

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE
ARMY'S NEW DOCTRINE (FIELD MANUAL 3-
0, OPERATIONS) IN REVIEW OF THE DE-
FENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 2009 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM**

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

U.S. SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Lieberman [presiding] and Cornyn.

Committee staff members present: None.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Professional Staff Member, and William K. Sutey, Professional Staff Member.

Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano, Professional Staff Member, Paul C. Hutton IV, Research assistant, and Gregory T. Kiley, Professional Staff Member.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Ali Z. Pasha.

Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy, Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh, Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb, Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill, and Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S.
SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good morning and welcome to this hearing. I was going to start with an apology that I've got a little bit of a sore throat, but the sound system is so good that I'll just make believe that I'm all right.

I want to welcome Lieutenant General William Caldwell, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. This is the first of two Airland Subcommittee hearings this week that focus on changes to the Army's Capstone operational doctrine, that is the definitive statement about war and how the Army expects to fight and win and keep the peace and what those

changes mean for organizing, equipping, training, and employing the U.S. Army.

At the outset I want to both welcome and thank my colleague and ranking member Senator Cornyn for the work that he and his staff have done in a real collegial fashion to help the committee carry out the oversight responsibilities which we're involved in this morning.

We are here today to continue the important and urgent task of deciding what kind of Army America needs to have for the future security and freedom of our country.

The fight against Islamic extremists has been the defining national security issue of the past 7 years, that is since 9-11-01. America's ground forces and especially the Army have been asked to carry the brunt of that fight and have done so exceedingly well. But of course that has also caused some stress on our forces.

Not only has the tempo of operations been extraordinarily high, but the Army has had to rapidly shift between conventional warfare and irregular warfare. In 2001, Special Operations Forces, some on horseback, but employing state of the art electronics, accompanied Afghan forces into battle to successfully overthrow and evict the Taliban from Afghanistan, the place from which the attacks were planned and launched against the United States on 9-11-01.

2 years later, Army heavy brigades defeated Saddam's Republican Guards and raced to Baghdad to topple that murderous dictator. No sooner had the conventional phase of the war concluded than the Army found itself confronting Iraqis in irregular warfare, while at the same time conducting stability operations and nationbuilding.

As the range of missions expanded, the Army had to reorganize some units, give others tasks for which they were not previously organized, equipped, or in some cases trained, and the Army was forced to develop and field equipment it had not previously envisioned needing. The fact is that we were simply not ready for the aftermath of Saddam's defeat, certainly not as ready as we should have been.

The full Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings last year at which the Army leadership and some of the most respected and thoughtful retired officers and outside experts addressed the question of what kind of Army do we need for the future. All the witnesses agreed that we went to war in 2001 with the world's best conventional Army, but many of the experts also said that the subsequent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of that largely conventional Army in successfully fighting the kind of war we are in now, and that we will probably have to continue to fight in the years ahead.

Of course, the Army has adjusted, as have the Marines and the other services, with remarkable skill in dealing with the new threat environment.

Last year's full committee hearings brought forth what I would describe as two conflicting recommendations for organizing, training, and equipping the future Army. The Army's recommendation, which is embraced I would say generally speaking in the new Capstone doctrine, was to increase the size of the Army, create more

brigade combat teams, and to add to some low density, high demand capabilities, to give the brigade combat teams full spectrum capability, to better deal with both irregular warfare and conventional warfare.

The different recommendation from some of the outside experts it seemed to me was to build an Army substantially changed in both size and structure by creating specialized units to match the changes in conflict and doctrine.

So there was a difference of opinion expressed and a debate that began, a healthy debate. It's an important one, too, and the choices we make as we sift through it are consequential to our future security. I found the analysis and recommendations from the outside experts to be both interesting and at some points persuasive, so I don't think that we should in the interest of our National security simply accept the Army's different recommendation without examining it and its implications closely, particularly because we in Congress are the people who will now be asked to both authorize and fund the vision of our future Army.

I think we've got to answer three basic questions: First, for what will we hold the Army responsible? Will we insist on an Army ready for all possible combat and non-combat operations, on the full spectrum from stable peacekeeping to general warfighting? Should we build a force ready for the full spectrum of missions, but prioritized from higher, more dangerous or likely threats, to lower, less risky or unlikely threats? Or should we build a force only for specific missions on the conflict spectrum and, if so, for which ones?

Second, what operational doctrine should the Army adopt that provides for the greatest probability of success regardless of threat or intensity of conflict or commitment? Should the Army, as it proposes, combine the ability to execute offensive, defensive, and stability, civil support missions simultaneously and for long duration, or should it adopt some other concept?

Third, how should the Army organize, train, and equip to execute its doctrine? Should the Army continue to organize around brigade combat teams that could be tailored for specific missions or should it build both conventional units and specialized counterinsurgency training and advisory and stabilization and reconstruction units?

The Army recently released, that is earlier in March, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which is its new Capstone doctrine and is really an answer to some of these critical questions. It places the conduct of stability operations, significantly, on the same as the same operationally required level as conventional warfare. As the Army Training and Doctrine Command has said, this fundamental change redefines our basic notion of combat power from how we generate it to how we apply it, and its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine I think will be —well, I'm quoting, and I agree—“will be revolutionary.”

General Wallace, the TRADOC commander, also notes that “FM 3-0 adds to the Army's requirements for resources and will influence the Army's organization, training, equipment, leadership, education, and soldier concerns.” I believe that he's right and that a change of this magnitude therefore requires a thorough vetting. We've got to answer the question, what kind of an Army, in a way that makes this Army fully capable of successfully implementing

this revolutionary doctrine. Of course, I hope that today's hearing will do exactly that.

