

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE
CURRENT READINESS OF THE ARMED
FORCES IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AU-
THORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009 AND THE FISCAL YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM**

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

U.S. SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT
SUPPORT
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:52 p.m. in Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Akaka [presiding] and Thune.

Committee staff members present: None.

Majority staff members present: Michael J. McCord, Professional Staff Member, and William K. Sutey, Professional Staff Member.

Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano, Professional Staff Member, David G. Collins, Research assistant, Gregory T. Kiley, Professional Staff Member, David M. Morriss, Minority Counsel, Lucian L. Niemeyer, Professional Staff Member, and Sean G. Stackley, Professional Staff Member.

Staff assistants present: Benjamin L. Rubin and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members' assistants present: Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka, Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton, Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner, and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. AKAKA, U.S.
SENATOR FROM HAWAII**

Senator AKAKA. Aloha and good afternoon to all of you. Senator Thune and I are happy to be here, after that vote on the floor of the Senate, and to commence our hearing on the second subcommittee meeting to consider the current readiness of our military forces. And this hearing will come to order.

On March 12th, we received a briefing, from each of the services, on the readiness status of our Armed Forces. That session was a very useful initial discussion for today's hearing. Our committee, and indeed the entire Congress, shares the Nation's concern that

our land, sea, and air forces are under tremendous stress. We have watched with apprehension as the current scope and pace of combat opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed our military personnel and equipment over the last 6 years.

Military readiness does not just happen. It must be continuously measured, aggressively managed, and fully funded. We share the responsibility to ensure that the Nation has the land, sea, and air forces necessary to protect us and our interests at any time and anywhere in the world.

Each of our witnesses has the demanding responsibility for the measurement and management of their service's readiness to meet the requirements of military operations today and in the future.

This afternoon, we welcome General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, the United States Army; General Robert Magnus, assistant Commander of—Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and General Duncan J. McNabb, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

As this may well be the last time that General Cody and General Magnus testifies before this committee prior to their retirement later this year, I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your dedicated service to the Army, the Marine Corps, and this Nation. And this has been my great pleasure and privilege to work with you both. Your commitment to this Nation's soldiers and marines is a model to all of us. So, please accept my warmest mahalo, which is thank you, and also aloha, for your support and service to our great Nation.

Gentlemen, again, we look forward to your testimony. So, let me call on Senator Thune for his statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
SOUTH DAKOTA**

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing to discuss the critical issue of the current readiness of our Armed Forces.

I also want to thank our witnesses for their commitment and service to our country. Your experience and leadership ensures that, regardless of how much we have asked of our servicemembers, morale remains high, recruiting remains strong, and our units continue to accomplish their missions.

I also do want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, as you did, to recognize the honorable service of two of our witnesses, who both will be retiring this year, after distinguished careers in their respective services:

General Cody, in addition to being the Army's Vice Chief of Staff since 2004, you have 36 years of experience, including command of the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne Division and service in Albania, Korea, and the Middle East. I know you also have two sons who are serving in the Army, with a combined seven combat tours between them. So, the legacy of dedicated service continues for your family.

General Magnus, after 39 years, you're about to transition from active to inactive status, knowing that marines never really retire. You've had an amazing career, also, as a helicopter pilot, in assign-

ments ranging from Thailand to the commanding general at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, in California.

I want to thank both of you, and your families, for your leadership and commitment to your respective service and to our Nation.

Mr. Chairman, last week, the President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon to review the same issue we will discuss today: the impact of sustained combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan on the readiness of our forces. There's no doubt these issues are of the utmost importance to the National security interests of this Nation.

This month, Congress faces critical decisions about emergency supplemental funding for both current military operations and the readiness of our forces. In the debate to come, we must remember that our military forces are, indeed, showing the signs of stress and strain. General Cody has included, in his written testimony, that the Army is out of balance after 6 years of sustained combat operations against a ruthless and relentless enemy. This is to be expected. Any skilled and persistent enemy dedicated to the destruction of our National interests will seek to knock or formidable military forces out of balance; they will find ways to counter our strengths, through insurgency tactics, fomentation of civil war, and callous disregard for innocent lives. They may seek—they seek any means possible to weaken our forces and to defeat us through attrition and dissolution of national will. We cannot let this happen.

In September 2001, the Department of the Army assessed that only about 50 percent of its combat units were fully ready to carry out their assigned missions. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, our Armed Forces on Active Duty and our citizen soldiers in the Reserve component responded to the call to duty with selfless sacrifice and a commitment to succeed in every mission, no matter how difficult. Regardless of their level of readiness, they've responded to every task with innovation, sweat equity, and the can-do attitude that is a hallmark of the best traditions of America's military.

The written testimony today describes the same candid responses of our forces. Airmen and sailors perform unfamiliar missions alongside their comrades in the ground forces. The Army is transforming the way it is organized to meet emerging threats, deploying units trained in innovative ways, and quickly modified doctrine for the mission at hand, in order to ensure absolute success. We provide these deploying units a fully array of resources at the expense of nondeploying units, while we ship the newest equipment forward to the fight.

While these correct decisions ensure success in the war at hand, they have a detrimental effect on the strength and depth of our Reserves and our ground forces. These effects are understandable and, in some cases, unavoidable, but they impact our residual strength, our strategic depth. Our Nation has a vast array of national security interests. These interests require military forces prepared for the full spectrum of potential missions overseas and at home. Against this standard, many military commanders of ground forces rate their units as not fully prepared. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses of the actions being taken to improve the readiness of our nondeployed forces.

An assessment of unit readiness depends upon four factors in relation to assigned missions: personnel who are ready, adequate training, available equipment, and the working order of that equipment. I asked the witnesses to describe exactly which factors affect current unit readiness. Given this level of detail, the Department of Defense leadership and Congress can focus resources, prioritize efforts, and ultimately reverse negative readiness trends to restore balance to our Armed Forces.

Many fixes are already in place for many of the issues affecting readiness. The President's January 2007 announcement of an increase in the number of combat ground forces in the Army and the Marine Corps is a vital part of the readiness remedy. I would prefer that we grow the forces more quickly and with the assurance that we can maintain the same high-quality recruits we presently have in the force. I'm hopeful our witnesses will be able to tell us when this growth will translate into positive effects for readiness.

The witnesses described concerns with training. In the next 3 years, the availability of additional forces will add time between deployments to allow for full-spectrum training for mission-essential tasks. The Army has also transformed units to task-organized, modular brigades, reorganizing its Reserve Forces and growing new support units to address the need for high-demand and low-density skill sets. These efforts will reduce reliance on the other services for augmentation and allow them to concentrate on their own training.

I also look forward to hearing what plans are in place to maximize the dwell time between deployments to ensure adequate preparation for a full range of missions.

In the written statements, the witnesses also emphasized the readiness impacts of equipment that is available, operable, and represents the best technology. Both the budget request for fiscal year 2009 and the second part of fiscal year 2008 emergency supplemental appropriations request pending before Congress contain funding requests to procure equipment in response to current shortages. I firmly believe the timely delivery of funds for the reset and reconstitution of equipment directly enhances the readiness of nondeployed forces. I hope our witnesses will be able to discuss their service's investment strategy to re-equip forces and to restore pre-positioned stocks for levels required by operational plans.

As a final note, I want to emphasize one readiness trend. This country is in a period of the longest sustained combat with an enemy since Vietnam. We're fighting a war with Armed Forces comprised completely of volunteers. Every person entering a recruiting station knows that he or she will eventually see combat. Additionally, servicemembers faced with the decision about whether to stay in the military know that they will continue to be deployed to combat zones, and know their families will continue to sacrifice. Yet, as this committee continues to watch recruiting and retention statistics closely, the numbers remain consistent with historic trends, morale remains high, young men and women continue to volunteer to serve. I'm not sure whether this is more a credit to their character or the result of outstanding efforts by military leaders to emphasize the tangible benefits and the noble endeavor of service to our country. Either way, I'm grateful for the

decisions of our servicemembers, and I am determined to ensure that they and their families have everything that they need to be successful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.

Each of you have submitted a written statement. So, without objection, they will all be included in today's record.

We would appreciate it if you would keep your comments short, to allow time for Senators' questions.

General Cody, will you please begin with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General Cody: Thank you, Chairman, Senator Thune.

I'm honored to represent the Nation's 1 million soldiers, nearly 600,000 of whom are serving on Active Duty today, and over 250,000 of whom are deployed worldwide, doing the Nation's bidding, as I testify on these issues critical to the readiness of the United States Army.

As the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have testified, the coming decades are likely to be ones of persistent conflict. And I agree with that assessment. To defend this Nation in a dangerous and unpredictable world, the Army, as part of the Joint Force, must be fully prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations across the full spectrum of conflict, worldwide.

But, today our Army is out of balance. The current demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply of soldiers, of units and equipment, and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. Our readiness, quite frankly, is being consumed as fast as we can build it. Lengthy and repeated deployments, with insufficient recovery time at home station, have placed incredible stress on our soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve of the All-Volunteer Force like never before. And, while we should be extremely proud that our men and women in uniform have proven incredibly resilient so far, we must never take their selfless service for granted.

The senior leaders of the Army are committed to preserving the All-Volunteer Force, building strategic depth, and improving the capabilities of our soldiers, all the while providing the necessary combat forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. And I know you are, too.

Our plan to restore balance by 2011 has four fundamental imperatives: sustain the force, prepare the force, reset the force, and transform the force.

Critical to these imperatives is our plan to grow the Army by 74,000 soldiers, which will provide a total of 76 brigade combat teams and approximately 227 support brigades across all three components of the Army by 2013. Following a reduction in operational demand, our rotational goals for a steady-state security posture of the Army is 1 year in combat or deployed, 3 years back, for the active Force; and 1 year mobilized and 5 years back, for the Reserve component. Continued deployments below these goals put the All-Volunteer Force at risk in a time of persistent conflict.

