond to your inquiries to the best of my ability and take the remaining questions for the record.

As all of you know, it's been a busy time for our Nation's military. We are at war, and we've been at war for the past 7-plus years. During this period, demand has continued to grow and the Army's level of responsibility has expanded considerably. At the same time, our forces become smaller in terms of the number of available personnel. The combined effect has been increased deployments, shorter dwell, and insufficient recovery times for our soldiers, their families, and our equipment.

Today, as has been previously reported to this subcommittee, the Army remains out of balance. We continue to be consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and overall we are consuming our readiness as fast as we are building it. Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand and the current level does not appear likely to improve significantly for the foreseeable future.

In order to meet the demand, we are currently staffing many of the critical functions by reassigning authorizations and personnel from within our ranks. My concern is we cannot fully predict what the derivative effects of these decisions will be in the future.

These are challenging times for our Nation and for our military and, although, with the support of Congress, we have deployed the best manned, best equipped, best trained and led forces in the history of the United States Army, it is my personal opinion that we simply cannot continue to meet the current demand, expand our agility and focus, and sustain the force, including soldiers and equipment, without making some corresponding adjustments.

I assure the members of this subcommittee that is what the Army's senior leaders are focused on right now. We are working these issues and determining the needs of our Army for the future, and we will continue to coordinate with senior DOD officials and Congress to identify both short and long-term solutions.

Chairman, members the subcommittee, and thank you again for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and their families. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli follows:]

Senator BAYH. Thank you very much, General.
General Amos.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

General Amos: Sir, good morning, Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to report on the readiness of your United States Marine Corps.

On behalf of the more than 239,000 active and Reserve marines and their families, I'd like to extend my warm appreciation for the sustained support Congress has faithfully provided its Corps of Marines. I would like to begin by highlighting a few points from my written statement.

As we sit in this hearing room today, we have over 31,000 marines forward deployed across the globe. Despite high operational tempo, your marine are resilient, motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the globe. For the past 7 years they have been fully engaged in winning in combat operations as part of a generational struggle against global extremism.

This sustained effort and performance has not gone—has not come without costs, to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly to our marines and their families. Our forward deployed units are manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions and these units continue to report the highest levels of readiness for those missions.

To ensure our deployed and next to deploy forces maintain this high state of readiness, we have taxed our non-deployed forces and strategic programs for equipment and personnel. As a result, the majority of our non- deployed forces are reporting degraded readiness levels.

Our equipment availability challenge was recently highlighted with the equipment sourcing effort for the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade that is currently deploying to Afghanistan. To resource the 2nd MEB with the required and most capable equipment, we drew equipment assets from across the Corps. Although a concerted effort was made to minimize the impact on home stationed unit readiness, we still needed to draw 14 percent of the necessary equipment from our home stationed operating forces.

This degraded state of readiness within our non- deployed forces presents risks to our ability to rapidly respond to other unexpected contingencies around the globe. To mitigate this risk posed by our current state of equipment availability, we have developed a plan

for the reset of equipment being deployed—excuse me—being redeployed from Iraq. The OIF reset plan synchronizes Marine Corps reset efforts to ensure we effectively and efficiently provide equipment to support follow-on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected and a decision is then made on whether it will be sorted and redistributed in theater or redeployed to CONUS for rework. Redeployed assets will then be repaired at maintenance facilities and distributed to fill shortfalls for established priorities. Equipment determined to be beyond economical repair will be disposed of and replacements procured.

Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities have been necessarily focused on counterinsurgency operations, we have experienced degradation in some of our traditional core competencies, such as integrated combined arms, fire and maneuver, and large-scale operations from the sea. These skills are critical to maintaining the Marine Corps's full spectrum capabilities and primacy in forcible entry operations. Although the current security environment has justified the tradeoffs we have made to support overseas contingency operations, we must maintain a balanced force capable of responding to crises around the globe and across the full spectrum of conflict.

With your continued and consistent backing, we will no doubt succeed in current operations, we will take care of our marines and their family members, reset and modernize our equipment, and train the Marine air-ground task forces for the future security environment. Your support will ensure the Marine Corps's success as the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness.

I thank each of you for your faithfulness to this Nation, your faithfulness to our Corps, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]

Senator BAYH. General, thank you for your devotion to both your soldiers and to our country.

We've been joined by Senator Inhofe. Jim, thank you for your presence. He's very graciously agreed to defer any comments to the question period, which we will now commence. We're going to try and have this to 8 rounds, so you'll let me know when my 8 minutes has expired. I don't want to go on and on.

General Chiarelli, I hope I'm pronouncing that correctly now.

General Chiarelli: Perfect.

Senator BAYH. I'll start with you. You mentioned that we're consuming our readiness as fast as we're rebuilding it. I think that's what you said. What must be done to change that, so that we're no longer just kind of treading water? What needs to be done specifically to actually improve our readiness, so that we're not in this constant state of tearing it down while building it up without really making long-term progress?

General Chiarelli: Well, two things I'd point out, Senator, would be: first of all, we need to complete the grow-the-Army plan and, as you know, that growth to the 45 brigade mark. We are that.

Senator BAYH. That would be at the top of your priority list?

General Chiarelli: That is very, very important, that we grow those 45 brigades, because this is a question of supply and demand. I can't control the demand, and the demand right now shows that I have 26 combat brigades that are currently deployed. I have a

total of 18 active component brigades and 8 Reserve component brigades. When I have that many brigades deployed, I have what's called friction, best explained by kind of a Navy analogy, that when you have—

Senator BAYH. This is a first, the Army referencing the Navy.

General Chiarelli: I have a rough time explaining friction if I don't call on my other services to help me out.

When you have an aircraft carrier that's sitting in the middle of the Persian Gulf and you want to go ahead and relieve it, an aircraft carrier casts off from someplace in the United States and at that particular point in time you've got two aircraft carriers doing the job of one. The same thing happens with Army brigades. When I have 26 deployed, I've got normally 6 that are also doing another job. So that total number goes up to 32 in a force right now of total brigades in that net 1.1 million force Army of about 70.

That is causing my dwell time to be at about 1 to 3, 1 year deployed, 12 months, and 1.3 years back at home. I would also point out to you that the surge for the United States Army is not over. We won't get our last combat brigade off a 15-month deployment until June of this year and I won't get my last combat service support or combat support unit back off a 15-month deployment until September.

So what has to change for us is the demand, the demand for forces. Right now it's as high as it has ever been, with our continued commitment to Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan.

Senator BAYH. I understood your answer, General, to be that I understand the demand has gone up. Unfortunately, the world has a way of determining the demand. It's somewhat beyond our control. But I understood your answer to be that we need to actually deal with the supply to meet the demand. You can't meet an increased demand with a constant supply. It's an increase in the force levels that will enable us to improve the situation.

General Chiarelli: That's correct, Senator.

Senator BAYH. You used the term, General, "corresponding adjustments" were going to have to be made to kind of reconcile the different demands that we face. I think that's the term that you used in your testimony. What did you mean by that? I took that in layman's terms to be some tough choices we're going to have to make. Is that a fair translation?

General Chiarelli: That's a fair translation. We're making tough choices every day. I think you know we've had great success with retention and recruiting and, quite frankly, the Army has reached its goal of 547,400, and before we can put the brakes on we even went a little bit over. So we have met our grow-the-Army goal of 547,400.

But when you look at that force, I have right now today 9500 soldiers that are in warrior transition units, soldiers who have been wounded in battle or in training to a degree where they are assigned to those units. I have another 10,000 soldiers that are non-deployable in units trying to heal from past rotations. And I have another 10 to 12,000 soldiers that are serving in joint manning documents that aren't necessarily the unit they were assigned to.