The fiscal year 2009 Army budget request was developed over a year ago and delivered to Congress before this new Capstone doctrine, of course, was released on March 7 of this year. The budget request is heavily tilted toward resetting, modernizing, and transforming the existing heavy force. But I think we need to determine whether it includes enough money to fund the changes that the new Capstone doctrine logically and inevitably requires or whether the existing budget has shaped those requirements. And we need to find out whether we should begin to make changes to either the programs or the priorities that have been requested. That includes whether the existing authorization of end strength for the Army is sufficient to implement the Capstone doctrine that the Army issued less than a month ago.

Hopefully, our hearing today will begin to answer those questions. I will note for the record that on Thursday the subcommittee will ask the Army for an update on its modernization plans, equipment modernization plans, with an emphasis on transformation to the Future Combat Systems, which this subcommittee has over the years proudly played a leading role in supporting.

We will also ask how the Army intends to modernize and transform the individual soldier to ensure that we begin now to build the right Army to protect the security and freedom of our country and our people during the generations ahead.

I thank you for hearing me out on that opening statement and I'm now honored to call on the committee's ranking member, Senator Cornyn from Texas.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You too.

Senator CORNYN. And thank you for scheduling this hearing.

General Caldwell, thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony and your answers to the questions that the committee propounds.

Of course, today the subcommittee will receive testimony on the new Field Manual for Operations. This edition of the field manual represents the first major update since 2001 and was crafted from the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that's what I would like to focus some of my questions on. The appropriateness of the Army, as opposed to other, and the military, as opposed to other institutions of the Federal Government, how those will be coordinated in order to leverage and maximize resources—my impression is post-Katrina there was some discussion about giving the uniformed military services additional roles in natural disaster relief because, frankly, I think most people view the military as the most competent institution in the Federal Government. But the problem is that with that competence and professionalism, it can clearly be stretched too thin and overloaded and perhaps given missions that are inappropriate or divert it from its main mission. So I'd like to talk a little bit about some of that.

Recognizing the Army's long commitment to the development of military doctrine, this can be traced back to the Continental Army and Valley Forge in the winter of 1777 and 1778. I'm reminded of the connection between the release of this most recent—of the most recent counterinsurgency field manual, just in terms of talking about what the impact of these manuals can have, the impact of that counterinsurgency field manual and the revised strategy we've had in Iraq, which has from my perspective turned things around in a way that's very positive, and I'm not the only one that feels that way, obviously.

In 2006 the Army and Marine Corps released the new Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations. It had been 20 years since the Army had published a formal field manual devoted to that subject, and of course General Petraeus oversaw the preparation of that field manual. In 2007, just a month after the release of that field manual, President Bush announced a new strategy in Iraq and that new strategy has been sometimes referred to, of course, as the surge strategy, but closely parallels the doctrine advocated in that new Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

Now, a year later, the subsequent improvements in security in Iraq have been notable and I believe demonstrate the extant connection between doctrine, strategy, and change.

General Caldwell, in today's discussion of the Army's new Field Manual on Operations I'd like to ask you a little bit about how and in what respects you consider this to be revolutionary and whether that revolutionary change is in fact something that the Army can do, given the fact of our international commitments and the fact that, as Senator Lieberman said, end strength concerns remain and stresses on the military given its current mission, and what changes that you would foresee in the institutional Army and the organization of the Army's combat formations, the requirements for future systems being fielded to the force, the roles and missions of the Army Reserve and the National Guard, and the mobility requirements of the Army and the training of young officers and non-commissioned officers.

I'm particularly interested in whether a career path for a military officer conducting stability operations is something that would be considered a plus or a minus and how we deal with that very practical concern.

In addition, I'd like to ask you a little bit about how this field manual can be harmonized with joint doctrine and how it has been received by our allies, coalition partners, and other agencies and departments in the Federal Government with whom the Army and the military need to work to bring all aspects of U.S. power to the table.

It's our Army's soldiers, of course, who will execute this doctrine and learn the new lessons that it requires. Thus, General Caldwell, we're going to ask you a little bit about the kind of feedback that you received from soldiers.

There's no doubt that our Nation will require more agile, responsive campaign quality and expeditionary Army to meet the challenges of persistent conflict and change that will characterize the strategic environment well into the 21st century. I'm confident that

this field manual is an important contribution to the Army successfully meeting the high demand for Army forces and capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for calling this important hearing and I look forward to the testimony.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn, for that excellent statement. I appreciate what you said at the beginning about the Army. I was just over in Iraq again about 2 weeks ago, and our military is an extraordinary experience in our society. It's hard to find another group like it that has a sense, a similar sense of purpose, resourcefulness to respond to changing environments, a tremendous sense of loyalty within the group to one another, and a sense of real pride in what they're doing for our country.

So it's in that spirit, General Caldwell, that I welcome you again, as I stated for the record, Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in which capacity you have overseen the drafting of this new field manual and doctrine. We welcome your testimony now. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH

General Caldwell: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sir, if you don't mind, I have a written statement I'd like to submit for the record.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Without objection, we'll include it in full in the record.

General Caldwell: And then I just have a brief opening one. If I may, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and other members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to come here today to discuss on behalf of our Army our new Capstone manual, FM 3-0, Operations.

As you know, my command at the Combined Arms Center has oversight of our Army's 17 schools and centers across the country, which have the responsibility for doctrine, leader development, lessons learned, capability development, cultural training, education, and knowledge management. This wide variety of responsibilities and capabilities, combined with the tremendous pool of subject matter experts, gives us a unique insight into the state of our Army and helped us to shape this Capstone manual.