At the same time, we must continue to modernize, so that our soldiers will always have tactical and technical overmatch against every enemy. The Future Combat System will provide our soldiers an unparalleled understanding of the operational environment they're in, increased precision in lethality, and enhanced force protection in both irregular and conventional campaigns. In essence, the Future Combat System will provide that overmatch. Soldiers need the Future Combat System. They need it now, in the current fight, and they need it to defeat future enemies.

The Future Combat System is this Nation's promise to the men and women on the ground who face the greatest danger, that we remain committed to provide the best equipment to help them accomplish their mission and return safely to their families.

To be ready to meet the needs of this Nation, our soldiers in this Army need full and timely funding. We need the remaining \$66.5 billion from the fiscal year-08 GWOT funding, the \$140.7 billion requested in the fiscal year-09 base budget, and the fiscal year-09 GWOT supplemental request. A delay in the fiscal year-08 GWOT funding, the remaining piece of that supplemental request by the end of May, would create substantial impacts and unneeded stress on our people and our readiness.

The Nation and your Army have been at war for over 6 years. Our soldiers have borne the burden of this war with unparalleled strength and determination. Every day, they accomplish the mission. Every day, they do so with valor and incredible personal courage. For 15 months, 455 days, and what seems like an eternity of minutes when you are in combat, they and their families endure immeasurable hardships and personal sacrifices in defense of this Nation, and they do so with little complaint, because they believe this Nation is worth defending.

Those of us in leadership positions must be the vanguard to our soldiers' well-being. Our soldiers and their families must continue to be our utmost priority as we properly fund, man, train, and equip this All-Volunteer Force.

The Congress has provided tremendous support to our Army these past 6 years, and we are grateful for all the at you have provided. With the continued support of the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress, the Army will restore itself to balance and build the readiness and the strategic depth we need to meet the uncertainties of this world.

And I await your questions. [The prepared statement of General Cody follows:]

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.
General Magnus?

**STATEMENT GENERAL ROBERT MAGNUS, USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS**

General Magnus: Chairman Akaka, Senator Thune, thank you for this opportunity to report to you today on the readiness of your Marine Corps.

On behalf of our marines, sailors, and their families, I would like to extend my appreciation for the sustained support that the Congress provides your Marine Corps.

Your marines are fully engaged in the long war. Today, with over 33,000 marines deployed, from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Horn to West Africa, from Korea to the Philippines, and here in our homeland hemisphere, your marines and sailors are performing magnificently under challenging and often dangerous conditions. I want to assure you that our warriors in combat are our number-one priority. They are well trained, well led and equipped for their assigned missions.

Although we are currently meeting our operational requirements with ready, mission-capable forces, the net effects of sustained combat operations and our high operational tempo are taking a toll on our marines, their families, our equipment, and the full-spectrum-training readiness. Contributing to the stress on our force is the short dwell time between deployments and our intense focus on counterinsurgency operations. The short dwell time at home does not allow our units the time to train on the full-spectrum missions needed to be ready for other contingencies. This most directly affects your marines' proficiency in core competencies, such as combined arms and amphibious operations.

To ensure our forward-deployed forces maintain high readiness, we have been required to source personnel and equipment from nondeployed units and pre-positioning programs. This cross-leveling of personnel and equipment has reduced the nondeployed units' ability to train for those other contingency operations.

First, to sustain the demands of the long war while we correct the effects of stress, the Marine Corps is growing its Active-component end strength to 202,000 marines. This increase will provide the combatant commanders with ready marines for the current counterinsurgency mission. It will also improve our Active-component deployment-to-dwell ration to 1-to-2, reducing the stress on marines and families, and ensuring that marines have the necessary full-spectrum training. The increased active end strength will create three balanced marine expeditionary forces and also reduce the need to mobilize our Reserve Forces, improving their dwell ration to 1-to-5.

Second, we are resetting our forces to ensure our equipment remains ready for tomorrow's missions. For over 5 years, intensive combat operations have resulted in the heavy use and loss of our ground and aviation equipment. Operational demands have also increased our equipment maintenance and replacement costs far beyond what was planned in our baseline budgets. With Congress's help over the past 3 years, we have begun to make progress in meeting reset requirements. To date, the Congress has provided \$10.9 billion in supplemental funding towards our estimated current total reset requirement of \$15.6 billion. We look forward to continuing to reset our forces with the remaining fiscal-year 2008 GWOT request.

Third, to ensure that your Marine Corps will remain ready for future challenges, we will continue to modernize our warfighting equipment, including new ships and aircraft, and our infrastructure. I am proud to report that your support has helped ensure the continuing success of marines and sailors. The morale and resiliency of your marines have never been higher. They volunteer to serve their Nation at war, have been sent to do that mission, and

know that they are succeeding, despite very demanding conditions and a ruthless enemy. We will continue to keep our primary focus on supporting marines and sailors in combat and on taking care of their families at home. We will continue to reset and modernize your Marine Corps, ensuring that it remains ready today, ready tomorrow, and ready for the uncertain challenges of the future.

Congress's support has enabled us to succeed. That continuing support will ensure that we will always, as Congress has directed, be the most ready when the Nation is least ready.

I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Magnus follows:]

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General Magnus. Admiral Walsh?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PATRICK M. WALSH, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Walsh: Chairman Akaka, Senator Thune, a little over a year ago I departed Bahrain as the Naval Component Commander to U.S. Central Command, and I was the Commander of U.S. Fifth Fleet. And, in many respects, I was the beneficiary of the support of this committee, as well as the investments made to the readiness account. I was a customer, and I witnessed many of the values that we talk about when it comes to forward presence, power projection, and deterrence. So, it's a real honor to be here today and to thank you and to testify, on behalf of sailors around the world, here, on the readiness of our Navy.

Today, 51 percent of the Navy is underway. Our sailors are operating with maritime coalition partners in the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, 15,000 serve on the ground in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

On any given day, their service is impressive and noteworthy. Just for example: In the past year, strike groups provided persistence forward presence in troubled spots around the globe; carrier air wings supported joint operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; riverine squadrons patrolled internal waterways of Iraq; a guided-missile destroyer destroyed a malfunctioning satellite; seabees, explosive ordnance disposal teams, SEALs, and individual augmentees served alongside marines, soldiers, and airmen; the fleet provided disaster relief in Central American, humanitarian assistance in the Pacific Rim, and worked to promote economic prosperity with African partners; helicopters provided support to firefighters in San Diego, and our divers provided support to civil authorities after the collapse of a bridge in Minneapolis.

While our maritime forces respond to contingencies, sustained wartime operations have placed acute demand on our people, our readiness, and our force structure. The '09 budget delivers the capabilities needed to these focus areas.

So, thanks to your support, the current risk in these areas, in our view, is moderate. However, we need to highlight for you, today, specific concerns that we have about future operations that elevate our risk-assessment trend lines to significant, in three areas.

Beginning with people: Attracting, developing, and retaining the best and the brightest remains a top priority, especially in our

naval special warfare, in our special operations field, in our nuclear power field, our medical community and chaplain communities. The Navy needs your continued strong support for accession bonuses, as well as special and incentive pays. You've given us the necessary tools to attract and retain talent in these critical skill sets.

In the area of readiness: To provide a ready, responsive expeditionary, full-spectrum force, we must train the way we conduct our National security missions. Your support for the readiness accounts has allowed us to train uninterrupted in time of war. Additionally, we need your continued support and partnership for the training required for full-spectrum operations, as local groups, and, in some cases, local governments, challenge our ability to conduct active sonar interior landing training.

In the area of force structure: Our immediate challenge is in managing the impact of high operating rates in harsh conditions on equipment. Specifically, the demand for select forces exceeds our ability to sustain the supply of these assets. The high tempo of operations has consumed service life faster than programmed. This is why early in the CNO's tenure, he made it a priority to examine our industrial base, personally walk the shipyard, and take a hard look at the procurement accounts for aviation and surface combatants. Our immediate concern is for wing- fatigue repair on our P-3 aircraft.

Last fall, we published a new maritime strategy that reflects what we have learned about the evolving security environment. We see a direct connection, and draw a direct correlation, between the stability of the global commons and the security and the prosperity of the Nation. No matter what advancements futurists predict for the movement of energy and goods, the bulk of the world market will continue to move by sea in an environment where the security challenge has become increasingly transnational.

We recognize how quickly conflict can escalate, how ideological movements can become destabilizing and disrupt the international economic system. The potential for conflict based on grievance, resentment, and state interests, fueled by weapons proliferation, characterized by terrorism, insurgency, and disorder, now seems more likely in areas of vulnerability, poor governance, and demographic stress. In this environment, we understand why we must position forces forward, to move promptly and interrupt the symptoms and conflict before local problems become regional or international.

The character of today's challenge cuts across boundaries and borders; and, therefore, it demands solutions that are rapid, credible, joint, interagency, combined, and cooperative. This is why the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard took the unprecedented step and signed the first unified maritime strategy, which acknowledges the traditional role of the services, as well as recognizes that security challenge requires us to move seamlessly across the maritime domain, prepared for the full spectrum of military operations.

Because you have invested in recruiting, we have a high-quality force. Because you invested in education, we have a skilled and technically competent force. Because you invested in the quality of life for our families, we retain a senior, seasoned, and experienced

force. Because you've invested in full-spectrum training, we are a force prepared for the full range of military operations, from irregular warfare to major combat, which gives us the opportunity to describe where we can go and what we can do, rather than where we cannot go and what we cannot do. Because you've invested in readiness, we can sustain our posture forward. It means that, on any day in the Navy, we knock down the door or serve as the force in strategic Reserve. It means that when we are on station, we don't reach a tipping point, we move in any direction, any time, and any place, for as long as the Nation needs us. Your investment presents true military options for national leadership. The value of what we do is that we're in a position to lead, to play an enduring leadership role, to assert national interests on the world stage in operations that range from combat to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

The American people have given us a skilled, experienced, credible, agile Navy, with sailors who reflect the commitment of the country and reveal the soul of the Nation. Our readiness story is about strength, but it's also about generosity and humanity. It's about what we must defeat in war, and what we can build in peace as a force of last resort and guarantor of freedom. Your support for the '09 budget will help us meet the challenge of this security environment that we describe.