Senator BAYH. That's a total of about 30,000 if you add it all together.

General Chiarelli: That is. And that creates some real challenges for us. We're finding that our non-deployable numbers are going up as we get into successive rotations for individuals. All that creates a challenge for us. It is a stretched and sometimes tired force that is meeting all the requirements, but at the same time it is difficult to get our units up to the operating strength they need to be before deployment.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, General.

General Amos, in your testimony you said that—and I'm not the best note taker in the world, but I tried—that the majority of non-deployed forces are reporting degraded readiness levels. So a majority of the non-deployed forces. Then I think you cited a statistic, I think it was 14 percent of the equipment we've had to kind of cannibalize away from the non-deployed forces; is that correct?

General Amos: Sir, we didn't really—we took it from the non-deployed. These are whole cloth principal end items, but we outfitted the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade with 14 percent of the equipment—

Senator BAYH. My question again for the public that's interested in this, wants to make sure we're giving you what you need to make sure our forces are prepared: Just how unready are the non-deployed forces? I know it's a subjective determination. It's hard to put an exact figure on it. But if we've taken 14 percent of their equipment, is that about how unready they are? Or is it some sort of—

General Amos: Sir, I would say I think the potential could be—it's 14 percent of the equipment—there were 41,000 what we call principal end items that we brought together and deployed to Afghanistan for the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade. So 14 percent of that 41,000 items came from home stationed units. 55 percent came right off the assembly line as a result of Congress' graciousness to help reset the force.

Senator BAYH. Well, maybe I should restate my question. If an ordinary citizen—you know, they're watching us today. They want our marines and soldiers to have what you need to be ready. And they hear a majority of the non-deployed forces are unready; I think somebody might ask you, General, just how unready are they? If they were called upon today to deploy, just what would your response be? What would it take to get them ready?

General Amos: Sir, I think it would take probably several months. I think it would take global sourcing for the Marine Corps. It would—

Senator BAYH. By global sourcing, you mean?

General Amos: I mean going to the western Pacific, bringing marines and equipment out of the western Pacific, going to Hawaii, taking them out of the Third Marine Regiment in Hawaii, coming to the West Coast.

Senator BAYH. So at least on a short-term basis, we'd have to continue to rob Peter to pay Paul?

General Amos: We do, sir. We do. And that's why the reset and the overseas contingency funds and your help to reset the force—and General Chiarelli talked about it in his statement. We continue to feed the current operations with the generosity of Congress. You've given us over \$12 billion over the last several years

and we're estimating today that our reset cost is probably right around \$20 billion total, to include the \$12 billion you've given us.

But as we get these vehicles and equipment that we purchased last year to reset the force, we are sending those into Afghanistan, we're sending them into Iraq because they're being used. And all those new up-armored Humvees that we bought last year to reset the force at home have been sent and expended and they're en route right now.

Senator BAYH. It's like being in a treadmill. We're running faster and faster, but we're staying in place.

General Amos: Sir, we are. But I think the positive—there are several positive notes here. First of all, Congress has been very good to us in supporting us. So thank you for that.

But the forces that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan are at the very highest state of readiness. So what we do back sat home in the Marine Corps is we'll take those units that are fixing to deploy. We've identified them. We know who they are, and about 6 months out and to 4 months out we get the people in there. We start looking for—we cobble together the equipment into kind of training pools, and we have enough to train them, but it's not without great pain.

So when they deploy they fall in on equipment that we have left there or that we are maintaining in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator BAYH. My time has expired, but in the second round I'd like to follow up on that, because I assume that you're both doing a great job of making sure the soldiers on the front line are getting what they need, but that's at the expense of our preparedness to meet some future unexpected contingency. So I'd just like to get to that in my next round of questions.

But Senator Burr, I'll turn the microphone over to you.

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To both Generals, I have a question about the impact on military readiness and operations of support provided by contractors, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of my colleagues have pressed this administration to curtail the use by the military of service contracts for base operating services, security, supply, and other mission support requirements.

Can you briefly describe the impact of service support contracts on readiness and mission capability for the Army and the Marine Corps? Let me go to General Amos first.

General Amos: Sir, we have—there's no question we have some contract support in Iraq right now. Too soon for me to tell you what we're going to have in Afghanistan. I don't think it's going to be a lot, but I suspect there will be some. We are just flowing forces in there now.

But we have some in Iraq, and I'll give you a good example. Honeywell has 100 contractors at al-Taqaddum, which is our main logistics hub in the western part of the Anbar Province. All the equipment comes in to Taqaddum and those 100 contractors from Honeywell do the triage. They do the preliminary maintenance on these things, and then they make the determination, okay, is this something that we need to retrograde down to Kuwait to send back home or not.

So they are critical to our support, our combat support in Iraq. We certainly have contracting support back home. We have it at our depot in Albany, Georgia. We have not only our regular Federal employees, but we have contract employees, temporary employees, and we have contracts available that we can call on to speed this up.

So it is—to be honest with you, a little over 85 percent of our contracts have been competed competitively. So I don't think we are the target necessarily for perhaps what the President has talked about with regard to contracting. So I think we're actually in pretty good shape.

Senator BURR. General, is it safe in the context of what you said about Honeywell and potentially other contractors, correct for me to assume that as we go through the drawdown those contractors become even more crucial, those that are tied to the logistics side of it, for our need to assess what we're bringing home, what is repairable, that type of thing?

General Amos: Sir, they absolutely are, because they will probably be some of the last folks who will actually retrograde out of the Anbar Province, because what we'd really like to be able to do is free up as many marines as we possibly can, reset their clocks so that they can flow through to the next deployment into Afghanistan.

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli?

General Chiarelli: Well, I would have to totally agree with Jim. I will tell you the best example that I can give you from my time in Iraq was the aircraft maintenance contractors that we had helping to take care of our aircraft, our rotary wing aircraft. Those contractors just did a magnificent job. They've done a magnificent job for 7.5 years in providing that kind of maintenance support and we and our fleet have had unprecedented high OR rates, operational ready rates, because of the great support that we've gotten in that one specific area.

I think they're unheard of for equipment that's been flown as hard as our rotary wing aircraft have been flown, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I would argue that they are essential for much of what we do, and also provide the opportunity for our soldiers to get off the forward operating bases and do what soldiers need to do, and that's get out and among the people as part of the joint campaign plan in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator BURR. Is it safe for me to assume from what both of you have said that if for some reason we eliminated the ability for the services to contract certain aspects of what we need, that we're then required to remove boots from the battle to handle the logistics and all of these other assessments, and we strain troop strength even that much more?

General Amos: Sir, that's absolutely correct. They become—they would then become what we classically call enablers. Those enablers would then come from marines wearing uniforms like this, soldiers wearing uniforms like that. A great example is the MRAP. You know, it's been a huge success story and we enjoy over 90 percent up-ready or operationally ready MRAPs across the theater, I think for both our services. That's done because contractors are there taking care of them.

If they are not there, then marines wearing digital cammies are going to have to be trained and they are going to be out there turning wrenches, and our dwell, deployment to dwell, will only increase.

General Chiarelli: And I might add, that's a great example that Jim just teed up here, and it's particularly important when you understand that many of those MRAPs have been assigned to units that aren't used to taking care of heavy equipment. Your light infantry forces aren't necessarily known for their ability to maintain heavy armor equipment like MRAPs, and those contractors who are able to provide that direct support and maintenance are critical to the high OR rates that General Amos just quoted.