As the intellectual center for our Army, the Combined Arms Center plays a central role in shaping what will become the operational Army, from the doctrine that guides the actions of our forces to the structure and capabilities of those organizations that prosecute those actions, from the training and education that prepares our soldiers for the uncertainties of the future that we see ahead to the leader development programs that produce those creative thinkers and those adaptive leaders that are absolutely essential for our Army in this era of persistent conflict.

Your Army's role through transformation and beyond remains to fight and win our Nation's wars. However, this new doctrine puts stability operations and civil support, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, on an equal footing with offensive and defensive operations, institutionalizing our commitment to support and integrate it in a whole new governing approach to future operations.

This approach will not be easy and it will require a renewed commitment by all within our Nation's government. Your Army can win every battle and every engagement. We will never lose. But we alone can never win the peace. This can only be accomplished through an integrated effort by both uniformed and civilian personnel, working in the same synchronized manner as our joint forces do today.

Additionally, this manual recognizes the unparalleled power of information that we are seeing here in the 21st century. Our Army is asking more of our soldiers than ever before and it is our responsibility as leaders to empower them with the road map, the skills, the decisionmaking abilities to complete their missions. Probably more than at any time in our Nation's history, our Army requires flexible and agile forces with the capability to conduct joint and multinational operations at any point across the spectrum of conflict.

The new FM 3-0 reflects what we believe to be the blueprint for the future of our Army, one that will take us out the next 10 to 15 years. Although the environment in which we operate will consistently change, the constant will be our soldiers. I ask you to join me in sharing and saluting their incredible sacrifices and join me in reaffirming our commitment as leaders to provide them with the right combination of skills, the training, the equipment, and the leadership they need to accomplish the mission we have set before them.

With that, sir, I'm prepared to take whatever questions you might have. [The prepared statement of General Caldwell follows:]

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, General. We certainly join you in that commitment to our troops.

Let me ask you a couple of—I think we'll do 10-minute rounds and see how long we continue to have questions for you.

Let me go back to my opening statement and ask you to respond to what I believe I heard at the hearing that the full committee held last year on the future of the Army and try to relate that to this new Field Manual 3-0, which is that—and this is obviously taking a lot of testimony and simplifying it, but there seemed to be a difference of opinion as to whether, essentially, the existing brigade combat team structure could be made into a full spectrum structure or whether, on the other hand, we needed to develop highly specialized units to engage in the different kinds of operations that the Army says it will have to engage in, from low intensity peacekeeping, stability operations to the broadest notion of general warfighting.

So did I hear that correctly and what's Field Manual 3-0—what's the answer that Field Manual 3-0 in your opinion gives to that good healthy debate we had before the full committee last year?

General Caldwell: Sir, it's an excellent question, and I can tell you from the symposiums we conducted out at Fort Leavenworth just over the last 8 months that I've been in command out there, that was one of the very subjects we took on and addressed, because it is a great intellectual debate and it's one that should be done. Out of that, though, the position that the Army has taken we have codified in the Field Manual, is that in fact we will take these brigade combat teams, this modular force, and develop within it

the abilities so that it can in fact conduct full spectrum operations from literally peacekeeping type operations to major combat operations, rather than developing unique and specialized forces, other than, obviously, our special operating forces. We will continue to grow.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So do I understand correctly that the vision, the policy decision in the Field Manual 3-0, is that each of the brigade combat teams will have the full spectrum capabilities?

General Caldwell: That's correct, sir. Now, as you know, Mr. Chairman, there are 76 brigade combat teams in the total Army. We have another 223 additional combat teams that are of other types. We have taken—we've recognized that elements like civil affairs are critical in this type environment. So from one active duty civil affairs battalion, we now have an active duty civil affairs brigade, and we're growing to two active duty civil affairs brigades.

So it's not that the brigade combat team alone can do it all, but there will need to be other combat-type multipliers that can be augmented with them and support them in that effort. Fortunately, through the authorization that the Congress gave us, we're growing the Army by about another 76,000 people, and in that growth we will find those additional enablers being added into the force structure that will give us that enhanced capability.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So what were the people who were on the other side of the debate last year and at the symposium asking as you understood it? That, essentially that the existing brigade combat team structure and organization be set aside and that you organize separate units for separate purposes? Was that the debate?

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. Obviously, if you take a tank battalion, about a 600-person unit that's got to go through the qualifications of tank gunnery and learn how to operate as a combined force, and then as a combined arms force, and then ask it to do something like stability operations, entirely different skill sets are being applied at that point. So there will be a decrement in their tank gunnery skills and their ability to conduct tank operations, which they're going to have to go back and recalibrate.

But in fact, we recognize that with the agility we have built into the soldiers today in our Army—I mean, Mr. Chairman, we literally have—I brought today with me behind me Captain Kuhlman. Captain Kuhlman just came out of Iraq, has just been assigned out there to work with me. I asked to have him because I had met him one time when I went to the Beiji oil refinery.

He's an infantry company commander from the 82nd Airborne Division. He went over there with his 140-man company with the primary mission to bring peace, security, and stability to the country. The next thing he knew, he had an area of operations and he's now responsible for literally helping run infrastructure. He's got the Beiji oil refinery, the number one major oil-producing oil refinery in Iraq. He's handling the electrical plant, he's dealing with the local governance committees. He's working through corruption issues. He's having to deal with the inter-agency.

He literally has taken on, become a full spectrum type adaptive leader that we're finding across the Army today, that are just doing incredible things. Through our educational process, the experiences we give them, the training that they have, and now they find them-

selves in this case in this situation in Iraq, and he's having to apply all those diverse kind of skills, as are his soldiers, as he can talk about how he took and formed Task Force Oil with a young sergeant E-5 and a young specialist, who took on working within the plant on a daily basis to understand better the operations of the plant.