So, on behalf of a ready, responsive, and relevant Navy, I'd like to thank you, again, for your enduring support for our sailors, our civilians, and our families. [The prepared statement of Admiral Walsh follows:]

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Admiral Walsh.
General McNabb?

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, VICE
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

General McNabb: Chairman Akaka, Senator Thune, and distinguished committee members, it's a pleasure to be here this afternoon.

I thank the committee for your tremendous support of our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen in ensuring that we have what we need, to win. On behalf of the over 600,000 total force airmen, thank you for the opportunity today to talk about the very important subject of readiness.

Our airmen have been vital to the success of the joint team to win this critical global war on terror while constantly providing the global deterrence that keeps our enemies at bay and our friends assured. We stand ready to go to the most dangerous places on the planet tonight to protect our country, and if the Nation needs us to go, tomorrow or 20 years from now, we will go. Our airmen, like our fellow warriors, have been tested in the crucible of war, and been found worthy. As part of the Joint Force, our airmen have pushed our combat capability to new heights, and have forever changed the way we fight.

We have compressed the kill chain. With our ground combat teams, we have developed the tactics and technology that allows the joint team to find the enemy and strike where needed and when needed. Airmen have evolved the battlespace vigilance. We

keep an unblinking eye on rooftops and over ridgelines so our ground forces are not surprised by the enemy and are always prepared to engage them.

Our airmen have revolutionized the concept of air mobility. We have moved our mobility forces forward with innovative ideas and equipment to precisely resupply forces on the ground and reduce the number of ground convoys in harm's way. Airmen have extended our aeromedical evacuation bridge. We move our wounded warriors to higher levels of care faster than ever, saving the remarkable Americans who have risked their lives in defense of this great Nation.

Our airmen are absolutely honored to do their part, but we have sustained this increased tempo for over 17 years, with the last 6 being the highest in over 40 years. Senator Thune, you mentioned that. This pace has had its effect on our people and our equipment. Our overall readiness is down, across the board. The average age of our aircraft is over 24 years, and we're flying this equipment harder than ever, accelerating the wear and tear on our inventory. We have witnessed an 11-percent decline in our fully-mission-capable rate, and this rate would have decreased even further, were it not for the superb work in our depots and our superb maintainers.

The high tempo has also affected our airmen and their families. Just like my counterparts here today, many elements of our force are stressed with deployment-to-dwell ratios of 1-to-1. Notably, we've seen declining re-enlistment rates among our mid-level NCOs. We're watching all these indicators closely and doing everything that we can to maintain the quality of life for our airmen and their families.

Despite these challenges, we are committed to the defense of this great Nation and this great cause of freedom. We know our Nation and our joint team absolutely depends on us, and, when called again, we will go. However, we cannot rest on the laurels of our current dominance in air. We must also be able to dominate airspace and cyberspace tomorrow. We ask the committee for your continued help to recapitalize and modernize our aging equipment, to improve our readiness and to provide future generations of airmen with equipment that is worthy of the challenges that they will face.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this committee's continued help, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General McNabb follows:]

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General McNabb.

I have a question for all of our witnesses. In General Petraeus's report to Congress next week, he is expected to make a recommendation with regard to the size of the force required to continue operations in Iraq. He may say that a force of about 140,000 troops is still required, or he may indicate that the force may be reduced. But, we expect to hear from him next week. Very briefly, what are the nondeployed forces' readiness implications, for each of you, if the force stays about the same or if the force begins to draw down? Also, if General Petraeus recommends that forces may be reduced, what readiness objectives and actions have your services

planned that will make immediate—that will take immediate advantage of the lower operational tempo?

General Cody?

General Cody: Thank you, Senator, for that question.

I'm not sure what General Petraeus is going to come back and say, but I'll try to put it in a strategic context for you, in terms of the United States Army, where we are.

When this surge went—and, by the way, this is about the fifth surge we've had during this war; we surged several times for elections in both Afghanistan and Iraq—when the 5-brigade surge went in, last year, that took all the stroke out of the shock absorber for the United States Army. That put 23 brigade combat teams into combat, as well as into Kosovo, and we had 17 brigades back that were in reset, that had already served 12-month tours. And that is why, when we put the five brigades in, we had to extend the other brigades to an additional 3-months-per to give General Petraeus the amount of forces he needed to provide a safe and secure environment for the Iraqis and to give time, as he stated, to the Iraqi government and to the—and the Iraqi army.

So, if comes back and says a certain number will not have to be replaced, it will not be instantaneous, in terms of how we will be able to reduce, one, the 15-month boots-on-the-ground deployment time, as well as those units that are coming back that have already served 15 months; we have to give them at least 12 months reset time. At the same time, it—I say it took all the stroke out of the shock absorbers, in terms of our brigade combat teams—it also forced us to issue the last of our pre-positioned stocks in that area, so that we could get those five brigades in there. And so, over time, in '06 and '07, we rebuilt two brigade-combat-teams worth of equipment. We had to use that equipment to provide for the surge. And so, on the back side of how many brigades come out and don't have to be replaced, we also have to turn around and reset quite a bit of equipment.

The brigades that we have today, that are getting ready to deploy, are all going back to either Afghanistan or Iraq. They will all have 12-months dwell time. Many of them are at a readiness rate, in terms of equipment, in an unclassified setting, of not what they need to be.

In the training area, as Senator Thune had mentioned, they are training solely for counterinsurgency operations and focusing on the mission of the brigade they're replacing in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and they're not training to full spectrum for other operations. In terms of their equipment, in many cases we will not be able to get them fully up for equipment just prior to their major training exercise before they deploy.

And that is the status, at this time. A long answer, but this is very complex, in terms of—when these five brigades come out, we'll have to provide all those 15-month-deployed units 12 months dwell time, minimum, which means it would still be short, as we continue to rotate, and it may take us 15 months to get ourselves to a 12-months boots-on-the-ground and an 18-months dwell time. And, quite frankly, where we need to be with this force at this time is no more than 12 months boots on the ground and 24 months back at home.

Senator AKAKA. General Magnus?

General Magnus: Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, thank you for the question.

Again, I agree with General Cody. While I cannot foresee what is in General Petraeus's report, your questions regarding the—What would be the effect on us, if, in fact, there were reductions in the forces assigned to Operation Iraqi Freedom? In fact, as we come out of the increased support that took place over the past year, we have reduced by two infantry battalions and a marine expeditionary unit out of Iraq, and, at the same time, today, we are currently deploying 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to Afghanistan and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit is fully on deck in Afghanistan. And we have also added the equivalent of another infantry battalion in Iraq to provide security forces. Effectively, there has been little, if any, change in the stress or the tempo on our forces, so I see that the stress right now over the balance of this summer, pending what the President decides after he receives General Petraeus's report, remains the same as it was over the past year.

What would we do if there was a reduction in force from Operation Iraqi Freedom? Sir, marines move to the sound of guns. As we achieve stability in the successful transition to the Iraqi security forces, the marines, as they are today, will move to the sound of the guns in Afghanistan to achieve the same thing under our Joint Force Commander. Currently, as with the Army, our Active-component forces are operating at a one-to-one dwell. For that battalions and squadrons, that means 7 months in combat, 7 months home, most of which is getting ready to go back, and then 7 months back again. We also have Reserve battalions that are, again, in combat in Iraq. The units, I can guarantee you, the ones that are forward and the ones that are preparing to go forward, are at their highest readiness levels, both personnel, equipment on hand, and materiel readiness of that equipment. The ones that are in the deployment cycle, either forward or preparing to go forward, they have given up personnel in order to be able to flesh out the battalions—and, in particular, the transition teams and other augment personnel that are required in both Iraq and Afghanistan—and we have cross-leveled equipment. So, the readiness of the non-deploying units has been at a significantly lower level than the forward-deployed forces. We can provide the details, of course, in a classified hearing. But, it's clear that we are supporting the units and the troops forward in the fight.

Likewise, the readiness of our three maritime pre-positioned squadrons and of the equipment stored in the caves in Norway has been degraded even more than of the units that remain behind. So, for the units that remain behind that are not in the predeployment training cycle, their ability to conduct necessary training, particularly in the event that other contingencies arise, is significantly degraded.

Senator AKAKA. Admiral Walsh?

Admiral Walsh: We would anticipate continued requirements for combat support and combat service support. We would expect similar sorts of manning levels as we have today. That has a direct impact on very specific ratings for us, sir—Seabees, the special warfare supply, information professionals and medical communities, as

well as the chaplain corps, as we mentioned. We would anticipate greater requirements for ISR as we reduce the footprint in theater to provide the timely information necessary for those who remain. We would also anticipate that, as the footprint reduces over land, that there would be a greater requirement for presence at sea. And so, we're prepared to redeploy with marines when they're ready to back aboard ship and support operations in Afghanistan, if that's where the focus of effort turns to.

Senator AKAKA. General McNabb?

General McNabb: Sir, very much like Admiral Walsh, as we—we don't know exactly what General Petraeus will recommend. I will say that there's no question that they—we are getting increasing demands on what air can provide, and we don't see that changing. That is, strike. We're tripled the amount of ordnance that we deliver, between '05 and '06, and we've done that again between '06 and '07, as we figure out ways to support the ground forces even better than we do today. Your committee's help on that has been superb.