Senator BURR. Something very quick at this point. Do you see the MRAP as significant a piece of equipment for use in Afghanistan as it was used in Iraq, given the difference in terrains between the two?

General Chiarelli: I would argue yes, sir. In the south for sure, some of the current variants of the MRAP that the theater has requested to be sent are doing yeoman's work. I think you know we're working on an MRAP all-terrain vehicle. That vehicle is currently in testing. The last I saw, that vehicle will be ready to begin moving into Afghanistan in the November time period.

I think it's going to be a great lap forward.

We're doing modifications on some of the current MRAPs to give them independent suspension. The early variants did not have them on any of them. I know the marines are doing it on one of their variants. But I see the MRAP as playing an important role in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq, and particularly so once we get the all-terrain vehicle available for those in the hilly east portion of that country.

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, the USA Today reported in April or ran a press report in April entitled "Battalion Shifted to Afghanistan," that described how the Army's Fourth Engineering Battalion, that had just arrived in Iraq, was now being redeployed to Afghanistan to perform a vital mission of clearing roads of bombs and other obstacles.

The article went on to assert that "The decision underscores how military commanders are scrambling to meet President Obama's order."

What is the extent to which the Army units currently deployed to Iraq are in training for deployment—or currently in training for deployment to Iraq, will be redirected to Afghanistan?

General Chiarelli: Senator, we've got a total of four of our combat units that have been redirected. We have the 173rd out of Italy, but it won't be going until January, so it will have time to do the necessary training for its new mission. We've got the 5-2 Stryker Brigade out of Fort Lewis, Washington. I will tell you that was one of the most difficult ones. 5-2 was one of those units that had taken aboard all the cultural lessons we've had over these last 7.5 years. I think they had the highest number of Arabic speakers of any unit.

We were getting ready to deploy to theater and when we switched their mission to Afghanistan that Arabic is no longer necessarily needed. That was a hard one, but they'll be ready to go.

We have 2–10 Mountain going in October, and the 82nd Cav, the aviation brigade, will be going in here in the next month. That was a difficult one because their dwell time was cut and we had to get them the high altitude training they needed. But we get all our units the training they need for the different conditions if they are redirected from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Senator BURR. So you're fairly confident that the training that we provided is sufficient for these troops either to transition from Iraq to Afghanistan or to be redirected to Afghanistan?

General Chiarelli: I am. And I know the commanders downrange, if they get a redirected unit and feel that additional training was needed before they put them out into actual operations, would ensure that in theater that training was conducted.

Senator BURR. I thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burr.

Senator Burris.

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just for clarification, Generals—and both of you may be able to respond to this. I just heard General Amos say that the equipment is coming right out of the factory, being shipped or being used right as it's coming off. Now, this is really then going to the contractors to be inspected and they determine if this equipment is functional and that it will be military ready or combat ready when that equipment hits the battlefield? Is that the case?

General Amos: Sir, the stuff—55 percent of the 41,000 end items that I was telling you about that came off the assembly line, that actually—those were brand new pieces of equipment, and of course it almost—probably I would assume at all of those plants we have military contracting officers, we have folks that are there to keep track of the quality assurance.

So when these things come off, they don't actually just leave Oshkosh and then arrive into Kandahar. They actually pass through the Marine Corps. Most of them will end up going through Charleston, where we put all the electronic countermeasures equipment on it. We will get our hands on this equipment and verify that everything is there. But it is brand spanking new equipment, and then we will through military transportation—Transportation Command, will send this stuff into Afghanistan.

So I don't know if that answers your question.

Senator BURRIS. So that means that when it hits the battlefield we don't have our warriors out there with equipment that's failing or malfunctioning or that hasn't really been tested, like you get the automobile and—

General Amos: Sir, it's not. It's not. It would be if you pick your nicest car that you have the most confidence in when you buy it, that's the way the equipment's arriving in theater. That's my perception.

Senator BURRIS. Okay, and that's your responsibility, to make sure that those boots on the ground out in those fields have got the best stuff they can have to protect us.

General Amos: Absolutely, sir.

Senator BURRIS. Are they dealing with any inferior, broken-down equipment? Up to date, the latest modern weaponry, protection?

The Humvees that you just mentioned, because you're in Afghanistan where all those IEDs are being used there now, are those Humvees transferable to Afghanistan at all now?

General Amos: They are. They are, Senator. They're the ones—in fact, this has been an iterative—Humvee is a great example. When we first crossed the border in March of 2003, most of our Humvees weren't armored at all. So now we are doing what we call the enhanced capability vehicle, which is a Humvee that has a bigger motor, bigger suspension, better air conditioning, better electric bus for all the ECM gear. That's the progression of the kind of vehicle now that is going into Afghanistan. So this is absolutely the very best that American money can pay for.

Senator BURRIS. Just to change the direction of my questions, Generals: General Amos, I've been led to believe that a typical marine infantry battalion deployment is about 7 months on average, as opposed to a marine headquarter unit whose deployment is about 12 months. General Amos, does this difference in deployment length between the units cause morale issues, and would it be realistic to make all deployments for 12 months?

General Amos: Sir, actually the opposite is true. What happens is—

Senator BURRIS. Just the opposite is true?

General Amos: Well, the opposite is true from the standpoint of the morale on the units that are deploying for 7 months are very happy. They're very grateful that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has said, okay, you're an infantry battalion or a squadron and you're only going to go for 7 months. The headquarters, usually made up of older guys like General Chiarelli and I and colonels and whatever, those what we call colonel-level commands, the regimental commands, they go for 13 months, somewhere between 12 and 13 months depending on how the rotation goes.

They provide the stability and they provide the continuity of that operation for that period of time. The operational units, the ones that are really out there doing the heavy lifting, the fighting, the flying, the supplying, and the repairing, they're going on the 7-month rotation. So they're very happy. Their families are very appreciative of the Commandant's decision. And all us old guys were in those units at one time, so now it's time for us to go—and to be honest with you, the 12 to 13 months for the higher headquarters has not caused a problem in the Marine Corps.

Senator BURRIS. General Chiarelli, in your statement for the record you addressed the lack of participation by civilian agencies in assisting in the Nationbuilding process with these various commands. You cited the example of the National Guard farmers teaching farmers. In other words, if you're in Africa you want farmers teaching farmers, rather than having the military personnel.

Now, are you aware of any agency refusing a request to participate, and do you have recommendations regarding this participation involvement?

General Chiarelli: I would argue that no one has refused to participate. It's a matter of capability. We took much of that capability down here in the last 10 to 12 years. A good example would be U.S. AID. U.S. AID used to be about 16,000 folks and it's down now to

about 3,000 or a little bit more than 3,000. It is really a contracting agency now that looks for other people to execute contracts.

The specific example I gave you in my statement of our agricultural teams is a great success story. These are 60-man teams. I visited one at Camp Atterbury that had worked with Purdue University. Purdue University had brought these guys on board. These are National Guardsmen, brought together for this special agricultural team. They are farmers from Middle America, who know how to farm. They come to Purdue. Purdue teaches them the language, the dialect of Pushtun that they're going to have to learn.

They dumbed down their farming techniques from the standpoint of, we're not going to go over there and teach them how we do it here, but what techniques can Purdue give them to take over to Afghanistan so that they can make use of limited water and the amount of mechanization they have in farming. And these 60-man teams go over and they're strategic in nature, I would argue. They've been a great asset to the commanders on the ground.

But when I take those 60 men out of the National Guard to form that team, I'm leaving 60 holes in National Guard units that I have to go ahead and fill. That creates issues for us.