I mean, these are military members who are having to work at that full spectrum.

In the debates we had at Fort Leavenworth at the symposiums was whether or not there should be an organization that doesn't have tanks, that is given the sole mission to conduct stability operations, that becomes very specialized in those skills. The challenge you do find as we've continued this debate is, Captain Kuhlman still had to conduct force on force combat operations at different times. It wasn't like he was free of the ability to not have to worry about some external threat.

And as they found themselves being more successful in reducing the level of the corruption and increasing the output of oil through the refinery there, in fact the insurgents did in fact start conducting more attacks against his forces and against the truck drivers and other things like that, where he was then required to use his military force in response to that. So he became a full spectrum unit operating over there in Iraq.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, that's a really interesting response and story. I guess in a way you're saying that there will be some specialized units to supplement the brigade combat teams, but—and this gets to the individual soldier and certainly the individual officer, such as the captain you've described, which is the remarkable, you might call it, agility or resourcefulness that our troops have demonstrated in Iraq, and Afghanistan, but I'm focused on Iraq now, that allows them to do this range of assignments.

Is there a way you try to train somebody to be an officer like this, or do you count on—

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. And sir, that's a great point. Out there, as the educational director for our Army on behalf of our chief of staff, that's in fact what we do at the Combined Arms Center, with our 17 schools and centers. We have taken a lot of time and effort to inculcate into the educational process the development of those very skills.

The importance of taking this manual—sir, I spent 30 years in the Army. I was in Panama and then had to work the aftermath when we had to get the basic services going and stand up the police. Then I went to the Desert Storm and found the same thing up in Iraq. Then I went into Haiti, did it all over again, you know, trying to get the police stood up and trying to get basic services going.

Here we are now in Iraq, we are doing the same thing. The Army has always withdrawn from those kind of skill sets after we've been required to do them and we have had to do them in every conflict, and has refused to inculcate them into our educational process, to recognize them and to say that this is a responsibility that we have to be able to execute. We now have done that in FM 3-0. We have observed what's occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 6 years. It's in fact a skill set that they're demonstrating on a daily

basis, those remarkable young men and women in uniform, and we have codified it now and said, this will be something that we're going to capture and bring into the educational and training process and put into our doctrinal manuals, so that we don't lose that skill set in the future, but rather continue to reinforce it and, as you asked earlier, sir, reward those and develop the incentives so that if in fact they have done those type of skill sets it's something that's recognized by our Army as being very important and not something that's not important.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, that's an excellent answer. So in a way, we train the brigade combat teams for full spectrum, but we're training individual soldiers to have the really mental acuity and individual leadership capability and resourcefulness to deal with an array of different problems. What you're saying is that FM 3-0 now accepts an institutional responsibility of the Army to the best of their ability, of your ability, to train our forces to carry out that range of responsibilities, and in fact puts it at a level that's equal to the traditional warfighting.

General Caldwell: Exactly right, sir. And that's so important because there are those who are very comfortable with offenses and defensive, you know, the kinetic type operations, and the recognition of making stability operations as equally important, recognizing that we simultaneously are executing all of those in these current operations today and will in the future, now is in fact reinforcing and going to reward those who in fact engage in those type activities.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was great, thank you.

Senator Cornyn?

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Caldwell, this significant development of this field manual to incorporate into Army doctrine the requirement of stability and civil support in a much more formal sort of way, do you see any conflict between the traditional warfighting function of the Army and providing enhanced responsibilities for these kind of operations, or do you believe it's inherent in that warfighting capability?

General Caldwell: Sir, I believe it's inherent, and it's something we'll be doing for the next 10 or 15 years. We've spent a lot of time looking at the threat out in the future and examining that as part of this manual development, and one thing we do say is that there will continue to be these type of operations for the next 10 or 15 years.

Senator CORNYN. After 9-11 we heard a lot about stovepipes in the intelligence community, and of course in the military we've been working a long time to build a joint capability between the various branches of the military. But I'm wondering whether it's time to look at removing some of the stovepipes in terms of all U.S. Government power through greater inter-agency cooperation, to perhaps engage in a more meaningful way from my perspective the State Department and other U.S. Government agencies in these stability and civil affairs operations.

Could you comment on that?

General Caldwell: Sir, I have three objectives out in my command. One is leader development, obviously; and the second is the

inter-agency. And I am aptly passionate and cannot agree with you more. If you just take our educational process, where we have to start it, if you go out to the Command and General Staff College, our mid-grade level leaders at 10 years we're bringing out there and educating, I have 1100—I'm the commandant of the college out there. I have 1100 majors. 100 of them are from other nations. I have 82 different nations represented to give me the international flavor so that we can have that kind of cultural dialogue exchange between us.

I have 200 from the other services, from the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines. I'm down now to about 800 Army officers. I have three from the inter-agency. Two of them are from the Diplomatic Security Corps and one is from the Defense Intelligence Agency. I literally have for the last 8 months, have put a team together to try to somehow get the inter-agency to participate and be a part of the educational process, because if we don't train and educate together we're going to be challenged when we go into the type of situations we see in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Sir, just having come out of Iraq, I can tell you that the members of the U.S. Government that are there other than the military are incredible heroes, putting forth a 110 percent effort. They're absolutely committed and dedicated and they're working every day with us. But they just aren't resourced and funded to be able to do what's necessary there, nor in this case to provide, like students, who can come out to the Command and General Staff College and spend 10 months in an educational process with all those other students out there, to enrich the training environment so that we educate and train ourselves as we will find ourselves operating in future environments in the world that our Nation may commit us to.