I would say the same thing on mobility, they are looking for ways that we can resupply them in different ways than we've done before. We don't think that will change. The surveillance and reconnaissance, that we provide so that nobody's surprised, becomes even more important, and those demands continue.

What that means for us is that if we look at the number of flying hours that we do, it has stayed about the same since '92. However, we are 31-percent smaller in the number of aircraft that we have, and we're 41-percent older. So, what does this demand mean? It means that we are going to age out our equipment even more rapidly, so recapitalization of our assets becomes even more important to us.

We know, and we continue to do, what all—everything that we can to make sure that we fully support this global war on terrorism, but it is at the expense of tomorrow if we don't recapitalize, and that is probably our biggest concern.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your responses.

This question is for General Cody, General Magnus, and General McNabb. The services have requested, and the Congress has provided, billions of dollars to reset the equipment that has been lost or worn out in operations. Our briefers, last month, told us that we cannot expect to see real readiness improvement until demand for forces goes down or the size of the forces goes up. This question is, as I said, to the three of you on the panel. How do you plan to manage the eventual reduction of demand for forces in support of Iraq and Afghanistan, and rebuild basic readiness? And what major changes in funding requirements do you anticipate will be necessary? And how long will it take to rebuild basic readiness?

General Cody: Thank you, Chairman. I'll take the first swing at it.

Senator AKAKA. General Cody?

General Cody: As you know, we have five depots in the Army that's doing what I would consider unbelievable work. And it's—really, all five of them are national treasures. And they have been the reasons why we've been able to sustain the equipment as we start buying new equipment, but also to reset that equipment we

have. Today, we have about five brigades worth of equipment across those five depots. We've increased the manpower direct-labor hours that—that's how they measure, in the depots. When we started the war, it was about 7 million direct-labor hours in those five depots. They're now operating at 25 million direct-labor hours. And with the funding from Congress in '07 that gave us the \$17.1 billion to start resetting our equipment, we were able to use all that money in '07, and that's what gave us the ability to reset those two Army pre-positioned brigades I talked about, as well as start flowing critical items to the National Guard and Reserves.

This year, we've got almost \$18 billion in the fiscal year-08 GWOT supplemental. We've received over 10 billion of that. We've got another 7.6 billion that is in procurement dollars to buy the long-lead items for—as these five brigades come out, get that equipment retrograded to those depots so that we can start building back the readiness. And the readiness I'm talking about is in things that shoot, move, and communicate—hundreds of thousands of rifles, machine guns that we do at Anniston, the reset of thousands of our up-armored Humvees, our medium tactical vehicles, our radios, our Blue Force tracking, the devices that you've seen when you've traveled over there that give the situational awareness. All of those are being done at our depots. I anticipate, because of the surge, it'll probably take 3 years, and maybe 4, to be able to reset that equipment, as well as the new procurement, to continue to fill the holes of the Army, that we testified to in 2006.

Senator AKAKA. General Magnus?

General Magnus: Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, the—we are doing several things, which makes this a more challenging problem—not only the level of current combat operations, but the fact that we are growing the force. We're increasing the force from—to 202,000. That's a net increase of about 27,000 marines, the majority of which is going into operational forces. Because of that, we have to field equipment back to the units that were either short of equipment or who have had equipment attrited or equipment that is in the depots, as well as provide new equipment to the new battalions and squadrons that we're standing up.

The Congress has funded approximately two-thirds of our requests for reset, and we look forward to receiving the remainder that is in the fiscal year-08 GWOT request.

You asked the question, How long would it take to reset the force? Of course, due to the often long lead times for industrial production and the fielding of equipment, we are just now, within the last several months, seeing an uptick, an increase, in the on-hand equipment readiness to reset the force. Now, that's essentially an uptick that you're seeing in the forces that are not deployed forward, because I indicated earlier that the forces that are forward are at their highest level of readiness reporting.

Depot maintenance, particularly of equipment in the maritime pre-positioned squadrons and our aircraft, which are maintained in Navy depots, will take up to 4 to 6 years, depending upon the cycles of the ships going through Blount Island and the flow—massive flows of equipment that will go through not only our depots, but the Army depots and the Navy depots. For our pre-positioned stocks, Maritime Pre-Positioned Squadron 1 is at 80 percent of its

on-hand equipment. We believe that that—those ships will go through their normal maintenance cycle at Blount Island for the ships, and, at that time, will be restocked and will be at 100 percent in the year 2011. Maritime Pre-Positions 2, which was the main source of equipment for the CENTCOM operational area, is down to 54 percent of its on-hand equipment. Those ships will go through their cycle, and we will be back up to 100 percent in 2012. Maritime Pre-Positioned Squadron 3, which is in the Pacific, is at 100 percent of its on-hand equipment and ready for other contingency operations. We will restock the equipment in the Norwegian caves with security cooperation equipment as we follow the restocking of the equipment that are in the ships.

We will grow the force by 2011. That is, the marines and the battalions and squadrons will be grown by 2011. The trail will—on this—will not only be depot maintenance, but it'll be the necessary military construction to provide the troops bachelor enlisted quarters and the working spaces for the new units.

Thank you, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

General McNabb?

General McNabb: Yes, sir, I—like General Cody, the first thing that jumps to my mind is, I'd like to talk a little bit about our depots. When you think about the investment that this committee helped us make in our depots, we end up having depots that are world-class.

In '01, when you looked at a depot, we had about 64 percent on-time deliveries, meaning that 36 percent were not on time. We had almost 290 airplanes that were delivered late; they were actually sitting in depots as we went through and had additional work done on them. In '07, that number was 17. So, we had a 98-percent—you know, 98 percent on time. And I would say that was because of investment in depots. And so, that 9-percent decline that I was mentioning, when I said that the depots have completely changed that, in a couple of the weapons systems, the difference is 10 percent; they've increased the availability of our airplanes by 10 percent. So, instead of 9 percent, it would be 19 percent if they had not done that.

The other portion this committee really helped us on was “spare” funding, and continuing that with reimbursing us in the supplemental to make sure that our spares accounts are up. We put almost a billion dollars in the '00, '01, '02 timeframe, and have sustained that to make sure that we kept the supplies up. Again, those are things that created serious decline in the '90s, that this committee has helped us. Again, the 9 percent, kind of, masks that we've had that kind of a decline, but it would be so much worse if we had not jumped in there.

What I worry about is, when you take an airplane like a C-17 or a -130 or a fighter, it is the cycles—it's not necessarily the flying hours, it's the cycles. The C-17 that is deployed into Al Udeid, Incirlik, or Manas, and is flying what would have typically gone by ground, because we're using C-17s to do that, the wear and tear is three times the amount that you would have on a typical airplane that's coming from the States, going across to Ramstein, going into theater, and coming back out. Those are the kinds of

wear and tear that—it doesn't mean that you've got to replace the airplane this year, but your fleet just aged by 3 or 4 years because of the way you've used it.

We have taken risks in recapitalization over the years, because we had to make sure the near-term readiness was done. We now are at that point where, if you look at our aging fleet, we have almost 688 airplanes that are restricted—restricted from our ability to use them. We've got about 95 airplanes that we've been—had to take off the flying schedule because they're broken. Those are the things that absolutely concern us, so that when you talk about, "What is our overall readiness of our overall fleet?" when we talk about C-1 and C-2 from '00, '01, down to today, it is a decrease of about 19 percent, from 70 percent to 51 percent. That is the part that really concerns me. And when you talk about what it will take, I would say it's a sustained investment. We've given you our—you asked us for, and we've provided, our unfunded requirements list. It is consistent, what we say, within the requirement—required force. This is the kind of sustained amount of investment that we need.

I will say, with that, we know that there is—this is all based on risk. We don't know where the next dollar should be spent. There are needs across all the forces; there is no question about that. We don't know where that will be. We just know that, you know, with—given the money that we have, we are investing it the very best way that we can.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General.

Senator THUNE?

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Cody, in your written testimony, you advocate for full and timely funding of the Army's budget request for fiscal year 2009 and 66.5 billion for the Army continuing the remaining fiscal year 2008 emergency supplemental appropriations request that's pending before the Congress. You also list specific impacts to certain programs if the supplemental funding is delayed beyond the end of the month. Will these impacts affect the readiness of units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan?

General Cody: If we get the timely funding, Senator, for the 66.5 billion, of which—it's broken out, as you know—and military pay is a large part of it, with the numbers of national guardsmen we have, and reservists, on Active Duty, as well as the operational dollars, and then, there's about 7.6 billion of it for reset—if that money is not on time, we will not put any soldier in harm's way without equipment. What we'll have to do is fall in on equipment that's there and use it in theater longer than we wanted to. But, it would have a cascading impact in readiness, over time.

As you know, a couple of times during the last 2 or 3 years we have sent brigades, and left their equipment back, that they trained on, and flown them over, and had them fall in on equipment that was there, and left there for 2 years. That's the beauty of the Army modular force, because all the brigades look alike now, and we were able to send the 1st Cav falling in on 4th ID's equipment, and vice versa, with helicopters and with tanks and Bradleys. We don't want to do that too much, because when you leave that equipment over there for 2 to 3 or 4 years, the recapitalization

dollars really creep up on you and you're deferring the maintenance.

But, the short answer is, it will have an impact, but it will not impact the equipping of the soldier. We will not let that happen.

Senator THUNE. What will be the impact to your current readiness "C" rating if Congress delays the remainder of the emergency funds?

General Cody: The readiness of the next-to-deploy units, especially our Stryker brigades—two of our Stryker brigades and two of our heavy brigades and our ability to build the next infantry brigades—will be degraded in both equipping and then the training, because they won't have the equipment to train on.

Senator THUNE. How does the delivery of partial supplemental appropriations inhibit or affect the Army's plan to improve readiness rates by funding reset activities?