Senator BURRIS. So they're not drawing down on your numbers of servicemen because they've got to deal with the local community as we try to do nationbuilding, especially an Africa man? You know, General David Clark I think it is, just took over the command of Africa, and we are now trying to do nationbuilding in some of those countries over in Africa. I understand you have to use military personnel to do that rather than civilian personnel that would be in there contracting to help them do it.

So that's not a problem in your eyes?

General Chiarelli: It does create holes. It is an asset that I am happy to go ahead and deploy and use. It provides force protection for my soldiers. Where we do that kind of work we are safer, and we must do it, albeit it would be good for us if other people could come to the table and do some of that work.

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to run. I've got another committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity, but I have to go over to another meeting. So I won't be here in round two. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. Thank you for your line of questioning—

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Generals.

Senator BAYH. —Senator Burriss. Any time a line of questioning brings to light the contributions of the Indiana National Guard and Purdue University, the chairman is delighted. So thank you for that.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to try to get everything in in this first round because we have our EPW hearing going coinciding with this.

General Chiarelli, I appreciate what you said about the ag efforts that are taking place up there on the border. It started out, I believe it was Nebraska, and then Oklahoma is actually en route right now. I talked to—I was up there. I was over there as they

were making that movement up. They're just getting great responses.

That's something that really is not out of the conventional book, but people are having good responses to that.

Mr. Chairman, I chaired this committee many years ago and I think the Readiness Subcommittee is so incredibly important. At that time, it was right after the drawdown of the 90s and several of us—I don't want to be overly critical of President Clinton, but as they were bringing down the forces and delaying our modernization programs, I was very critical during those times.

Then, as, unfortunately, we moved into the Bush Administration, 9-11 came along, so we are in a position of trying to rebuild what should not have been torn down in the first place in prosecuting two wars at the same time. So that's why it is incredibly difficult.

I happened to be over in Afghanistan when Secretary Gates made his announcement 2 weeks ago on Monday, and I know I was overly critical, but I really—when you stop and you think about the money that is being spent right now, \$700 billion for the bailout and \$789 billion on a stimulus program, then our omnibus of 410—that's \$2 trillion. Yet what we really need in order to stop the things that appear to be true is about maybe \$25 billion more in the military. I'm talking about things that are not directly involving you. The F-22, we've got to keep that going. It's the only fifth generation thing that we've got out there. We know both the Chinese and the Russians are making something that would put our kids at a handicap down the road. So our modernization has got to continue there.

The C-17s—oh, you're directly involved with that, the lift capacity. You have to have that. The National Missile Defense System. And then of course the FCS. The word that was used was "recocking" the FCS. Well, we've been recocking the FCS for 6 years now, and when General Shinseki started this thing he was right. We—well, it goes back—and I hate to even say that this happened, but my last year on the House Armed Services Committee was 1994. We had someone testify at that time that in 10 years we'd no longer need ground troops. Now look what happened since that time.

So the marines, the ground forces in the marines and the Army have been neglected in terms of, in my opinion, of the modernization program. So we are faced right now, General Chiarelli, with some of the elements that would have been in the FCS, Future Combat System. It wasn't real clear as to where the administration is going to go with this, but it is going to be delayed.

You and I both know that one of the greatest weaknesses we have on the ground is in our artillery. We're working with the Paladin. That was World War II technology, you know, where you have to get out and swab the breech after every shot. Now, we've had some upgrades. We had one scheduled. I hope we can continue with that, because it's unconscionable to me to think that our kids are out there on the battlefield against potential adversaries that have better artillery equipment than we do. Even South Africa is making a better piece than we have.

So I am concerned about the modernization program. I guess the first question I would ask you, General Chiarelli, is do you think

we are going to be able to continue while they're deciding what to do with the Future Combat System, with an increase in our capability with perhaps the PIM program on the Paladin?

General Chiarelli: I do, Senator. I do. As you well know, the PIM program is an important Army program to improve the Paladin and to work off some of the issues with that older system. We are committed to that program.

I would tell you that the Army is committed to a modernization program, and we are very pleased with statements made by the Secretary of Defense as he toured war colleges last week that indicated that he too is committed to an Army modernization program. We are going to move out as rapidly as we can to ensure that we put the pieces in place to use much of what has been developed over the last years into that modernization program as we look at it and design it right now.

But we are totally committed to a modernization program.

Senator INHOFE. Let me ask you. You brought up just a minute ago the 173rd. I've spent some time at Vicenza and I think we all remember in the early stages of the Iraq war when we found out we couldn't get across Turkey like we thought, and so at the last minute the 173rd came in, and did a great job.

I was over there. At that time they didn't really have a staging area, and we put in the authorization bill money and resources to give them the staging area that they could have, where it's on concrete and all of that. Is that now at a point where it's functional?

General Chiarelli: I'm going to have to take that one back and make sure I give you a correct answer. I do not have the specifics on that.

Senator INHOFE. I think it is. But at that time they were getting ready in the rain out in the mud and all of that. So you might check on that. I want to be sure that that's right, because we're going to be—there were some, I think Jim Jones and others, and I was among them, who felt that we're going to look at a time when our live ranges are going to have to be moved maybe to Eastern Europe, where they don't have all the environmental problems and the restrictions that we have. Perhaps the last thing remaining in that area might just be Vicenza, and I think that's a very valuable asset there.

While we're talking about equipment, General Amos, try not to be a marine for just a minute, because you never complain. You guys, you know, you're the only ones with retreads, and we know all that stuff. But you have some stuff—I mean, you're still using the Harrier, the V-22, the CH-53. What do you think in terms of modernization, equipment, as you look out in the future, what you'll need?

General Amos: Senator, you've flown on most of those airplanes, if not all of them, and been in all of our vehicles. Fortunately, we began a modernization program in aviation about 5 or 6 years years ago, and it began with the new Huey Cobra, the then V-22. We invested money early on, skipped over the F-18E and F and decided we would go with the Joint Strike Fighter.

So we've got C-130Js that—

Senator INHOFE. Yes, but still, that's out in the future.

General Amos: Some of it is, sir. Certainly the V-22 is not.

Senator INHOFE. No, I'm talking about the Joint Strike Fighter. That is a great need you have now and you're still using the F-18s, I guess?

General Amos: We are, sir. We've got about—if you just look at service life, we've got about 5 or 6 more years left on our single-seat F-18s and about the same amount on our F-18 two-seaters. So we began this thing, there is a plan in motion, and it's actually I think working pretty well for the Marine Corps.

Senator INHOFE. Well, okay. I just want you to know that there are a lot of us here who are so appreciative of you two guys and what you're doing with the hand that's dealt you. Our job is to deal you a better hand.

General Amos, I was fortunate to be in Fallujah for the first two elections that they had, and I watched your marines, I watched the door to door activity, and it made me very proud. And I would say the same thing, General Chiarelli. I was a product of the draft and I never believed that an all-volunteer force could do what these guys are doing over there. We're just really, really proud that they are.

One of you said—and I wrote this down, but I'm not sure which one of you said it—we can't continue to meet the demands; we have to make corresponding adjustments. Which one used that term? Was the thank you?

General Chiarelli: It was me, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Can you suggest a few corresponding adjustments?

General Chiarelli: What we have to do is find a way to work the demand issue. I mean, the demand issue is critical for us, and if we see the savings in troops if the drawdown in Iraq occurs as scheduled, we see current demand lasting for the Army until the middle of '10 and into the fall of 2010. We can make that, and we should start to see about that time some corresponding decreases in the requirements in Iraq and increased dwell for forces back home.

But if something were to happen that caused demand to remain the same as it is today or to increase in the upcoming months, it becomes very, very difficult for the United States Army to meet those requirements.