Senator CORNYN. You mentioned funding and of course the key to—a key to stability operations that you outlined are the provincial reconstruction teams and their efforts to rebuild key infrastructure. A large portion of the PRT funding, the economic support fund, was in the fiscal year GWOT supplemental funding request. In December, Congress appropriated only \$15 million out of the \$797 million requested to fund the provincial reconstruction teams.

In your opinion, how does this impact the PRTs' ability to provide stability operations?

General Caldwell: Sir, it obviously starts much earlier, because the other branches of the government are challenged to find the people to put into the PRTs because they aren't resourced with that kind of expeditionary capability. Given, though, that the members that we do find there—the PRTs are essential if we're going to eventually transition and provide greater stability and quality of life for the Iraqi people or the Afghan people.

Captain Kuhlman can share a personal example of how, here he is at the Beiji oil refinery, where you think you would find every element of U.S. Government engaged up there, and he has one person that he's able to find from a PRT that's nearby, who's coming in and working with him and helping provide some connectivity back into the whole government, and that's it. Had it not been for that PRT, had it not been for that one department person outside the U.S. military, he would have had no outside engagement with him through his first 6 or 7 months there in trying to figure out,

how do we help the government of Iraq get the Beiji oil refinery, its major number one refinery in the country, more operational and functioning better.

Senator CORNYN. I was interested to see in chapter 7 of the field manual, it's about information superiority and particularly information operations. Information operations divides into five Army information tasks, with particular emphasis on information engagement. Could you explain a little bit what you see as the role, the proper role of the military when it comes to information superiority?

General Caldwell: Sir, in the 21st century, as we all know, the information medium has exploded, and the messages and ways people can transmit information has quadrupled. So the question is are we as a military going to understand and embrace this information medium and establish the procedures, the methods, the means by which we can in fact use it to educate and inform others and help work and understand that the perceptions of the people, because we're working among the people, in fact becomes reality, and therefore your actions on the ground, that of the American soldier, he or she and what he or she does on a daily basis has a tremendous impact.

But then there's also the other medium of conveying a message through the Internet, through radio, through TV, through newspapers, that are out there, and we need to understand better and take advantage of. We haven't fully embraced and taken hold of that medium yet. We need to. It's critical to the 21st century.

Some people call it "soft power." In the Combined Arms Center we prefer to call it "smart power." It's taking these nonlethal elements like information and figuring, how do we take and use that in the 21st century, where in fact force on force is not necessarily the means by which you're going to achieve an objective, but rather informing and educating people and making them understand what's going on will in fact many times change their behaviors and their attitudes much more quickly than anything else will.

So this information medium is absolutely paramount. It's a major change in this manual. Of the four—if you were to say what are the four major things, one of them of course is elevating stability operations equal to and as important as offensive, defensive. Another one is this information domain. I had the opportunity yesterday to talk to every public affairs officer in the United States Army at a worldwide public affairs conference and share with them and talk to them about this information domain, because it is so critical and they're a key element of helping us get at that. They're not alone in this effort, but they're an aspect of it, because we do have to figure it out if we're going to better inform and educate others about what the objectives are of our U.S. Government.

Senator CORNYN. Well, I'm glad to see the emphasis on that and the emphasis on that issue, because frankly I think the enemy we are confronting is a master of using information tactics to enhance, to advance their cause. I remember being with a group, a bipartisan group of members of this committee, in Kirkuk in August of 2003 with General Odierno and General Petraeus at the time, and listening to a briefing of the good work that was being done there,

and must marveling that that information just never seemed to get out.

Obviously, in terms of the public support for the mission of the military, I think it's important for the public to know what the military's doing and not to leave it to the halls of Congress for people to spin and sort of characterize it for whatever their motives might be, but actually to get good solid information. So I'm glad to see that the field manual does view that as an important part of the function of the military, to make sure that information, accurate information, does get out in a way that enhances our ability to do the job.

Mr. Chairman, I'll turn it back to you for right now.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn.

General Caldwell, let me come back and ask you to talk some about the process that led to the field manual and the Capstone doctrine that we're focused on, which is a very important document. The first question is, what were the Army's assumptions about the likelihood of employment of Army personnel at different points on the conflict spectrum over the next generation and the resultant priority among expected missions?

In other words, did you go through a process where you reached some assumptions about whether it was more likely that you be called on for conventional, irregular, or stability operations, and if so what kind of priority was there?

General Caldwell: Sir, we did in fact do that, and our assumption is that we will be called on over the next 10 to 15 years on a somewhat "regular" basis, and that in fact there will be more of the lower end kind of operations, not major combat operations.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So lower end, define it a little bit for the record?

General Caldwell: The best way I could tell you, being responsible for helping put together our Army doctrine, we're rewriting right now our Army training manual, the manual that will tell you how we're going to train the United States Army. What we have done, sir, we've laid out that spectrum of conflict and we have actually put a circle on it and said, here is the area in which we think we'll most likely see U.S. military forces operating over the next—

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean geographically or in terms of?

General Caldwell: Geographically, yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And what—

General Caldwell: Well, we haven't published it yet, sir. We're publishing it in about 90 days. We're out briefing it. We're conducting the sensing sessions. We're talking to the other services. A lot of like we did with FM 3-0, to ensure there's not something we've missed before we publish this.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's very important to know. So hopefully this hearing can be a part of that process, too.

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. And what we're telling everybody is that, instead of focusing on major combat operations, we're going to focus on slightly less than that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So give us an example of what slightly less, something we've experienced?