General Cody: The two things that—with the reset piece—in '07, Congress was very good about giving us all \$17.1 billion up front, as you know, and we committed almost all of those dollars by January of '08. And that was where we were able to energize our five depots and build back the Army pre-positioned stocks that enabled, quite frankly, the surge. If we do not get these dollars on time, the \$7.6 billion I talked about—most of that is procurement dollars for long-lead items—we will not be able to rebuild our heavy brigade combat team and our light brigade combat team and our light battalion for Afghanistan on time, and then, if something happens and General Petraeus needs more forces to roll back in with, we will have to fly equipment over from the States and take it away from units training.

Senator THUNE. I want to direct this to the rest of the panel, but, What do impact your service's readiness may occur from a delay in the passage of the second part of the fiscal year—fiscal year-08 emergency supplemental appropriation request?

General Magnus: Senator Thune, General Magnus, if I may.

I agree completely with General Cody, but let me put this in three categories:

The delays in military pay, not only present us with a financial problem, depending upon—as we run out of the fiscal year appropriations for military pay, but they send a strong, unmistakable signal to our seasoned warriors, who have been willing, and their families have been willing, to sign them up to re-enlist. Whenever see a significant delay in deliberations regarding appropriations to support the pay for our marines—and I'm sure it's the same for the other services—you have a very intelligent, very professional force, and they also pause to be able to see what this means for them and their future. So, my concern is the effect that it does have, with a significant delay; and, therefore, we strongly encourage the Congress to appropriate the balance of those GWOT request funds that affect military pays.

Second, delays in readiness-and-reset funding that are directed—that we need for contracting for warfighting equipment and stocks, it simply means that—of course we will continue to support the marines and the sailors, soldiers, and airmen and the units that are forward, and the ones that are preparing to deploy, but those that would be next, those that will go late this year and early next

year, there will be lead-time lags for some of the equipment that would be under contract this spring and this summer.

And lastly, perhaps, it's a longer-term effect; delays in the operation maintenance fund and the procurements necessary to effect depot maintenance will affect us in future years.

Thank you, sir.

Admiral Walsh: Sir, if I could add to the previous comments.

We shouldn't presume that just because the services are on spend plans that will run out of money at different times during the year, that we're not all affected by this. So, for example, the bridge in January got us through August of this year, as far as Navy funding is concerned. But, if the Army runs out of money first, the Pentagon looks at this as a national effort, which requires everybody helping out. So, what we would anticipate now is a re-programming effort inside the Pentagon that would then shift resources from various services. And now we have a different set of issues than I could describe to you in my earlier remarks. What we would have is, we would have significant issues with regard to depot-level maintenance, which, right now, under current funding plan, is at 100 percent, in terms of programmed overhauls. Aviation maintenance is at 100 percent. All of that—all of those calculations, now, present themselves in a different light.

One of the reasons why Navy can come to you today and present the picture that we present is a reflection of where we were, more so than where we are. If this was in the mid- '90s, we would have a much different story to tell, and it had a lot to do with the way we prioritize funding for readiness, as well as the pricing for people. If we expect those kind of cuts to take place during the summer, what that does is, number one, introduce uncertainty for people who don't deserve uncertainty at this point, in terms of their level of commitment to us, because they don't know where the next check is coming, in some cases, as far as our civilian workforce is concerned.

Second, it introduces a new range of variables here, in terms of a force that's whole and a force that's serving as a strategic Reserve, a hedge, that's helping out with combat support and combat service support. And now we introduce a range of problems, here, that we haven't anticipated.

And so, sir, I would strongly endorse the comments made by my peers, here.

Senator THUNE. All right.

General McNabb?

General McNabb: Yes, Senator Thune.

When you go forth, you—as I listened to my fellow Vices, I would just tell you that I echo—I echo what they mentioned. We also see that, given the bridge, we're thinking about August as when we would end up having to have real problems. Starting in June, we start making adjustments. And, just as Admiral Walsh mentioned, if we needed to move money to help the Army and the Marines, obviously that will be worked out in the Department. So, we'd anticipate that we'd have to move that up. We would start looking at additional training, looking at the full-spectrum kinds of work that we have to do, and be ready to do tonight, as I was mentioning. And then, the depot and the spares is one of those things that—

it is this committee and the Congress's ability to give us those supplementals to make sure that those spares and the depot is fully funded, which has allowed us to maintain the readiness that we have, especially over in OIF and OEF.

When I look at the maintenance man hours per flying hour that is required today, versus where we were, say, back in '92, the increase in our fighter forces has gone up 74 percent. Give you an example: the F-15 has gone from 13 to 28 maintenance man hours per flying hours. Your spares and the depot funding that you've done has allowed us to keep that readiness high, even though you've gone up that dramatically. Our overall force has gone up 40 percent. Those are the things that you're making up for, and we really appreciate that. But, that's what starts being at risk if we delay the supplemental.

Senator THUNE. Also an argument for more, newer planes.

General McNabb: Yes, sir, absolutely.

Senator THUNE. General Magnus, 3400 marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, are currently deploying to Afghanistan. This deployment was not anticipated during the planning for "grow the force." What is the impact on the Corps, in terms of readiness and deployment-to-dwell measures, to this—of this added deployment—deployed requirement—deployment requirement?

General Magnus: Thank you, Senator Thune.

The 3400 marines that are deploying, which is the 24th MEU and its battalion, and, separately, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, which is deploying out of Twentynine Palms, California, adds to the approximately 350 marines that are already in Afghanistan; therefore, nearly 4,000 marines in Afghanistan.

Essentially, from last year, when we had added two additional battalions, for a total of eight infantry battalions, and we had moved a marine expeditionary unit ashore into Operation Iraqi Freedom, totaling over 25,000 marines. We reduced the number of infantry battalions by two. We reduced the MEU out of Operation Iraqi Freedom. But, as I said earlier, we simply extended one marine expeditionary unit that was at sea, we accelerated a second marine expeditionary unit that was going to go to sea later, and we took one and put a third marine expeditionary unit in Afghanistan, adding to it another battalion, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, and also adding an additional battalion in Iraq, to provide security forces for our installations, and a line of communication.

Effectively, there has not been a diminution of stress and tempo on the force. This—having said that, we trained these marines for the mission. We trained the marines that are going to Afghanistan for mountain operations and operations in an Afghan cultural and language environment, and they're working underneath General Dan McNeill and with our International Security Assistance Force partners, and they are ready for their mission. But, the effect is to prolong what we believe, similar to what our soldiers in the Army believe, is, over the long term, an unsustainable tempo for the force. To mitigate that, of course, we're growing the force, but growing the force lags the demands of current combat operations. Your marines will move to the sound of the guns when the Nation calls.

Senator THUNE. The—is this deployment an indicator of long-term changes in the Marine's role in Afghanistan? And how are you postured, in terms of manpower, equipment, and training, to support that role?

General Magnus: The shift of forces from Iraq to Afghanistan has us basically having our feet, if you will, in two boats at the same time. From a command-and-control perspective and from a logistics-support-ability perspective, this becomes very difficult, over the long term, to sustain. It's not just the number of battalions and squadrons, and the number of marines whose boots are on the ground; it's those critical enablers, as well as command-and-control and communications assets. So, as the Secretary of Defense and the President consider what force levels are necessary in Iraq, on receipt of General Petraeus's report, as they consider—and I know this—there's consideration going on, this week, and discussions over in Europe, about our strategy in Afghanistan—we need to consider, not just for the Marine Corps, but for the Joint Force, because the Army picks up a tremendous load, supporting Marines with logistics in theater, the Navy picks up a tremendous burden; there are more sailors on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait, than there are at sea. And, of course, our Air Force supports what the Marines can't support with our own air, particularly, of course, strategic lift. But, over the short term, we can support this, as the Commandant has said. We will do the—we do this because of a—of the—America's team that we're supporting. Over the long term, there has to be a posture reassessment, not only for the Marine forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, but for the overall force commitment.

Senator THUNE. Have you begun planning to provide replacement force to relieve the marines when their deployment completes, later this year?

General Magnus: Senator, we are always planning for contingencies. The—our preference is to recover the ability to bring down our overall dwell time, to be able to let these marines and their families get the rest, get the proper full-spectrum training, in case something else unpredicted happens, and, of course, to be able to refit them with the new gear. But, as I said earlier, we will do what the Nation requires. The Nation asked the Marine Corps to be ready, and we will move to the sound of the guns, when told.

Senator THUNE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Thune.

General Cody and General Magnus, this has to do with increasing Army and Marine end strength. Readiness improvements in nondeployed forces for the Army and Marines depend significantly on increases in end strength—74,200 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marines.

General Cody and General Magnus, how and when will you know if this level of growth is sufficient to meet demands for trained and ready forces available for deployed commitments and to restore our ground forces' strategic depth?

General Cody: Thank you, Chairman, for that question.

First, I'd like to put this in a strategic context, if I could, because it really speaks to what your Army's going through right now,

which is the largest organizational change since World War II as we transform while we're fighting—with 176,000 soldiers in combat today, we're transforming our units to the Army modular force. At the same time, we're restationing, as part of the global defense posture, 50,000 soldiers out of Europe and out of Korea. That impacts about 380,000 soldiers as we do all these moves. At the same time, we're executing the BRAC '05 moves, which affect about 304 posts, camps, and stations. We're doing all that while we're rotating, in and out of combat every year, about 176,000 soldiers. So, growing the Army by 65,000 in the active Force, and the Reserve Force by 9,000, is critical if we're going to be at this level of commitment downrange while, at the same time, executing BRAC, global defense posture, and rebuilding our infrastructure. And so, it's a very tightly woven plan.