I just toured 6 installations in 7 days, from Fort Jackson to Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Lewis, Hood, and Drum. I met with spouses of soldiers who were deployed and returning. I met with junior NCOs and senior leaders. It is a resilient force. It is an amazing force. But I've got to tell you, it's a tired and stretched force.

To turn around and go back to either Iraq or Afghanistan just under 12 months or just over 12 months, and have it be your third or fourth long deployment, is difficult. It's difficult on soldiers and families. So the key to me as I see it is seeing demand come down as projected. But if it doesn't, we'll have some issues.

Senator INHOFE. I know my time has expired. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman?

On this idea of the brigade combat teams, I haven't really heard specifically. I guess we have 43 now and we were going to go to 47. Now it's going to be 45. How is that going to work, and is that

going to be—can we maintain our efforts with that change, and how is that going to work?

General Chiarelli: As Secretary Gates indicated, stopping at 45 will allow us to thicken our forces. It will allow us to ensure that forces that are deploying are deploying at their prescribed strength. But the Secretary did indicate that if demand changed and went up, that there could be a reevaluation period down the road.

Stopping at 45, if you just do the simple math, if demand were to remain the same would cut into dwell time. It's just simple mathematics. But allowing us to thicken our forces and use those soldiers to ensure that our units are going out close to their authorized strength I think is critical. It will also assist us in January coming off of stop-loss, which we will.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Chiarelli: Begin coming off stop-loss.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

I'd like to pick up where Senator Inhofe left off with your last response, General Chiarelli. The term you used was "very difficult" in terms of managing demand. I understood your answer to say we can make it through the middle or the end of next year, it's tough but you can make it, but we're looking forward to the demand from Iraq decreasing even as there's a little bit of an increase in Afghanistan, but that's then going to give us an opportunity to really try and regenerate our force capabilities.

You said that if something happened to keep demand constant or to increase demand, I think the words you used, "it would be very difficult" to meet those demands. You're a good soldier, you'll follow orders and you'll do your best, you'll try and get the job done. But the words you used, so the American public can understand, "it will be very difficult."

So that if, God forbid, if there's a confrontation with North Korea or would Iran that would require some commitment from our Army, or in some other spot that we can't even anticipate, it would be very difficult, to use your words, to meet those contingencies. Is that a fair summary of what you've said today?

General Chiarelli: That's a fair summary. It would be very difficult on the force. It would be very difficult on families if we were to see dwell time, the time at home, remain at the levels it is now and not improve with folks coming off of three, four, and sometimes five deployments.

Senator BAYH. And that affects retention and recruitment, particularly for some of the noncommissioned folks, sergeants, and then even lieutenants, captains, people like that, does it not?

General Chiarelli: It does. But it's a function also, Senator, of the economy. I will tell you our retention rates have never been better than they are right now. Our recruiting quality points are—

Senator BAYH. We'd prefer that to not be because there are no good alternatives.

General Chiarelli: We too prefer that to be that way.

Senator BAYH. But the broader point, and one of the purposes from the hearings, you guys have been doing a great job under adverse circumstances, but I think the American public has a right to know that if something else comes along we're going to have a

very difficult time meeting the National security threat that faces the country. We'll do our best, but it puts you folks in a very difficult situation, and I would assume that the policymakers understand that, and so that our responses to some of these contingencies that are out there may be in some way shaped by our ability or lack thereof to deal with it.

General Amos, anything you'd like to add to the discussion? Would you use similar terms, "very difficult," from the Corps' standpoint?

General Amos: Sir, I think it would be very challenging. "Difficult," "challenging," to me they mean the same thing. I don't think there's any question about it. This is not—

Senator BAYH. It's not an abstract problem we're dealing with here.

General Amos: It's not, sir, and I think it's a very worthwhile question. In the case of the Marine Corps, if something happened in Iran or Korea, North Korea, we would end up freezing the forces in place. You'd freeze the ones you have in Iraq and Afghanistan, hold them in there, and then, as we said earlier on in the testimony, you would bring together—you would build a fighting force that you could deploy. But you'd have to train it, you'd have to figure out how you're going to get the equipment.

We in the case of the Marine Corps would emasculate all our strategic Reserves, which are in our maritime prepositioned squadrons, whatever is left up in the caves in Norway. We would pull all that together and deploy that force. But we'd have to train it, we'd have to figure out what we'd need to do in that environment that we're not training people for right now, because we're predominantly a counterinsurgency, irregular warfare focused Marine Corps right now. So all those other skills—combined arms, fire maneuver, forcible entry—those things would have to—we'd have to figure out, okay, what do we need to do for this new contingency? Is it possible?

The answer is yes. Your military, both your Army and Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force, would come together and we'd make it happen, just like we did prior to the onset of Korea. We did exactly the same thing. But it would be painful.

Senator BAYH. As I recall, in the beginning stages of Korea it also meant that our performance suffered because we were just trying to make the best of a bad situation. We shouldn't consciously put ourselves in that spot.

General Amos: Sir, that's absolutely correct. In the case of—just instructive for me as I think about this, we went—after the President and the Secretary of War, after World War Two and the great successes of World War Two, emasculated the Marine Corps—in fact, they even went public and said, we don't even—we're not even sure we need a Marine Corps any more, and for certain we'll never do an amphibious operation.

Yet in 1949 we took a Fifth Marine Regiment from the West Coast which was down to about 15 to 20 percent of what it should have been, cobbled together marines from the East Coast all across, brought them into Fifth Marines, blew that balloon up, trained them, and then brought ships together and made the largest am-

phibious operation and probably the most difficult one we've ever done shortly thereafter.

So sir, I think your concerns are very valid.

Senator BAYH. When a marine uses a term like "emasculate" the situation must be fairly dire.

General Amos: Well, yes, sir. I think it certainly was then. I think it was almost on the verge of—

Senator BAYH. It puts you in a position of trying to cut and paste and make do, and that's certainly not an optimal situation for us to be in.

Let me—thank you. I think that's the broader issue here today. Looking out, if there are threats to our Nation's security, unexpected contingencies or things that might happen, that we hope don't happen, that just puts us in a very difficult—it puts you in a very difficult situation. You'll try and make do, but that's not really fair to your forces, and it really in some respects jeopardizes our National security.

A couple other questions I have, gentlemen. There is—I think, General Chiarelli, this would be in your territory—a few days ago an article in the New York Times you're probably familiar with regard to new body armor that we had hoped would lighten the load for some of our combat folks. I think we've all been impressed by the load that our soldiers carry out there in combat. It might reduce the weight they've got to carry by as much as 20 pounds, which is not insignificant when you're going up and down hills wearing your hot desert terrain, that sort of thing.

The article suggested that there were delays that were keeping that body armor from getting to our troops in the field. Are you familiar with this issue, and if so can you address what's going on with that and what we need to do if the equipment is actually going to be good to get it to the soldiers who need it?

General Chiarelli: I had a meeting on that yesterday, Senator, and I will tell you that particular plate carrier—and that's what it is. The official name is MBAB, and I don't know what "MBAB" stands for. But it is a plate carrier, and it literally is a carrier made to carry those ceramic plates that we wear on the front and the back.

It saves 3.77 pounds.

Senator BAYH. 3.77 pounds?

General Chiarelli: 3.77 pounds. It was part of a total package—

Senator BAYH. So the 20 pounds that was reported was a little overstatement?

General Chiarelli: It was part of a total package of equipment, to include lighter machine guns and individual equipment, that, depending on what position you had in the unit—from a machine gunner, it would save, this total package would save 23 pounds; for a rifleman it would save 14 pounds.

Senator BAYH. What are the prospects for getting this done and how long will it take if we can't get it done?