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. Like out at our Combat Training Center, sir, at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness

Training Center, instead of just having major force on force operations, we have over the last couple of years now been building large urban areas out of different elements, makeshift towns. We've hired on lots of Afghan Americans or Iraqi Americans, depending on what unit is going to go to what area of the world, and have brought them in and they're doing role-playing, and they're in native costumes, with organizations set up. Then we bring the unit just before it's prepared to deploy about 3 months out there for what we call a mission rehearsal exercise, where they're rehearsing their final mission before they deploy and have them actually exercise and go through about a 10-day iteration out there, giving different challenges, situations changing, very dynamic depending on what they do and how the people react, so that—putting them through the challenges of IEDs and everything else we do.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So is it fair to say that you think that we're going to face more situations like we're facing in Iraq and Afghanistan today in the next 10 or 15 years, or are those more large-scale than you anticipate as the most significant responsibilities the Army will be asked to take on?

General Caldwell: Sir, our assumption is that there will be like type operations in a smaller scale.

Senator LIEBERMAN. On a smaller scale. And then how about, what ranking do you give stability operations?

General Caldwell: Sir, we really do see it as coequal to—I mean, it truly is. I know we say that in doctrine, but when we put them out through our—and again, I have oversight for our Army, of our combat training center exercises. You know, the Army has given us, we educate, we write it in doctrine, and we also collect the lessons learned, and then we go out and do the collective training, too, out there.

So we've in fact incorporated that in so that everybody has to go through the stability operations aspects when they're doing a rotation at either the Northern Training Center—the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me go back to the question that I raised on my first round and just see if I can ask you to focus in on this aspect of it, which is, in the same way you've described some of the assumptions that you've made about the likelihood of the threat environments or activities you'll be called on, what was the process that you followed that led to your decision to rely more on the full spectrum general purpose units than on the specialized units organized, trained, and equipped for specific missions?

In other words, you made a decision here that did reject an alternative view and I want to understand on what basis you made that decision.

General Caldwell: Sir, what we're experiencing over the last 6 years in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that a military unit when it goes in, who may be one day conducting stability operations, can very well the very next day be conducting combat operations. Given the complexities of that environment, it's just not sterile enough where you can just do one thing.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So the alternative view is in some sense unrealistic, is that what you're saying, the one that focuses on more specialized units?

General Caldwell: We want specialized like units that can bring in and augment.

Senator LIEBERMAN. To supplement or augment.

General Caldwell: That's absolutely imperative, sir, like I said, with the civil affairs. One battalion was not enough for our United States Army. We're literally going to have six times as much here because of what Congress gave us in allowing us to have the growth we're experiencing right now.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So I think I better understand why you made the decision, and it was that in what you see as the normal circumstance now it's not—and this is why I used the word “realistic”—it's not realistic to think you can send in one unit to perform one kind of operation and have another ready for another operation, whether it's on the conventional, irregular warfare spectrum, or information, or peacekeeping, stability operations. Presumably based on what our troops are being called on to do now, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, that their presence there puts them in a position where it's much more realistic and, I suppose you're saying, efficient to train those units for a broad spectrum of responsibilities, rather than thinking you can send in specialized units to deal with whatever problems emerge.

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. And I can share a personal experience. One of our great coalition partners, the Republic of Korea, has sent a unit into northern Iraq that is providing great stability operations assistance. That's all they're able to do and that's all that their government has allowed them to do. They're providing medical care and training in how to operate heavy machinery. They're educating them in bakery goods. I mean, they're doing a lot of great things for the people of Iraq.

But they're very, very limited in what we can do with them. They're only able to stay just within their operating base and, although they're able to perform self-defense if attacked, we are unable to use them for anything else. So if some incident occurs in a nearby town, we have to bring in additional forces from outside the area to in fact assist the Iraqi forces.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you about another assumption. You had a very interesting, I think important, exchange with Senator Cornyn about the fact that we know that the Army and the Marines are being called on to perform an extraordinary range of functions that go well beyond what most people would think our military should be doing or would be asked to do. And we're very lucky, blessed, that you're doing it so well.

But you get very little help from other Federal agencies and as a result you're doing stuff not only that in the normal organizational chart we would assume that the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Agriculture Department—you could go on—would have been asked to do, but they don't have the personnel to do it.

So my question is, is one of the assumptions that you've made here as you put together this new doctrine that in fact in the next 10 to 15 years you won't, the Army won't be getting much more help from other Federal agencies than you are today?

General Caldwell: Yes, sir, it is. But we also talk about—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Talk about reality. I'm afraid you may be right, but it's unfortunate.

General Caldwell: But we make sure that they understand how critical it is that we don't want to ever lose, and continue to push, to try to get the whole of government engaged and involved in this process. Again, sir, I'd just go back to my personal experiences. Literally, I sat there in Panama after we did Just Cause, and I remember my division commander turning to me and saying: Okay, Bill, how are you going to get the police force up now? I was the plans officer. And I said: Get the police force up? We haven't even thought about that.

And what we went through. And then I watched in Haiti. Again, it was standing up a police force and working to get ICITAP and Ray Kelly down and everything else, and then how are we going to pay them and what are the standards. And then I walk into Iraq, sir, and it's *deja vu* all over again.

So this manual, which I am very thankful we're finally codifying it there, has recognized the importance of that aspect of stability operations and ensuring that it's in our educational processes and we do train to it and we have discussions about it.

We're writing right now, sir, FM 3-07, called "Stability Operations." We in fact will host an inter-agency conference on it, an inter-agency conference, out at Fort Leavenworth in the late part of June for 2 days. We in fact will have the ambassador who's in charge of the Department of State security and reconstruction come out and be our keynote speaker, because he understands how critical this is to the whole of government. And he's assisting us, his office is, greatly in this effort, as are many elements of the U.S. Government. But at the same time, everybody recognizes they don't have the resources they can contribute to the effort.