When we build our six infantry brigade combat teams and our eight additional combat support teams as part of the active Force, that'll give us 48 brigade combat teams in the active, and, in the National Guard, 28 brigade combat teams, by fiscal year-11. That means the Army can sustain about 15 to 16 brigade combat teams deployed on the active side, and about three to four deployed on the National Guard side, with a 1-year-in/2-years-out for the active, a 1-year-in/4-years-out for the National Guard. Now, that is not our objective; our objective goal would be 1 year in, 3 years out for the active; 1 year in, 5 years out for the National Guard. But, once we get to 76 brigade combat teams, as well as the supporting brigades, we can sustain that level.

What—right now, we're at a higher level, and that is why we're at a deployment ratio of 1-to-1, and, in many cases, on our aviation units, our civil affairs and SIOPs units, our MP units, it's less than 1-to-1. We are fully funded for the equipment, and we have a very tightly woven plan to build these brigade combat teams. The first one, we built at Fort Hood, Texas. But—that, kind of, puts a strategic context I was talking about. We built it at Fort Hood, Texas, because the units were deployed. We didn't have the barracks for 'em. Their home is at Fort Knox, Kentucky. So, we built 'em at Fort Hood, Texas, moved their families down there, built that unit up. It will deploy in the next 3 months. We established it last year. It takes us about 15 months to build it. It'll be fully trained, ready to go. My nephew is in that unit, by the way. And they'll go to Afghanistan to relieve the brigade out of Italy. When it redeploys, it'll come back to Fort Hood for about 90 days, and then move to Fort Knox, Kentucky, because, by that time, the military construction will be completed.

And so, as we talk about growing the Army, you have to look at it in the complexity of BRAC, global defense posture, the resetting of our force, and the in-and-out transition of supplying trained and ready forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator AKAKA: General Magnus?

General Magnus: Chairman Akaka, thank you very much for the question.

We're building a force that will give the Nation three balanced marine expeditionary forces. That force will also have the time to be able to do the full-spectrum training that allows them to be ready for the unplanned and foreseen contingencies. Those forces

will be ready, they will be equipped. This will allow us to achieve a level of forces that future commanders and chiefs will be able to draw on, that will assure sustained tempos of operation, and still give us the 1-to-2 dwell for our Active-component forces, and a 1-to-5 dwell for our Reserve Forces. Of course, in crises, the Commander in Chief may elect to draw down even further on the tempo, but those are looking at spikes. We're looking at a sustained level of operations, where we build the force in the Marine Corps, just as the Army is building, so that we don't see the sustained operations themselves become the crisis, that—which is, of course, the problem right now, where the level of deployments we have right now, even as we build the force, are becoming a tremendous challenge for our troops, as well as for the institutions.

Building this force will give us marine air/ground task forces of combined arms, not only the 27 infantry battalions that we're building—and we've already built 26 of the 27 battalions; the last battalion is 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, which we built in the next year—but, along with that, our—large numbers of marines that wrap around the infantry forces that are core of the Marine Corps: artillery forces, tactical mobility on the ground, tactical mobility in the air, engineers, military police, 1,000 new marines trained in intelligence, command-and-control marines, fires—we have a battalion of HIMARS rockets that's going into 14th Marines in the Reserves, and a battalion of HIMARS rockets going into our Active component—those new HIMARS are already on the ground at Taqaddum in Iraq right now, at the battery level—and new aviation squadrons.

When will we be complete? Well, very difficult to predict the future, but the plan, right now, which has been well resourced by the Congress, has us on track to grow the force of marines to 202,000 well before 2011. It is the equipment, both the new equipment that is being procured as part of reset, as well as the depot-level maintenance of the remainder of the equipment, and, of course, the military construction, that will slightly lag behind the “grow the force.” We're looking for the stocks to be reset by around 2012, and the last of the new construction will follow shortly thereafter. But, our focus is on making sure that the marines are ready to be able to continue operations throughout this time, sir.

Senator AKAKA. General Magnus, about the Marine Corps non-deployed C ratings, last month's readiness briefing to the subcommittee made out the historically low levels of reported readiness in our Army and Marine Corps. The percentage of non-deployed units in the Marine Corps rated C-1 and C-2, or generally ready for full-spectrum, worldwide deployment, was significantly higher than in the Army. However, the Marine Corps has emphasized that it is not conducting any full-spectrum training; focusing, instead, in on counterinsurgency for Iraq or Afghanistan. General Magnus, how can such a significantly higher share of marine units be rated C-1 or C-2 if full-spectrum training is not currently underway?

General Magnus: Chairman Akaka, thank you for the question.

Of course, the exact details of that readiness reporting, I would be pleased to share with the committee or with any of the staff in a closed session. But, let me answer your question directly.

The readiness ratings, the so-called “C” ratings, of our forces—and that’s just not the Marine Corps, but our forces that are forward in Iraq and Afghanistan and other contingency operations—are based upon the mission that they are assigned. So, if we take an artillery unit, and make it into a provisional military police unit, or we assign it a road-security unit, which—mission—which is not in its mission as an artillery unit, then we rate it against the mission that is assigned. It’s called “percent effective.” So, they may be 100—and they should be 90- to 100-percent effective, depending upon the grade the skills of their personnel, and the kinds of equipment. They will have the highest ratings, as I told you earlier, for their assigned missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever else we have contingency operations. So, their ratings go higher because of the mission that they are assigned at war today.

The units that are back home, they are being rated against the global mission, the “what if” mission if something were to break out tomorrow.

So, as they deploy forward, they get assigned as their percent effectiveness against the mission that the combatant commander has assigned them; the remainder of the units are graded against the mission that they “may” be assigned, the full-spectrum mission, I said before.

So, our ratings—I can’t compare our ratings to the Army—and we certainly could discuss this in a closed session—but we have increasingly pushed the equipment, as well as the marines, to those forward to fight, and our units that are forward, and those that are going forward, are at the highest levels of readiness. And, as I said earlier, we are beginning to see the uptick, in the last couple of months, of the equipment readiness, the equipment- on-hand ratings for those that are not in the deployment cycle, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, General.

Senator Thune?

Senator THUNE. Gentlemen, if I could get each of you to comment. You’ve all provided Congress, recently, with a list of unfunded priorities to be considered in review of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2009. For the record, could you designate, from that list, the items that will affect current unit readiness, and a description of how that item will have a direct impact on the readiness of your service, and, in your opinion, what items from the unfunded list are most critical to unit readiness?

General Cody: Thank you, Senator, for that.

I’d like to circle back to your question you asked me on readiness, after I listened to my comrades, here. On the reset, if it’s late—you asked about readiness and how would it affect—what I should have told you, with a follow-on to that, was, if we don’t get that money, the residual money for fiscal year-08 GWOT, we run out of MILPAY in June for the Army. And that’s what the Admiral was talking about, in terms of the Department; we’ll have to look at how we shift. In July, we run out of operational dollars. And so, I was talking directly to the \$7.6 billion of reset, but the total 66.5, if we go through what we did in July or June of ’06, where we had to almost shut down all the operations in our Army, it would be a devastating blow, as General Magnus said, to the morale of our soldiers, that 176,000 of them are serving 15-month tours right

now—if we don't get that money on time, it affects MILPAY, and then it certainly affects our ability to provide operational dollars. So, it has a—more impact than what I stated. I was just dealing with the reset.

Having to deal with the money that we need, we're short light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles in the Army. The Congress has been very good about the \$56 billion that General Schumaker, our previous Chief, and I briefed you on, back in 2006. We're 17-some-odd-billion dollars short of equipment across the active, Guard, and Reserve, most of it in the National Guard. But, we do need light-, medium-, and heavy-wheeled vehicles, and the money we requested in the supplemental and in the fiscal year-09 base budget, we need. We need the trailers, we need the night-vision devices, and the aviation support equipment and avionics, our radios. Those are the key items that will enable us to reset our force faster and to provide the National Guard with the equipment that they need for their dual use.

Senator THUNE. General Magnus?

General Cody: Senator, thank you, again, for the question.

We submitted an unfunded programs list to the Congress, as requested, earlier this year. That total request was \$3 billion. We didn't prioritize that request, but let me tell you the basis for the request.

We are already, today, 98 tactical aircraft short in our inventory, in the midst of a war. Most of those aircraft lines have closed, so the few aircraft lines that are open, both the fixed wing and the rotary wing, are the ones for which we submit a request where we have inventory shortfalls. As a result of that, we requested approximately \$600 million for new-aircraft procurement, both to replace aircraft that were lost due to combat action, those that are lost to other attrition, and pre-existing inventory shortfalls when we started this war. That includes three UH-1 utility helicopters, two Cobra attack helicopters. Additionally, we were short on aerial refuelers, and we are modernizing a force where the KC-130F and R tankers are two generations old and aging, and their reliability and maintenance man hours per flight hour are rising rapidly, in a war where tactical airlift and tactical aerial refueling is important to us. So, we have requested, on the unfunded program list, an additional KC-130Js off of that Air Force production line.

Separate from the aircraft, we're concerned about our ability to do our—one our core competency missions, which is forward presence in peacetime from the sea, as well as amphibious forcible entry operations. The Navy is doing yeoman's work in increasing the amount of ship construction that it can, to be able to provide ships to support marines at sea. We have requested, now, for the second year running, the Navy and the Marine Corps, support from the Congress for a tenth LPD-17. Our concern about that is really a near- to long-term problem. The Gulf shipyards which are capable of producing these ships are about ready to lose 1,000 skilled workers, and the line is about ready to close, and the amount of amphibious ships that are necessary to carry marines in peacetime, as well as in combat operations, is not at the level that the CNO and the Commandant want, and, unfortunately, our constrained budgets did not allow that to be funded.

And lastly, perhaps not the same kind of visibility that's normally associated, but is our 20 MILCON projects, for about \$300 million. That is probably the longest lead time to be able to provide something for our troops and for their families, is proper bachelor enlisted quarters, proper working spaces. And we have requested that we—because we are accelerating the “grow the force,” that we have asked for an acceleration of these military construction projects.