General Chiarelli: The machine guns have already gone downrange. They are already in Afghanistan, and more are going to be shipped to Afghanistan. But we already have the machine guns down.

The M240 machine gun saved, the lighter model, saved a total of 9 of those 23 pounds, with 3.77 pounds in the body armor, and another approximately 10 pounds in individual equipment. Now, that individual equipment and body armor is pre-stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, and will be distributed from the 11th to the 15th of May to the next unit to go into Afghanistan.

This is civilian off-the-shelf individual equipment that we need to test. The Secretary of the Army directed yesterday we expand that test, given the ten pounds of savings. But I think it was unfair to characterize this as it was characterized. We needed to test—

Senator BAYH. How long do you think the testing process will take?

General Chiarelli: It's done.

Senator BAYH. Oh, it's done.

General Chiarelli: The testing is done, and the unit has asked that the equipment be distributed the 11th to the 15th of May.

Senator BAYH. So less than—in a matter of weeks.

General Chiarelli: We're meeting the unit's request. We could do it right now, but based on where they are in their training phase they've asked to wait until the 11th to the 15th.

But we had to test this integrated system to make sure that when we put our very good SAPI plates in this carrier and when we tested that whole system, we got the levels of protection that we needed to ensure, to make sure our soldiers were as safe as possible.

Senator BAYH. My time has expired. If I could just slip one more in, and then Senator Udall has joined us and we're grateful for his presence here today.

There have been a number of published reports I'm sure you're both familiar with about some of the difficulties we're having getting equipment into Afghanistan through Pakistan, some of the challenges, security challenges that exist in that arena. Does this concern either of you? And there are some alternative routes we've explored. Either of you have any thoughts about relying upon, for example, Russia as a place through which to ship our equipment to Afghanistan?

General Amos?

General Amos: For the Marine Corps, the equipment will either fly into Kandahar for what we call sensitive type of things, things that we would not want to put on a commercial carrier, or it'll come up through Pakistan, through Karachi, it'll be offloaded down at the port of Karachi. All that equipment that flows up, that you see on TV every now and then when a convoy gets blown up, that's all by commercial carriers. In other words, there are no U.S. soldiers or U.S. marines involved in that. They offload it, put it on the commercial carriers, and they actually drive it up north.

There are two main routes up from that direction coming up from Pakistan.

Senator BAYH. Do you have concerns about the reliability of those routes, General, with some of the attacks that have taken place there, the increasing instability in some parts of Pakistan?

General Amos: Well, I think the bulk of the attacks have taken place up in the very northern part of the route. When you enter Afghanistan, you enter either the southern part, which is almost

adjacent, just due east of Kandahar, and you come across the mountains that way. That's actually proven to be very safe thus far. I would suspect that it's only a matter of time when that starts becoming frisky as well, but right now the bulk of the stuff that's going up north into that part of Afghanistan, that's the more dangerous area. It goes across I believe the Khyber Pass and that area, and that's where the enemy is focusing its efforts.

This is an open hearing, so I can't tell you, but I saw some numbers that TRANSCOM, who is responsible for all that stuff that moves, even when it goes into Afghanistan, and the numbers are, even though the pictures are dramatic on television and the papers, the numbers are actually almost insignificant. Nothing's insignificant when you lose several hundred million dollars worth of equipment, I understand that.

Senator BAYH. So it's something to keep our eye on, but at this point not having a material impact on our operations?

General Amos: Sir, it's not. Certainly in the Marine Corps it's not. I'll let Pete talk about in the Army. But I'll tell you that General McNabb at TRANSCOM and General McKiernan in Afghanistan have got their eyes on this thing, and they're trying to work very carefully to try to mitigate that.

Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli.

General Chiarelli: From the dramatic pictures you saw in January, I think things have gotten better, particularly on the routes coming through Pakistan to Afghanistan. I think our logisticians have worked miracles to look for other lines of communication, other what we call LOCs, that they can use to continue to supply the force.

I think that AMC, TRANSCOM, are all over this. It is less a worry today than it was a few months ago.

Senator BAYH. Good, good.

Senator Burr, and then, Senator Udall, we'll get to you. And if you'd like, when Senator Burr is done with his questions, if you'd like to make any opening comments, or just get right into questions, it's entirely your privilege.

Senator BURR. Generals, I thank you both for your comments on the ability to access Afghanistan for supply or resupply. I think one of the things that the chairman and I strongly are concerned with is, as you have this tremendous plus-up of U.S. presence, the requirements then on the resupply side are significantly more than what they currently are.

I know there are some great minds working on alternative routes that come from north, that come from the south. At any point that you feel that our strategy does not accommodate our needs, please let us know. We truly look at this with a sense that we want to make sure that the right decisions are in fact made, and we believe the planning is in place.

General Chiarelli, let me turn to also a press article, and I don't want to catch you off guard because it's one from today. If in fact you're not up to speed on this, you certainly don't have to comment. But it's an article in Politico that reports that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs supports a proposal by his staff to change the method for selection and timing of Army units deployed to Afghanistan.

The article notes a concern that the current rotation schedule requires Army units to redeploy back to home stations just as they're becoming familiar with the terrain and culture in Afghanistan. The proposed change would have the Army adopting a shorter deployment tour, similar to the Marines and Special Forces, but using the same units repeatedly to return to those familiar areas. This proposal seems to be a significant change from the Army's traditional generation process.

Do you care to comment on it at all?

General Chiarelli: Well, I would have to say that one of the things the Chief of Staff of the Army is trying to get the Army to is 27 months at home, 9 months deployed. We would like to go to the shorter deployment schedules that the marines have. But as I explained earlier today—I talked friction. Given our requirement for deployment right now, if we were to go to a 7-month deployment as the marines have now, as many people have asked, that would double the amount of friction that we had. And rather than have 31 brigades that are currently employed with 12-month deployments, I would be up between 35, 36, and 37 brigades needed to maintain that shorter deployment.

So if you're talking about large units with the current demand, if we were to make deployments shorter it would raise my friction and demand on the force, which could be an issue for us.

Senator BURR. I think clearly this article alluded to the fact that the force size would be much smaller, but it would be repeated visits. And I question, one, if that meets the time back home, the target time back home. But two, this is quite a departure from the typical rotation that the Army's looked at.

General Chiarelli: It would, Senator. I'd really have to have more details to be able to sit down and analyze it, to give you the kind of answer that I think would be the Army position. I'm sure we've got people that are looking at it. I'm just not as familiar with this particular piece as I probably should be.

Senator BURR. To both of you for a very brief response, if you will. The second portion of the President's request for emergency supplementals, which totals \$83 billion plus for overseas contingency, was transmitted to Congress last week. Understanding that pay, operations, maintenance funding to support deployed forces are at the top of the priority list, what other crucial needs are funded in this supplemental?

General Amos: Sir, I can—we asked—I'll be able to tell you precisely. We asked for \$4.9 billion. A small portion of that is what we call blue in support of green, which is Navy. It's money that we share kind of back and forth with the Navy with regards to aviation assets, because we share the aviation program with the Navy. But \$4.9 billion.

\$1.5 billion of that was for military personnel. Those were just decremented, special pays, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, that kind of thing. It also helps with the acceleration of our growth to 202,000, and we're just about there. We'll sustain that for the rest of the year.

\$1.1 billion in O and M money to support those 29,000 marines that are forward deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

An investment of \$1.9 billion for equipment; these are things such as new lightweight 155 howitzers, EOD systems, new Humvees, the enhanced capability variant that I talked about, LAV production improvement plan, physical security, add-on armor kits, rockets, and 7-ton MTBR replacements.