But we're still going to write the manual. We'll have it out by this fall and it will be truly a U.S. Government manual. Although it will have an Army stamp on it, it will be anything but an Army manual. It will be a "How the U.S. Government should conduct stability operations." We will not publish anything that everybody is not comfortable with, because it's that critical to us that we have it right for the whole—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good for you. Look, we've got an obligation on our side, and obviously whoever is president in the years ahead has the same obligation, to try to get some of those other Federal agencies to pick up more of the responsibility.

But in the mean time, again it's amazing what the Army is doing and the Marines are doing over there on the ground. You know, people talk about economic development and microfinancing and building up sort of self-government, the Iraqis' capacity to protect their own people and local police forces. It's astounding the range of functions that the Army is carrying out successfully on our behalf.

I know General Petraeus said to me at one point that the CERP funds are so critical that he'd trade a lot of other things he's getting money for so he'd have enough of that CERP money, because that's actually helping, now that the surge has created some security, to build the country back up, to help the Iraqis take control of their destiny. It's quite something.

Senator Cornyn?

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, there was some criticism that going into Iraq we sort of were looking for a replication of what happened in Afghanistan, and we found something entirely different due to the failure of intelligence to let us anticipate what we in fact encountered. I don't mean from a military standpoint. I mean in terms of the disintegration of civil society, the insurgency, and the like.

Are you concerned at all that this field manual, responding as it does to the current need for increased stability and civil affairs operations, is a response to what we've experienced in Iraq, that may or may not be present, a need that may or may not be present in future conflicts?

General Caldwell: Senator, that's a great question. We've had a lot of discussion on that. The lessons we have learned over the last really 7 years now from both Afghanistan and Iraq have been taken and used in helping formulate this manual, but it's much more than that. It's also, as the chairman asked, what assumptions do we make in trying to look to what we're going to foresee that we could face in the future, and then having that as a major building block, too.

But very much so, we are influenced by and wanted to ensure we didn't lose the lessons learned from the last 6 or 7 years.

Senator CORNYN. My notes tell me here that more than 90 percent of civil affairs troops are reservists currently. Could you confirm that or not? And do you expect the regular Army as it adopts a larger role in the stability and civil affairs operations to—now that it's been doctrinally elevated to a core Army mission, is it going to change the need to have more of that capability in the regular Army?

General Caldwell: Sir, I'd have to come back to you on the exact percentage. I don't believe it's 90 percent any more. But I would really want to come back to you if I could on that and give you a definitive answer I'd like to be correct.

But what I can tell you, sir, is we only had one active duty civil affairs battalion when 9–11 occurred. We're going to have six of them very shortly. It's an acknowledgment of how critical that asset is, and that will be six in the active-Duty Force, not—there will be still some in the Reserves, but it's going to be six in the active-Duty Force, because we also recognized that we probably had—that we did put too much of it into the Reserve component. Again, but it's because we had not said stability operations is equal and is as important as offensive and defensive operations. We have now, and in doing so therefore must have more civil affairs in the active force.

Senator CORNYN. As this becomes a core Army mission of stability and civil affairs operations, I read one article suggesting that some military officers may not see this as particularly an advantageous career path leading to a promotion. Are you concerned about that?

General Caldwell: Sir, I am. I can tell you one thing that we have just done in the Army, too. We have taken and put all our leader development under the Training and Doctrine Commander. In fact, today General Walsh is chairing the first of the quarterly

leader development reviews so that we can look specifically at leader development issues. They were very much dispersed across the Army in different areas. We've now just in the last 6 months have pulled them all together. We have a team out at Fort Leavenworth that's working this for him, and we're having our first quarterly review today, which literally will include everybody in the Army, from the Army G-3, the G-1, our personnel people, our training and doctrine, our forces command. They're all coming and meeting, with General Walsh chairing the session, as we work through and then not only prioritize these leader development things, but then put the resources against it, which is the part that has also been missing. So that he has been given the authority to move resources within the Army, so that we ensure if we say this is our number one critical thing that in fact it will be resourced so that it occurs, which would then follow on with things like board instructions that give instructions for promotions and acknowledgment of how important those kind of skills are.

Senator CORNYN. We all know that the current conflicts in which our Nation is engaged have put a lot of stress on the Army with repetitive deployments. Of course, one way we're responding to that is by growing the end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. Does this change in the Army field manual call for any changes in your opinion with regard to the numbers of new members of the Army or the Marine Corps that we're going to need?

General Caldwell: Not directly, sir. If we're trying to figure out end strength, I think perhaps what we do is we look at what do we think are the mission requirements and then what are the forces to accomplish those missions.

Senator CORNYN. I guess to clarify my question maybe, since we're talking about more than offensive and defensive operations, more than just being the most lethal force on the planet, but expanding the role, it would seem to me you're going to need more people if your role is going to be expanded. Now, maybe you'll tell me you're doing it anyway now and really it's just sort of recognizing reality. But I would be interested if you do believe—and you can certainly take it under advisement, come back to us if you think there is any need to increase the numbers or growing our end strength in the Army or the Marine Corps as a result of this new core requirement of the field manual.

General Caldwell: Sir, what I can say, in the current growth that's been approved, the 72,000, over 65 or so is active duty. That's where in fact we're doing the civil affairs growth and some of these others. You know, as we say, this doctrine is evolutionary in nature because there has been the acknowledgment that these kind of things have been required, but it's revolutionary in that we codified it in writing. So that's the revolutionary aspect of this.