Thank you, sir.

Senator THUNE. Admiral and General, if you might—my time's about out, and there's one other question I want to ask—if you could submit, for the record, just those—the response of that question, it would be very helpful.

General McNabb: Yes. [INFORMATION]

Senator THUNE. And, General Cody, General Casey's been very candid about the impact of the deployments on Army readiness. And, in testimony before this committee, on—November of last year, he said that, and I quote, “Our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it. We will act quickly to restore balance to preserve our All- Volunteer Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities, and build essential capacity for the future,” end quote. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, last September, he said that the Army is—and again I quote—“unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies,” end quote. Which potential contingencies do you think are greatest—at greatest risk?

And, second question, followup question, would be, Where does Congress need to focus resources, in the short term, to mitigate those risks?

General Cody: The—right now, as I testified—and I've been doing this for 6 years; as you know, I was a G-3 of the Army, and a Vice Chief now for almost 4 years—and I've never seen our—a lack of strategic depth be at where it is today. And, as I told you and the Chairman, we're rotating these 23 brigade combat teams, but that's what you see; you see those flags. What you don't see is the 300- plus training teams, the aviation brigades, the MP units, the 86 security-force companies that are also a part of that 176,000 force that have to be retrained, artillerymen doing infantry jobs. And so, when we talk about restoring strategic depth, it's—it will go quicker with our brigade combat teams, because they are doing some of their combat work in counterinsurgency force, and they will come back up quicker. It is our artillery forces and our other forces, that are doing nontraditional jobs, that we worry about the most. Right now, all the units that are back at home station are training for—as I said before, to replace the next units in Afghanistan and Iraq. And if the surge comes down the way we predict, and we get so many troops back, and brigade combat teams back, and we can get the dwell time right, we will start getting those units trained to full- spectrum readiness for future contingencies. I don't know where those future contingencies are, but I do know that this Nation and this Joint Force needs to have a division-ready brigade, a airborne brigade ready for full-spectrum operations, a heavy brigade combat team ready for full- spectrum oper-

ations, and a Stryker brigade combat team ready for full-spectrum operations. And we don't have that today.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.

General Cody, you just stated that the Army is short of vehicles—light, heavy, and medium. My question to you is, Why, then, has the Department of Defense just reduced your 2008 supplemental request for medium tactical vehicles by \$2 million, which would mean buying only about 12,575 fewer medium-tactical vehicles this year?

General Cody: Yes, sir. That speaks to timely funding. We put that money in for the fiscal year-08 GWOT supplemental. That was for the family of medium tactical vehicles. Because we did not get all the money up front, and now we're looking into the fiscal year—later fiscal year-08, we cannot execute those dollars. And so, when we looked at what was remaining of the 66.5, as well as—if you remember, for a short time, it was also a foreign metals problem with parts of the transmission and other things that—I'm not as up to speed as I should be—we looked at it, and we said, "We can't execute those dollars, and so, those"—we offered that back up to Department of Defense, and said, "We'd like to use those dollars on joint urgent operational need statements" that have come into the field since we submitted the '08 supplemental. In January and February, we got some more operational need statements that we can execute with that money, with the caveat that we need to put that money into the '08-'09 supplemental when we can execute it. It was a timing issue. Had we had the money in October/November of '07, we would have put 'em on order.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, General Cody.

This question is for all the witnesses, having to do with depot maintenance baseline and backlogs. Each of the services' base requests underfund their annual depot maintenance requirements, and, as they have done so for many years, pushes significant parts of it into the war supplemental appropriations. I'm very concerned that the services will become trapped in an enduring inaccurate and inadequate depot maintenance baseline well beyond the war, and beyond reset. The question is, What are your views of the practice of pushing large portions of annual maintenance requirements into supplemental requests? And what are you doing to ensure that your service will know its true maintenance requirements and funding baselines after Iraq and reset?

General Cody?

General Cody: Chairman, as I stated, this country is blessed that we have these five depots. They truly are a national treasure. And we need to re-evaluate how we sustain their funding in the base. As you know, the—much of the direct labor hours I discussed, the increase of almost 18 million direct labor hours across those five depots, almost all of that labor is being paid for out of supplemental dollars. As we build the '10-to-'15 POM, part of getting in balance of our Army is not just in balance, in terms of supply and demand for brigade combat teams, is getting in balance our depots and putting into the base funding the requisite amount of OMA

dollars and procurement dollars to be able to sustain an Army that we believe is going to be in this level of conflict for some time.

And so, you'll see, as we build our programs, that the—we've looked at the last 5 years, at each one of our depots—and I've got my charts that I can give to your committee—and you can see the steady rise of the direct labor hours and the steady rise of procurement dollars that's required for resetting our equipment. And we're using that data to build the new base for our base budget for '10 to '15.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

General Magnus?

General Magnus: Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.

Quite frankly, sir, the fiscal guidance always defines our problem, every year. Of course, there's always more needs than there are funds for the needs. But, in a time of war, the baseline budgets, which I know have grown significantly over the past 6 years, are still inadequate to meet, not only the needs of the incremental costs of war, but the effects on the baseline planning, which, of course, could not foresee the impacts on our equipment and on our installations.

For the United States Marine Corps, similar to my sister services and my fellow Vices here, about 65 percent of the Marine Corps' budget, about 65 cents on the dollar, is the military pay that supports the Marines. And that includes the Defense Health Program, the retirement accruals. But, that's a—of course that's a must-pay bill. The Marine Corps' premier weapons system is the United States marine.

When I account for the necessary operating and maintenance funds to make sure the battalions and squadrons can do what they have to do, to make sure that the installations can support them, what I'm left with is, How much money does the Commandant have left every year to do essential warfighting investment, essential infrastructure investments, such as those bachelor enlisted quarters—and we have literally doubled, and then tripled again, the amount of funds we're putting in bachelor enlisted quarters, in the baseline, to make sure that we can house the marines that we're growing—and then, what's left are the long-term costs about equipment sustainment, and that includes depot maintenance, and the long-term costs of facilities sustainment. And there aren't—when there aren't enough dollars, we end up making some very, very difficult choices about what things cannot be funded.

So, I would simply say that our intent, as General Cody has indicated, as we are working through what our fiscal guidance will be for what will be the President's budget for fiscal year '10, the program objective memorandum '10 through '15, the Marine Corps wants to fully fund one depot maintenance shift, because, if we are working in excess of one shift—and, of course, we are, today—that will be a direct result of the effects of combat operations.

Thank you, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Admiral Walsh?

Admiral Walsh: Chairman, I'd like to add to the comments of my colleagues by just saying that the effort here, on our part, is, number one, to recognize the importance of depot-level maintenance, for

the points that you raised and mentioned earlier. We've gone through this before, where we haven't fully funded maintenance. We've lived with the outcome. We had poor availability. It resulted poor morale, poor quality of life. And so, as I look at our numbers of maintenance that's actually done by supplemental, it's relatively small, by comparison to the overall aviation and ship maintenance accounts, but it is something that we're continuing to try and migrate back into the baseline.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Admiral.

General McNabb?

General McNabb: Yes, sir. I—just like everything else, you have to deal with risk. And, obviously, if we look across our accounts, and we look at people, we look at readiness, we look at facilities, and we look at modernization and recapitalization, that's the part that we've got to do the balancing, just as General Magnus had mentioned. And so, as we look across those accounts, and we say—depending on how much money we have, we will figure out how we balance that risk across all of our accounts. And we understand that OSD and then the Congress will look across all of this and say, "Okay, you're too risky here," and we'll balance that across the force to make sure that we've got the very best force that every dollar can buy. I—and this is part of that.

We did take risk in our facilities. We did take risk in our people. Our Chief and Secretary testified, a couple of weeks ago, to that effect, and said that we simply cannot—we cannot do—take any more risk in recapitalization and modernization, nor in the readiness of being able to do the kinds of things that this committee is so interested in doing.

So, those are the two places that we went, okay, how much can we take, and what could we end up being able to manage in execution year? We are not happy—I'm not comfortable, as the Vice Chief, that we're about 77-percent funded in our DPEM account. You will see, on the required—in our unfunded requirement list, that we do have about 600-plus million on—for the DPEM. And that is the risk that we're assuming, that we know that we'll have to figure out how to make up an execution year by figuring out better ways to do things.

That is not a comfortable position. It is exactly where we are on—pretty much across—which I know the other services are in exactly the same place, as we try to manage the risk across all accounts.

Senator AKAKA. I'd like to ask that question you just raised, about the risk. And my question would be, What kind of risks to your readiness is created by depot maintenance backlogs? And the question to you, then, to all of you, is, What are you doing to control it?

General Cody?

General Cody: The—as we have gone through the last 5 years of ramping up our depots—when you talk about backlog, it's a function of how quickly you can get the equipment back from the combat zone, how quickly you can order the long-lead parts, and how quickly can you mobilize more workforce to be able to do this type of work? We're doing 12,000 recapitalizations a year, just on Humvees. We're recapping all our HMTs. As you know, we're re-

capitalizing our entire tank force of our Abrams tanks, at Anniston. On any given day, we will have almost 100,000 radios, between Tobyhanna and Letterkenny; over 125,000 machine guns and—50-cal machine guns—we'll do at Anniston. That's the level that we're talking about.

And so, when you don't have timely funding, you push a bow wave of either having to make a choice of having workers—right now, we're not doing that, our workers are—at the depots, are working every day, and, in some cases, like at Red River, they're working 7 days a week on our track pads and our road wheels to keep these tanks and Bradleys with their tracks—the bow wave is really in the long-lead items—the engines, the transmissions, and the long-lead items that we have to go back to the vendor to get and order. And that's what creates our backlog.