Finally, the last thing was we actually bought a few airplanes with this. So four brand-new Hueys, which are the new upgraded four-bladed, two-engine Huey, because we've lost a lot of those in combat.

So it's those kinds of things that fill out, flesh out that \$4.9 billion.

Senator BURR. Is it safe for us to assume, General, that any delay by Congress in approving this supplemental would have an impact on deployment?

General Amos: Sir, well, here's what we would do for the deployment, and that's what you're specifically asking. We would end up reprogramming other moneys to pay for that moneys for those 29,000 forces. We would make that fit, and we would take that from other pieces of the budget if the overseas contingency operations fund was not funded.

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli?

General Chiarelli: We currently project we can make it through payday 1 July. We would like to see the supplemental approved weeks prior to that, which would ensure that we had continuity of operations. That's our current projection, payday 1 July.

A majority of that money is not only for operations downrange—and I totally agree with General Amos, we would make that happen. We would do whatever we had to to make that happen. But the supplemental is critical for us, as I know you know, Senator, for our reset of equipment, which is critical. When I've got to turn around a combat aviation battalion in 11 months 22 days, it's hard on the people, but it's also hard to turn that equipment, particularly high tech equipment like helicopters, rapidly through the reset requirements it must go through.

Senator BURR. The last is not a question. It's an observation. When you represent the State that has the Pentagon and the Army, and I think the Pentagon and the Marine Corps, though California may challenge me on that one—the President's made it clear that this is the last emergency supplemental, this is the last war funding outside of the normal budget process. I think that's been clear.

General Amos, you said in your written statement that the Marine Corps will need approximately \$20 billion for replacing, repairing, rebuilding equipment to reset Marine Corps. General Chiarelli, you've been very open on what the needs are going to be.

It concerns me greatly that at a time we have troops deployed in two theaters, we have hot spots around the world that on any given day could reach a heat hotter than where we currently have forces, that we would limit ourselves to what is projected to be a 4 percent increase in the normal DOD process for the foreseeable future. I purposely am not asking this in the form of a question because I don't think it's fair to ask you to respond, but there is a disconnect on my part to believe that we can accommodate all of the things that are outside of just readiness today, but having a

force strength with the equipment to be able to be trained and respond anywhere they might be needed if in fact we're trying to do it with the limitations of an annual appropriations and limited to a 4 percent increase.

I think it is impossible for us to expect that any service will have the equipment that they needs, with the sufficient training that's required, clearly anything in addition to the two theaters that we have active engagement in today. It makes me feel very questionable about just how much training on those potential other hot spots might be able to be accomplished, given the need to shepherd the funds and not necessarily devote them in a way that broadly places those assets there for the military.

I want to once again thank both of you for your willingness to come in, but also for the great insight you've provided us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burr.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just if I might take advantage of your offer to make a brief opening statement, I'll do my best to keep it to three or four sentences.

I was fortunate enough to serve on the Armed Services

Committee on the House side and to serve on the equivalent subcommittee, the Readiness Subcommittee, on the House side. So I'm excited to be able to serve in the same capacity over here, and I look forward to adding hopefully a little bit of value to the committee's work with the ranking member and the chairman.

Senator BAYH. I'm sure your experience in this area will prove to be invaluable.

Senator UDALL. Well, I appreciate the confidence.

If I might turn to General Amos and General Chiarelli. General Chiarelli, I think the last time I saw you you wouldn't—I wouldn't expect you to remember. You were serving a de facto role as mayor of Baghdad, and thank you for your service in that situation. I hope we're, as a country and as a military institution, taking advantage of what you learned about counterinsurgencies and the Nationbuilding, if you will, that attends the kinds of challenges we face in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

If I might, I'd like to begin with a comment and then throw some questions your way. I first—I understand you're working on energy, that is the Army, and electricity grid security. I'm pleased to hear that because of the growing concerns over cyber and physical threats to the power grid and transformers. I don't have any questions right now, but I look forward to working with you and building on the Army's interest in energy security, and would like to offer my help in that regard.

I know a number of Senators attended a closed briefing recently about cyber security, particularly when it comes to our grid. So thank you for that work.

General Chiarelli: Thank you, Senator.

Senator UDALL. If I might, let me turn to an interview you gave to Defense News recently. In it you addressed the importance of evaluating lightweight equipment, weapons, and body armor for our soldiers in Afghanistan. Last week I was at Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and I heard specifically about the needs

of our soldiers in Afghanistan when I met with Colonel Randy George, who is the commander of the Fourth BCT, the 4th I.D.

He's preparing to deploy to Afghanistan next month. One of the first topics we discussed was the need for lightweight equipment and body armor in Afghanistan. Colonel George and others with him that day agreed that speed is the best protection—I think that's exactly how he put it—in an environment, a mountainous environment like Afghanistan, and that we should do anything we can to lighten our soldiers' loads so the Taliban can't outmaneuver them.

They noted this debate about light versus heavy vehicles and body armor can get political, because soldiers' families and the general public and those of us in the Congress push for our soldiers, our marines, to have the strongest vehicles and body armor, even as that same equipment makes it more difficult in some settings for soldiers to get around.

I think the Russians were at some points of that conflict in the 80s in Afghanistan called "turtles" by the mujahedin because they were so burdened by their armor. If you could flip them on their backs, literally and figuratively, they were helpless.

Could you share your views on how to strike that balance in Afghanistan, and as a follow-on do you believe the soldiers going to Afghanistan have all the lightweight equipment they need? And is the Rapid Equipping Force helping individual units deploying to Afghanistan?

Forgive me for throwing three questions at you.

General Chiarelli: I'll take the last one first. I think the REF has been absolutely critical in the Army's ability to get lightweight equipment and look for commercial off-the-shelf solutions to what we're doing. We're getting ready to issue equipment to Randy's brigade from the 11th to the 15th of May that will save anywhere from 13-plus pounds to 23-plus pounds, depending upon the position that the individual soldier has in the formation. A heavy machine gunner, 23-plus pounds; a rifleman, 14-plus pounds.

We've made great strides with body armor, and the MBAB carrier, or the plate carrier that will carry our standard SAPI accept ESAPI plates, will save 3.77 pounds. And Randy's will be the first Army unit that will have that ability. Now, he will go into Afghanistan with both sets of body armor. He will have his heavier IOTV, which weighs 3.77 pounds more, and he will have the lightweight plate carrier.

I would not pretend to try to make the call from Washington, D.C., which he should wear. That'll be up to him based on the conditions, both friendly and enemy, that he sees on the ground to make that decision. Our goal is to provide him with that weight savings as rapidly as we possibly can.

The savings of upwards of 23 pounds I think would not have been possible without great support from Army Material Command and our REF in getting commercial off-the-shelf kinds of things that we could rapidly get to soldiers to save weight.

Senator UDALL: We talked at some length as well about where that responsibility lies and where the discretion lies when it comes to making those decisions. I hear you suggesting he would have a

fair amount of discretion as to what kind of body armor and protective equipment he requires of his men and women in the field.

General Chiarelli: That's exactly right. It's our job to point out to him what the risk factor is, and we've worked very, very hard that we can lay that out and show him exactly what it would mean to go to the lighter body armor. But at the same time, when you're at 8 to 11,000 feet working in the terrain that he's working in, I don't think any of us down here near sea level can understand what it means in a soldier's ability in the tenth month of a rotation to have almost four pounds less weight and agility to be able to fire his individual or crew-served weapon.

That's what the MBAB with SAPI plates gives him, is an ability that we had not been able to give him before.