So in the growth that the Congress did approve already for the United States Army, a lot of that is already starting to occur and has been looked at. I will tell you there are still ongoing reviews, again because we also do that out of Fort Leavenworth for the Army, in the overall force structure. We are not finished with it. There are still dialogues and discussions. And we will go back here in about 2 more weeks with another major series of events that will lead up to about the 1st of July where we will go back to the De-

partment and make a recommendation on some further changes within our force structure.

Senator CORNYN. I appreciate your candor in responding to Senator Lieberman's question about whether you can rely on other agencies of the Federal Government to perform this function or whether the Army is going to be—the uniformed military is going to have to do it because, frankly, there is not going to be a lot of help from elsewhere. I would be interested if you have recommendations—I believe your staff and mine have talked a little bit about—what over and above the Army field manual and this elevation of this stability and civil affairs operations to a core part of the Army doctrine, what other ideas you might have about how we could engage the full spectrum of the Federal Government to assist.

I think you've acknowledged reality and I happen to agree with you under present circumstances. But I don't think we ought to give up. And if there are things that we could do that would supplement or enhance this capability of the Army in providing these operations by funding or training or some other reorganization of U.S. Government power, I would appreciate the benefit of your thoughts, ideas on that.

General Caldwell: All right, sir. We'll come back to you on that, sir. And you are right, sir. Our staffs are engaged, and I appreciate that dialogue that's been going on. [The information referred to follows:] [SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Cornyn. Very good questions.

I just have a couple more. I want to pick up on one of the exchanges with Senator Cornyn about end strength and whether the new doctrine, field manual, requires additional end strength even beyond what we've authorized. Let me focus in on this part of it. To carry out these full spectrum of missions, you're going to need good time for training of our troops. Under the current deployment schedule, obviously, there is less time, to some extent even less resources. The institutional Army has been cut back some to enable the Army out there on the field to carry out its responsibilities.

So my question is, as deployments are more frequent do you see that the Army will have enough time to train our troops to carry out the extraordinary range of responsibilities that the doctrine will give them individually?

General Caldwell: Sir, with the current deployments that are ongoing today, we are only able to train our forces for the mission which they have been directed to execute. So in fact the forces that we are sending into both Iraq and Afghanistan today are trained not to conduct high-end operations. We in fact recognize what the environment there is and we train them for that environment. It still requires them to have the capability to conduct force on force and stability operations, but they are not taught to conduct major force on force operations.

We in fact are sacrificing that part of our ongoing training so that they are fully prepared and ready for what they will face in Iraq or Afghanistan. We call it their directed mission essential task list.

It takes about 18 months dwell time in between deployments in order for us to get at the full spectrum of the military skill sets which every military unit needs to have the capability to execute. Right now, as you know, we're at about a 12-month rotation between deployments. So therefore we are challenged and have a difficulty in getting at that full spectrum.

But what we do ensure is that every man and woman who is deployed into theater has all the training they need for that environment upon which they're going to operate.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I hear you. So I think you're doing the best you can and really damn good under trying circumstances. I think as you consider some of the questions that Senator Cornyn asked, I'd like you to consider that question of whether there's a real need for greater end strength to allow the Army to train our troops more broadly for the missions, the broad spectrum of missions that they're going to be given under the new field manual doctrine.

You know, my own hope—I appreciate your testimony today—is that this is the beginning of a dialogue. I understand this is a proposal that you're now vetting and I hope that you'll continue, if you will, to vet with us also, because we have the ultimate responsibility, obviously, along with the President, but Congress has a unique responsibility under the Constitution to fund our military. And I think we want to understand what the doctrine is and make sure that we can support it and also to fund it, so that we're reducing the stress that the Army is feeling in carrying out the responsibility that you take on for our country.

General Caldwell: Yes, sir. Sir, if I could just say, from having again had the privilege and opportunity to serve with our men and women over there, we are extremely grateful for the support that the U.S. Congress has continued to give to us, and the American people. It's just absolutely overwhelming. Never seen anything like it in my military career. We're greatly appreciative. On behalf of all of us serving in uniform, I just want to say thank you very much.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, we owe it to you. This has been, as is obvious in this room, a controversial war in terms of the politics of it. But I think what's not controversial, although the two occasionally have bumped into each other on the floor of the Senate anyway, is our support for the troops. I think the general notion of supporting the troops is broadly held in our society. Sometimes the specifics of how we do it in terms of funding on the floor has come into confrontation politically.

But I go back to what Senator Cornyn and I both have said. This is a remarkable Army that has found itself being asked to do things that really it could not have anticipated—maybe it should have anticipated, but it didn't—it would be asked to do, not just within the foreseeable range of Army responsibilities, but all these other departmental responsibilities that the other agencies of the Federal Government are not carrying out, not picking up.

It's really one of the great untold stories of this conflict, both Iraq and Afghanistan, the tremendous human commitment by individual soldiers to make this work, beyond the warfighting—living in the neighborhoods, interacting with the people. When I was there, not this last time 2 weeks ago, but the time before on

Thanksgiving, I was hearing one of the marines telling me about how they used some CERP funds to help the local imam fix up the mosque and not a lot of money really, but a tremendous impact on the attitude of the local population toward us and toward their own future.

So bottom line: Let's continue the discussion.

I have some further questions which I'm going to submit to you in writing, for you to answer in writing. We'll keep the record of the hearing open if Senator Cornyn or I or you want to add to it, for 15 days from this date. But for now, thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your leadership and, through you, thanks to all the men and women who wear the uniform of the U.S. Army and are performing with extraordinary honor and effect. Can't thank you enough.

General Caldwell: Thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]