And I go back to my theme: full and timely funding. We have Lean Six Sigma in our depots today. As Admiral Walsh talked about how fast the depots are doing things, we—it used to take us 120-some-odd days to recap a turbine engine, down at Corpus Christi; they're doing it in less than 45 days today. I mean, we have Lean Six Sigma efficiencies, teaming with industry, to take care of that backlog. But, what creates the backlog is not having timely procurement dollars to buy the repair parts so you can keep that workforce going. And then, if you don't have the OMA dollars, and you have to start laying them off, or threaten to have to lay them off because you don't get the money in time, that causes backlogs, as you have to regen-up your force.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

General Magnus?

General Magnus: Mr. Chairman, thank you—Chairman Akaka.

Currently, our—in terms of backlogs, our only depot throughput problem is the availability of what I'll call “carcasses,” when we have out-of-production major end items of equipment, such as our light armored vehicles, we're literally having to go, not only to the bone yards, but go up to the Canadians, which are making them for foreign military sales, and be able to see if we can get carcasses. Because we have plenty of capacity. And the truth is, of course, as you indicated earlier, Chairman, that this is all being funded by a combination of baseline and supplemental, but we have no problem with our own industrial capacity, and we have not—I've read many stories about backlogs—we have been working hand-in-glove with the United States Army; we have no problem with the prioritization of work by the Army's depots, which do a lot of Marine Corps equipment, especially our Abrams tanks.

We are—we have had great success, and are continuing to work to increase the efficiency at our Marine Corps Logistics Depot at Albany and in Bartow, in California. Again, as General Cody said, the Congress has continued to provide us the funds that are necessary to keep the depot capacity working, and it's working at a—well above its peacetime rate. We simply request that the Congress continue to appropriate the funds that are necessary to keep the depots working at a wartime rate.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, General.

Admiral?

Admiral Walsh: Mr. Chairman, what I would add to what my colleagues have already mentioned is that, in the case of Navy, when we developed our fleet response plan, we recognized that, in order to provide for more availability of our ships, that we were going to have to manage very closely the workload inside the depot and the shipyard. And so, when we looked at this, we realized that we were going to need to work very closely with the manpower and the—in the depot leadership, as well as the shipyard leadership, in order that we could provide an even loading and not change requirements on them, so they could anticipate and be ready. What we've found in the case over the last four carriers that have gone into overhaul or extended periods of maintenance, the four of them have come out on time and on budget. In the case of Stennis, she came out a day early and underbudget. So, we continue to apply the lessons that we've learned here, and we value the funding that goes into this account, because it gives us the kind of predictability and readiness levels that we need for our forces.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

General McNabb?

General McNabb: Yes, sir. Primarily, what we—how we deal with this is, we prioritize our assets of what's going in. If we don't have full funding, if we're not in—if we end up saying that the depots—just like the Army, I had already mentioned how much more efficient our depots have gotten, and we're seeing that. Again, with the—with the great help of the committee and the Congress, we've been able to continue that kind of funding. But, what we do in—when we don't have enough money is, we prioritize all our assets, and we say, "Which ones are the most important, and which ones have to go first, which ones can we take, again, risk on?" But, we look across the fleet and say, "Which is the least capable of our assets, or which ones are not pertinent to the war or our strategic deterrence?" that I mentioned before. So, we will then do that.

We—right now, our depots are doing superb, and they're stayed up—like I said, 98 percent on time, which is unbelievable, and we will continue—we'll continue to push that.

The other portion that I would like to mention is that we're also looking for ways that we can share our best assets, our most capable assets, with the total force. We used to have 16 associate wings in which Active and Reserve or Guard shared airplanes. We are now extending that, under total force integration, to say, "If you've got a new asset that is really capable, if we've invested those kind of dollars, we need to make sure that we share those." And we have sharing relationships now, between the Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty, that are actually unprecedented, and it is really making a difference, to make sure we bring the most capability to bear that we can.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Senator Thune?

Senator Thune [presiding]: Gentlemen, if the—the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves just released a report that drew attention to the high OPSTEMPO and deployment schedule for our personnel in the Reserve components. And the Commission went on to question whether a Guard unit, in particular, were adequately trained and ready for State and home defense missions. In

your opinion, does the current readiness reporting system accurately assess the readiness of Guard units to respond to homeland defense tasking and emergency requests by the Governors?

General Cody: Senator, I'll take that, because I have most of the Reserve components.

First off, you'd—there's no requirement, that I know of, for readiness reporting to the Governor as to what he would use his forces under State control. What we do have is Northern Command, and the Army's component of Northern Component is Army North, where we're establishing, as you know, the consequence management response force, of which National Guard units are part of that. I believe that we have to go back and take a look at the mission sets that we would need for what we call the CCMRF force, to ensure—and—that we have the right mission essential task lists and the right pieces of equipment for dual use in response for homeland security. But, the National Guard units and the USAR units report their sea readiness, their combat ratings, for the mission that they're designed to do, which is a wartime mission.

Senator THUNE. I guess that's—I don't know, General Magnus, do you want to comment? I know, General, you do have most of that—most of the components, as you mentioned, under your bailiwick, but—

General McNabb: Senator, could—

Senator THUNE.—General Magnus, if you want to answer—

General McNabb: Oh, go ahead.

Senator THUNE. Or I—Air Guard, General McNabb, do you want to react?

General McNabb: I'll see if—Bob, do you want to go first, or do you want me to?

General Magnus: I will cede part of my time to—[Laughter.]

General Magnus:—my distinguished colleague.

General McNabb: No, Senator—probably our total force is one of the things we're the proudest of, is the way we've done that, and how we've integrated the total force across the board. And when we set up our air expeditionary forces, we took into mind that we will not have tiered readiness, and there will be no difference between our Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty.

Fifty-three percent and 20—53 percent of our Active Duty and 20 percent of our Guard and Reserve are on call right now in support of a combatant commander. That can very quickly surge to 80 percent, if required. If the balloon goes up, we mobilize, and we do the whole thing.

That is the part that we—by not having tiered readiness and having the same standards across the force, what a difference that makes, so that we can very quickly bring that to bear.

So, that's the part that I think that has really paid some dividends for us, and we're trying to take that to the next level, again, with these total-force initiatives. How could we share—how can we even take this to a different level, sharing airplanes at Guard and Reserve bases, having Active Duty people stationed there, be able to take full advantage of that? We think that's really paid some big dividends for the country.

General Magnus: Senator, for the Marine Corps—clearly, of course—and General Cody's right, the—America's Army and Amer-

ica—the Army total force bears the balance of the Reserve component in the—and its National Guard. The Marine Corps Reserve, of course, is not part of America's National Guard, but, as I indicated earlier, we're building the 27th of our Active-component infantry battalions, which is the centerpiece of our combined-arms force. In addition, there are already existing nine Reserve-component battalions. Those nine Reserve-component infantry battalions are just part of the 36,000 marines that are in selected Marine Corps Reserve units.

All of the selected Marine Corps Reserve units are measured against their wartime mission. The Marine Reserve units that deploy to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and wherever else they may be deployed in the global war on terrorism, will be measured in their effectiveness of the assigned mission. So, as I said before, if we have an artillery unit that becomes a provisional infantry unit, they will be measured against their infantry mission. We will train them to it. We will equip them to it. And they will be at the highest levels of readiness before they deploy.

General Cody: Senator, if I could, part of the Army's rebalancing—not to get in balance by 2011, but the rebalance that we've been doing since 2003—was to take a look at the active component and the Reserve component. And if you remember, back before the war started, there was a lot of combat forces inside the National Guard, a lot of heavy brigades. And what we did as part of the rebalance, we said what we needed to do was take a lot of that structure out, because it's not dual-purpose. And, quite frankly, it was too hard to keep full-spectrum-trained. And so, part of the rebalancing of the force to help the Governors, especially in the hurricane States—it doesn't help a Governor, down in the Gulf, to have a heavy brigade combat team in his State. It is much better, though, if he had truck companies, engineer companies, engineer brigades, medical units. And so, as we rebalance the Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—we've built 28 brigade combat teams to give depth to the total Army for combat. And then, the rest of the force, we took, in the National Guard, with the help of the Governors—and we had most of the TAGs, as part of our General Officer Steering Committee, to take a look at it—and we balanced out and created what we called the engineer brigades, the maneuver enhancement brigades. And so, most of the States will be supported by that and a lot of combat service support.

The real issue for their readiness in the—that the Governors are concerned with, as we are, is their equipping. And, as you know, they were short equipment when this war started, and what we have done is, we monitor their equipment every year before the hurricane crisis—or the hurricane season comes in. I review with every TAG—the ten hurricane States—we review their equipment. We've got programmed, for fiscal year-08, 1,000 trucks, 441 trailers, and hundreds of generators. But, in '06 and '07, we gave—we were able to procure and push out 3900 trucks, 352 different type of engineered brand-new equipment. And over the—'08 to '09, the distribution for the National Guard will be about 400,000 items. And most of it is in the combat- support, combat-service support that is dual-use for some type of natural disaster, that would help the Governors.

Senator THUNE. That—and you kind of answered my question, but I was going to get at that point of how you—when it comes to distribution of equipment, do you take into consideration the Guard's State and homeland security missions and whatnot. And—

General Cody: Yeah, we have fenced that money—since I've been the G-3 and the Vice Chief, we have fenced all the Guard equipping dollars, especially what we call dual-use equipment, so that we can build back that for the Governors.

Senator THUNE. Okay.

Well, I think that's all we have, gentlemen. Thank you, again, for your service. Clearly, these are issues which I—my takeaway from all this is, we need timely supplemental funding, for one; and, obviously, my view, increase in the top line to deal with a lot of the competing demands. You're trying to do more and more with less, and robbing from Peter to pay Paul, and I just don't think we can continue to run the military that way.

But, thanks again for your testimony, thanks for your service. And make sure that you let those who serve with you and under your command—let 'em know how much we appreciate their service.

Thank you all.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]