Senator UDALL. General, at the risk of sounding immodest, I would add to your comments. It also may be drawing into question my own personal judgment, but through the years I've participated in nine Himalayan climbing expeditions in that part of the world, and I went there for recreation and for other reasons. Some people think I killed so many brain cells I went into politics, at those high altitudes, but that's another discussion.

But the idea of carrying, as I did, 45, 50, 55 pounds on your back in those high mountains and being shot at at the same time is something I don't want to really contemplate. But I know the effect of even an additional pound on your ability to maneuver, to stay fit, to stay healthy. So I commend you for what you're doing.

There was also talk, by the way, about foot gear, and there are efforts under way to get the best possible foot gear for mountain environments, which weren't necessarily standard Army issue. So I would encourage that flexibility as well. The Army and the Corps move on their feet, and if your feet aren't healthy, you don't have the right foot gear, you're at a disadvantage.

General Chiarelli: The boot we're going to be testing with Randy's unit will save just over two pounds. But again, we want to get some good data on the reliability of that boot and whether or not soldiers feel that it does the job at two pounds lighter. But again, we're not leaving any stone unturned to try to get at lighter gear.

Senator UDALL. The new materials, new technologies, mountain boots have gone from in the old days 10, 12 pounds a pair to a third of that, and I think you can find an excellent pair of heavy duty boots for four pounds. They're not cheap, but I know the Army and the Marines have some elements to bring to the table, including an interest in volume. So I would think that we could find a way to provide that great foot gear.

Colonel George, by the way, is a phenomenal leader. I think you know that, but I just wanted for the record to note how impressed I am with him and his grasp of all of what we're going to ask him to do over there.

If I might, I'd like to turn to some testimony you gave earlier in the year about the alarming increases in suicides in the Army and how the Army is looking to address the crisis. Fort Carson, as you know, has seen its rate increase and it's a big concern of mine. You talked in that testimony about comprehensive soldier fitness, and you mentioned the Battle Mind training with its pre and post-de-

ployment modules. You said it's the only mental health and resilience program demonstrated to reduce symptoms of post-traumatic stress upon redeployment.

I heard last week from General Graham, who by the way as well is just a phenomenal leader and American, and Colonel George and other leaders about the importance of this pre-deployment training. The Fourth BCT as I understand it is the first major Army unit to get this mental toughness training. They've received very good feedback. They suggested that such training might be conducted all the way across the Army, perhaps expanding the Battle Mind program and setting up traditional pilots all over the country.

Would you care to comment on such training and where else we might apply it?

General Chiarelli: Brigadier General Rhonda Corham is running an effort for the Army, total soldier fitness resiliency training. Battle Mind will be a key and critical piece of that. In fact, we currently have train the trainers being trained as we speak to go out throughout the Army to help provide this as part of her overall program, which we hope to roll out here in the next couple of months. It is a critical piece of suicide prevention, as are so many things, as I found out.

I was not able to visit Fort Carson on my recent trip because the snow was so bad there that Mark asked me not to come in because we'd pull in additional soldiers, but I did meet Mark in Fort Lewis and he briefed me on some of the efforts that he has going on at Fort Carson. But it is a multi-disciplinary approach that we have to go after this with.

We just published this week our campaign plan. It's a lot of process, but it's process that I'm personally driving, 250 taskers that we are driving through the service by 1 September, some of them very, very difficult things, to get at this problem. We are committed to driving the rate of suicide down throughout the Army.

Senator UDALL. General, I need to work with you on that. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Thune I understand is on a tight time line, so, John, if there are questions you want to submit for the record, we'd be happy to take those. I know you're multi-tasking here today.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. A challenge we can all relate to.

Senator THUNE. I thank General Chiarelli and General Amos for your service to our country and those that you work with; be sure you convey our appreciation to all of them.

Just a couple of quick questions, if I might. It got touched on a little bit earlier by Senator Burr, but I want to come back to this whole process now of going away from supplementals and including everything in the annual defense budget. Does that create in your judgment particularly concerns about areas that might suffer without the flexibility that supplemental funding provides?

I'm sort of curious about your general view of how we have done this in the past and the way that we've responded to specific needs that come up, and the way that we have funded operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through supplemental budget requests, and now

trying to absorb all of that in the annual general budget process. Do you anticipate any issues related to that in terms of the needs that you have?

General Amos: Sir, I'll take the first stab at it and Pete can clean up the battlefield after I'm done.

About 2 years ago, the Commandant made a purposeful decision to try to get as much what we would call things that would be above the line, things that we would not normally be able to pay for in what we call the baseline budget, things that would be in the supplementals—to try to force ourselves on a diet so that we could bring some of that supplemental kind of things into the baseline.

We've been successful on things such as manpower. Now, this is—the typical cost of manpower in this fiscal year alone, when we finish the end of fiscal year '09, the 202,000 marines that Congress has given us authorization to grow to and money to buy them and all that stuff will in '10 and beyond be forced into the baseline. In other words, we will not be trying to pay manpower bills with supplementals.

So that's what I'm talking about, our forcing ourselves to get on a diet. You can only do that so much when you're wearing equipment out. If we were in static, if this was 1978 or 1985 and our equipment and our people were static, then we could probably figure out how to keep everything within a baseline. But when you're getting it destroyed, you're wearing it out at seven times the rate that you paid, that you programmed for that equipment, and you have the extra O and M costs of combat in two theaters, or one theater but in two major areas of that theater, it will be difficult. It will be very difficult to do this and put it in the baseline, unless the baseline itself increased, if that makes sense.

Senator THUNE. It certainly does.

General?

General Chiarelli: I would echo those comments. We've been able to move our MILPERS into the base, but two things that concern me: the first is one that we just talked Rapid Equipping Task Force. Their money that they use to go find these off-the-shelf solutions, to be able to go and lighten the soldiers' load from 14 to 23 pounds, is directly out of the supplemental or OCO funding, and I've got to find a place for that in the base because I think they do such critical work and it moved us ahead so rapidly.

I also worry about reset. So much of what we've got in the supplemental is in fact reset. I think that General Cody and General Casey have testified long before me that we see that reset requirement going on for 2 to 3 years after we bring the last forces back. It just takes time to rebuild that equipment and get it back. And I would only echo Jim's comments about how difficult that would be.

Senator THUNE. I have, Mr. Chairman—and I appreciate the answer to that; what I hear you saying is it's going to be very difficult to do this in the annual baseline—a question that if I might have him answer for the record, having to do with the different terrain that you're seeing in Afghanistan, the way that the infrastructure needs, the poor roads and everything, unique requirements relative to Iraq. And General Chiarelli, if you could identify additional equipment requirements that would better serve our forces in Af-

ghanistan that are currently underfunded or unfunded, I'd be interested if you would at least furnish that for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYH. We'll include your questions in the record, Senator. I would ask, gentlemen, if your staff could prepare some answers for Senator Thune.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator Udall, anything else from you?

Senator UDALL. No, thank you.

Senator BAYH. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This is the first hearing that I've had the privilege of chairing as the subcommittee chairman, and I want this to be a very cooperative relationship. Consider us to be your partners, and I am well aware of the demands on your time that hearings like this present to both you and your staff, so we will attempt to make the times we have you up here modest and no more than necessary. That's number one.

Number two, while there's much too much partisan divisiveness in Washington, I don't want that to be any part of this subcommittee. We're not really Democrats or Republicans here. We're American. We want to make sure that you and your soldiers have everything that you need to carry out the missions that our country is asking you to fulfill.

So I look forward to working with Senator Burr and members on both sides of the aisle in cooperation with you to accomplish that mission.

So I'd like to thank you for your time today, your staffs' time today, and look forward to working together. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]